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ABSTRACT 
 
Previous comparative research into the determinants of voting using aggregate data has 
suffered from two limitations: it relied predominantly on country-level data; and it seldom 
ventured beyond a consideration of one or two types of elections. In order to overcome these 
shortcomings, we use an original dataset in which data are aggregated to sub-national units; 
and include examples of national, sub-national, and supra-national elections. A total of 66 
elections between 1995 and 2008 are included, drawn from ten Western European countries: 
Belgium, England, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden.  
For each country, the same sub-national geographical units are used for all election types, 
allowing the direct comparison of the effects of our selected institutional and socio-
demographic variables. We find that the effects of the institutional determinants of voting are 
substantially and systematically reduced as the salience of the election type increases. For the 
socio-demographic variables, no such systematic relationship with salience is found. However, 
for some variables, the direction of effect is the opposite for European Parliament elections to 
that found for Municipal and Lower House elections, and supports the idea that EP elections 
differ sufficiently from sub-national, second-order elections to justify their ‘third-order’ 
classification. When we turn our attention to the effects of the socio-demographic variables in 
five individual countries, we find that the results are often consistent across different types of 
elections, and for all five countries. However, we also find that the effects of some variables 
have different effects in different countries. In these cases, we suggest explanations which 
relate turnout differences to wider political and social factors.   
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
This thesis is about electoral turnout in Western European countries: how it varies 
between different types of elections, and how it varies from place to place. We 
investigate the role of institutional and socio-demographic factors in explaining the 
levels of turnout in national, supra-national, and sub-national elections. In addition, we 
examine whether these variables are consistent in their effects when we consider the 
differences in turnout across the geographical regions within individual countries. We 
use an original dataset which combines election turnout data, characteristics of the 
electoral system, and socio-demographic information about the electorate. In contrast 
to much previous comparative research which has used country-level data, we use sub-
national regions as the unit of analysis. This means we can look at how turnout varies 
within countries as well as between them; in so doing we find that, although there are 
similarities, these are often outnumbered by the differences.  
In this introductory chapter, we first consider the reasons for studying participation in 
elections, then provide a brief overview of how characteristics of elections and of 
electorates can influence turnout. Although a number of determinants of voting have 
been suggested by previous research, we suggest that there are reasons to expect that 
the relationships between these and the level of turnout may vary from one type of 
election to another, and from country to country. We then consider the relative merits 
of individual or aggregate data for our investigation, before concluding with an outline of 
the chapters which follow. 
Why study elections? 
‘Elections are the lifeblood of democracy’ (LeDuc, Niemi et al. 2002:1), and citizens are 
expected to play their part by voting in elections (Dalton and Klingemann 2007). That not 
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all citizens vote in any given election is nothing new, and improving turnout by changing 
aspects of the electoral rules was considered as long ago as the Roman Empire (Staveley 
1972). Similarly, it has long been known that participation rates can vary with different 
electoral systems or the characteristics of individual voters (Gosnell 1930). More 
recently, perceptions that turnout is low or declining has led to renewed interest in 
those factors which are associated with different patterns of turnout. Unequal 
participation by various groups within the electorate can influence who gets elected and 
hence the policy choices which are ultimately made. Because elections are supposed to 
provide the means by which public preferences can be legitimately transformed into 
collective decisions, non-voting poses problems for representative democracy (Lijphart 
1997; Saward 2006). There are important, normative reasons, then, for wishing to better 
understand the reasons for variations in turnout. Further, because various aspects of 
elections and electorates are easily quantifiable, the study of electoral participation is 
particularly attractive to those researchers who seek to uncover regularities and 
patterns, and thus to suggest reasons for observed behaviour (Taagepera 2009).  
Determinants of voting? 
Not surprisingly, then, turnout in elections has long been the subject of research. The 
resulting literature is extensive, as is the list of factors which have been suggested as 
influencing electoral behaviour.  In this thesis, we will focus on three main areas: 
institutional factors; the relative importance of different elections (salience); and the 
socio-demographic characteristics of the electorate. Later, we will discuss these areas in 
more detail, along with a review of the literature relating to turnout in elections. Here, 
we will provide a brief overview in order to provide some context to the rest of this 
chapter.  
3 
Institutional Factors relate to the electoral system and associated rules, such as the 
degree of proportionality of the electoral system, or whether voting is compulsory. The 
effects of these factors can be usefully discussed with reference to rational choice 
theory1 (RCT), which suggests that individuals take into account the costs and benefits 
involved when deciding on a particular course of action. Although voting is usually seen 
as requiring less effort than many other forms of political activity, voting is not entirely 
without ‘cost’ to the voter. At a minimum, some time has to be spent in casting a vote, 
and that time could be used doing something else. Various electoral arrangements can 
influence this decision. An obvious example is when voting is compulsory and non-voters 
are penalised in some way; the costs of non-voting increase and the result is that more 
people vote. Alternatively, arrangements may reduce the costs of voting, for example by 
holding the election at the weekend when people may have more free time. Rather than 
affecting the costs of voting, other institutional factors may enhance the perceived 
benefits: thus, a more proportional system may encourage people to vote because there 
is more chance that their vote will ‘count’ (see, for example: Blais and Carty 1990; 
Jackman and Miller 1995; Massicotte, Blais et al. 2004; Norris 2004).   
The importance of the election can also be seen in terms of rational choice theory. 
Different types of elections are not viewed equally by the electorate (nor, it might be 
added, by political scientists), but vary in how consequential, competitive, visible, and 
meaningful they are: in short, some are more ‘salient’ than others (Karp and Brockington 
2005; Louth and Hill 2005). Those that result in the selection of the national government 
or the president are known as ‘first-order’ elections, and attract a high number of voters 
- turnout of around eighty per cent is common in some countries. In other types of 
elections, such as those for the local council or for the European Parliament, there is 
                                                             
1 Which is discussed, along with its shortcomings, in more detail in Chapter 2 
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‘less at stake’, and turnout is often markedly lower than in first-order elections. These 
less important elections have often been considered as ‘second-order’ elections (Reif 
and Schmitt 1980). That turnout should vary with the importance of the election makes 
sense from a rational choice perspective: the potential benefits are smaller in lower-
order elections but the costs of voting, at least in terms of actually going to the polling 
station and physically casting a vote, are the same. In lower-order elections, then, more 
people weigh these factors and decide not to bother.  
Socio-demographic factors. As we have seen, turnout is influenced by various 
characteristics of the electoral system and by the importance of the election. However, 
in any given election, with its associated set of electoral arrangements, participation is 
not even across various groups within the electorate. These different levels of turnout 
are often seen as reflecting different individual-level characteristics among the 
electorate. One such characteristic which has received a lot of attention is education: 
although voting is relatively straightforward compared to many other forms of political 
participation, it has been suggested that some minimum level of skills or resources is 
necessary. Education can contribute to those skills and resources, and therefore better 
equip citizens with the tools to overcome the opportunity costs of voting. Further, as the 
number of years spent at school or university increases, individuals are likely to become 
better informed about politics in general. Thus, it could be expected that better 
educated voters are more likely to vote. This has indeed been shown to be the case 
whether we examine turnout differences within, or between, countries2  (for example, 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998).  
                                                             
2 However, although overall levels of education have increased in the past few decades, turnout 
in many countries has fallen. Various authors have sought to account for declining turnout by 
noting that there are inter-generational differences in political interest, sense of duty, and 
propensity to vote, but there is a lack of convincing explanations of why this should be the case 
(Blais 2007). 
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As we have seen, there is empirical evidence to support the idea that various 
institutional arrangements, the importance of an election, and the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the electorate can all have an influence on turnout. However, as we 
will see later, few of the variables which have been suggested by previous research are 
entirely consistent in their effects. This is particularly so in the case of socio-
demographic measures. Indeed, Franklin (2004:206) suggested that, because the 
relationships between individual-level characteristics and the act of voting vary because 
of variations in the character of elections, these relationships are conditioned by the 
level of turnout itself. 
Why should this be so? In Franklin’s view, voting is an acquired habit; the nature of any 
given election will have a greater influence on first-time voters than on older voters who 
have already become accustomed to voting (or to non-voting). If, for example, an 
election is particularly competitive, more of these first-time voters will be likely to vote: 
not only in that election, but also in subsequent ones. Because a number of other 
individual-level characteristics are age linked, the relationships between these and 
voting ‘may well be different in different countries, depending on the historic pattern of 
turnout variation in those countries’ (Franklin 2004:207).  
This strikes us as an interesting suggestion, as it leads us to expect differences in 
patterns of turnout, rather than being surprised by them. Because we will be dealing 
with a relatively short time-frame, the effects of ageing cohorts of voters would be 
rather modest. For this reason, we will not concern ourselves with turnout changes from 
one election to the next. We will, though, examine the relationships between voting and 
the characteristics of the electorate under different levels of turnout.  We will do this in 
two ways: by considering different types of elections, and by using geographical units 
within countries.  
6 
Why Different Types of Elections? 
As outlined earlier in this chapter, it was the very low turnout in first European 
Parliament elections in 1979 that inspired the original distinction between first- and 
second-order elections. Since then, EP elections have attracted a fair amount of 
research. It has been shown that some factors, such as compulsory voting and weekend 
voting (van der Eijk, Franklin et al. 1996) can affect turnout in both national and EP 
elections. In fact, because there is so much less at stake and the threshold for non voting 
is consequently lower, those factors which can be seen as affecting the costs and 
benefits of voting may have a larger effect on turnout in EP elections than on national 
elections (Mattila 2003). On the other hand, various socio-demographic variables have 
been found to have much smaller effects on turnout in EP elections than previous 
literature would lead us to expect (Oppenhuis 1995:54). Indeed, it has been suggested 
that there are few differences between voters and non-voters in elections for the EP; 
and that ‘…there is a reduced likelihood to vote for everyone, just as in other low salience 
elections’ (Oppenhuis 1995:169 - emphasis added).    
Such a view would seem to support the first-order second-order distinction we touched 
on earlier in this chapter. But Reif himself was the first to point out that there was ‘little, 
if anything at all’ at stake in EP elections, which were ‘in danger of constituting a 
category of their own…with barely more relevance than that of an official opinion poll’ 
(Reif 1984:253). The remedy Reif prescribed to rectify this was to bestow more powers 
on the European Parliament (which at the time of Reif’s study had very few). However, 
although the European Parliament has indeed acquired more power in the intervening 
decades, many voters (and indeed, many politicians, party-activists, and parts of the 
media) still behave as if there was even less at stake in EP elections than in second-order 
elections. The very low turnout for EP elections in some countries supports a further 
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distinction: elections for sub-national levels of government can be considered second-
order, and the EP elections as third-order (Marsh 1998; Heath, McLean et al. 1999; 
Rallings and Thrasher 2005). 
Although the ‘less at stake’ dimension is clearly important, Reif and Schmitt (1980) also 
noted that various other characteristics, including those relating to the specific political 
arena, may differ between first- and second-order elections. For instance, different 
parties may compete in EP and national elections, resulting in a different range of 
choices set before the electorate. Even when the same parties compete, their respective 
party allegiances or coalition arrangements, policy agendas, and campaigning efforts 
may well be different according to the type of election being contested; as may, indeed, 
the powers associated with those ‘positions of control that are at stake’ (Reif and 
Schmitt 1980:10 emphasis in original), the role of partisan allegiances, and aspects of 
sub-national identity and culture. It is worth emphasising this point: certain 
characteristics of the electoral context may vary, not just from country to country, but 
also from one type of election to another; including between those individual types of 
elections often grouped together within the second-order category. Indeed, Reif and 
Schmitt considered that, because EP elections transcend national borders, these 
elections are quite distinct from all other second-order elections which take place within 
sub-national arenas (Reif and Schmitt 1980:11).  
Of course, Reif and Schmitt’s intention was to compare EP and national elections – and 
as we have seen there are important differences. However, the fact that EP elections 
may also differ from other second-order elections lends support to the first-, second-, 
third-order distinction discussed previously. Further, it would mean that previous 
8 
comparative (cross country3) research, which has seldom ventured beyond first-order 
and EP elections when examining variations in turnout, has barely scratched the surface 
of second-order elections; which indeed, would only have been subject to partial testing 
(Lyons and Sinnott 2003a). Consequently, there are questions to which we do not yet 
have answers. For example, if the threshold of non-voting in municipal elections lies 
somewhere between that of first-order and third-order elections, we would expect that 
the effects of the institutional arrangements on municipal elections would be greater 
than on elections to the national legislature, but smaller than on EP elections. Would our 
expectations be confirmed in a cross-country analysis which included first-, second-, and 
third-order elections? Similar questions apply when we consider the role played by 
various socio-demographic characteristics. These may well have a lesser effect on 
turnout in EP elections than in first-order elections; but what about municipal elections: 
somewhere between the two, or do quite different sets of relationships appear?  
Why different regions? 
As well as considering national, supra-national, and sub-national elections, we will also 
examine the differences in turnout within individual countries. Even in elections with 
high turnout, there are often substantial variations when we consider the geographical 
regions of a country. For example, nationally, turnout in the 2006 Italian Lower House 
election was over 80 per cent; but across 98 geographical units within Italy, turnout 
actually varied by over 20 percentage points: from a low of 68.7 per cent to a high of 
90.6 per cent. Further, sub-national variations in turnout can be quite stable. Figure 1.1 
shows the regional turnout for recent Lower House and EP elections in Spain as can be 
seen, the pattern across the regions is very similar for both elections.  
                                                             
3 In this thesis, ‘comparative’ refers to research which included more than one country. 
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 Figure 1.1 : Turnout in Spanish Lower House and EP Elections – Regional Variations 
 
 
These regions differ on the basis of several of the socio-demographic measures which 
previous research using country-level data has suggested are associated with differing 
levels of turnout. So, we have a further series of questions: Do these characteristics have 
the same relationship with turnout within each country? Are the relationships similar 
across the different types of elections? Or, as Franklin might expect, do these 
relationships vary?  
In this section, we have seen that there may be complex relationships between the 
socio-demographic characteristics of the electorate and the level of turnout. We have 
suggested that variations in turnout between different types of elections, and between 
different geographic regions within countries, provide opportunities to investigate the 
nature of these relationships. We have also set a number of questions for ourselves. In 
the following section, we consider the relative merits of using individual or aggregate 
data in attempting to answer these questions.  
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Individual or Aggregate? 
In Chapter 2, we will consider previous research in more detail; for the moment, though, 
we limit ourselves to weighing the suitability of using individual or aggregate data to 
answer the questions we seek to investigate.  
Research using individual-level survey data has led to important insights into the reasons 
that people vote and to the development of different explanations of political 
participation. Famously, Brady, Verba, and Schlozman suggested that people don’t 
participate ‘because they can’t, because they don’t want to, or because nobody asked’ 
(1995:271). More specifically, survey data has identified numerous aspects of an 
individual’s resources, their interest in politics, and the mobilising effects of their wider 
social environment as explaining whether they vote in an election.  
Survey data, though, suffer from a number of limitations, one of which is particularly 
relevant to studies into turnout in elections. Charitably put, people are often not very 
good at remembering if they voted: typically, substantially more people report having 
voted than actually did so. In studies where validation has been possible, it has been 
found that over-reporting of over twenty per cent is common, and over-reporting of 
forty per cent is not unknown. Thus, a post-election survey may suggest that eighty per 
cent of respondents voted, whereas the actual turnout may only have been sixty per 
cent. In fact, the picture becomes even worse when we consider the other side of the 
coin – twenty per cent of people declare that they did not vote, whereas the actual 
figure is double this number. This would not be so much of a problem if this tendency 
were exhibited evenly across the electorate. However, different groups within society 
are more prone than others to over-report their participation in elections. Further, the 
level of over-reporting varies from country to country (Bernstein, Chadha et al. 2001; 
Milligan, Moretti et al. 2004; Karp and Brockington 2005). This then, presents challenges 
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when we seek to investigate those factors which often have only marginal effects on 
turnout in elections.  
A second drawback is that surveys often vary considerably in their sampling frames, 
sampling methods, application methods, and questionnaire design. Because they have 
different aims, some surveys include questions that are of no interest in other countries. 
Even when similar questions are included, the responses are often categorised in 
different ways, which can lead to difficulties when trying to assemble a coherent data-
set from different countries. Although considerable efforts have been made at 
standardisation in order to reduce these problems, substantial differences often remain 
(see, for example Schmitt and Loveless 2004; Curtice 2007; Howell and Jusko 2009). 
A third disadvantage of survey data relates to our aim of investigating turnout 
differences, not just between countries, but from place to place within them. For 
example, in France, we wish to investigate turnout differences between the 
départements, of which Metropolitan France comprises ninety-six. In cross-national 
surveys, the number of respondents per country is typically between one and two 
thousand. On average, then, we would be faced with only ten to twenty respondents in 
each of the French départements. Further, although cross-national surveys provide a 
great deal of information for the individual respondent, they often provide only very 
coarse geographical information; and thus do not provide the detail we need. For 
example, the European Social Survey and the Asia Europe Survey assigned respondents 
to one of the nine top-level administrative regions in France, not to their individual 
départements. Finally, our aim is to investigate turnout across different types of 
elections. Most surveys are interested in only one or sometimes two types of elections, 
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and would be of little use to us in investigating turnout in municipal or regional 
elections, for example.4 
Because of the aforementioned limitations of survey data, we decided to use aggregate 
data. Aggregate data have the advantage of dealing with what people actually did, rather 
than what they say they did. Further, at the aggregate level, a number of individual 
idiosyncrasies tend to cancel each other out5 (Geys 2006a, citing Matsusaka and Palda).  
As with survey data, aggregate data has often been used to analyse turnout within a 
single country. Thus, in a recent meta-analysis of over eighty studies which used 
aggregate data, about three-quarters of these focused only on a single country; and 
often, indeed, on a single election (Geys 2006a). Several investigations, though, have 
used aggregate data to systematically compare turnout across countries and to identify 
the reasons for the differences. Partly as a consequence of the growing number of 
democracies, the breadth of these analyses had increased; from thirty countries for 
Powell in 1980, to 91 countries for Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) less than twenty years 
later. Such analyses have generated an ever-increasing list of institutional, demographic, 
and political factors which have been suggested as affecting turnout in elections.  
However, there is often a lack of consistency when comparing results of one study to 
another: as Geys noted, numerous explanatory variables have been proposed, but none 
of these is ‘omnipresent in the literature’ (Geys 2006a:641). For almost every suggested 
variable, at least one piece of contradictory research can be found. In part, this is 
because comparative studies have differed, not only in the countries they have included, 
                                                             
4
 ASES is the only survey we are aware of that asked about voting behaviour in three types of elections: 
national legislature or presidential, EP, and local. However, a comparison of reported and actual turnout 
suggested that over-reporting was broadly in line with that noted above. Further, as mentioned, the 
geographical detail was not fine enough for our needs.  
5
 Of course, we could combine individual and aggregate data; however, this would not overcome the 
limitations of existing survey data; notably the low numbers of respondents, our concerns over their powers 
of recall, and the lack of detail regarding their geographical location. 
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but also on the variables they have studied, and the questions which they sought to 
answer. 
Further, it would be easy to conclude that, when more than one country is included in 
the analysis, ‘aggregate’ is synonymous with ‘country-level’; of the score or so 
comparative (cross country) studies which Geys considered, all but two used a single, 
national turnout figure for each of the elections included in the analysis. Such an 
approach is certainly of use in identifying those factors which are associated with 
different levels of turnout between countries, but it is impossible to use these same data 
to explore the variations in turnout within countries. Indeed, beyond creating ‘dummy’ 
variables for countries which in some way do not ‘fit’ the more general pattern, it is 
difficult to go much further with country-level data.  
That most comparative research has been limited to investigating turnout variation at 
the country-level, and have usually considered only one or two types of election, is 
surely not due to a lack of curiosity – plenty of single-country studies have examined the 
reasons for turnout variations across constituencies or other geographical units within 
countries, or across different types of elections. Rather, the necessary data were not 
previously available in order to conduct a meaningful, cross-country analysis. For 
example, even when turnout data for different types of elections were available for the 
component geographical units within countries, these units often differed in complex 
ways from one election type to another, making aggregation to a common level 
impossible. Census data for sub-national regions, when it could be obtained, varied from 
country to country, not only in terms of the topics they included, but also in the specific 
questions they asked and the measures they used. When trying to combine census data 
with the corresponding turnout data, these difficulties would, of course, be 
compounded. 
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Given these constraints, it is perhaps not surprising that few comparative studies into 
the factors which influence turnout have used aggregate data below the country level. 
One notable exception was the investigation by Hoffmann-Martinot, Rallings and 
Thrasher (1996), which used turnout and census data aggregated to the level of the local 
government unit. Although this study uncovered some interesting similarities and 
differences, it was limited to only two countries and one type of election. A more 
comprehensive attempt to examine differences in electoral turnout across several 
countries and across multiple types of elections was made under the auspices of the 
‘Democratic Participation and Political Communication in Systems of Multi-level 
Governance’ (DEMPART nd). This project, carried out under the umbrella of the 
European Community’s Fifth Framework Programme for Research and Technological 
Development, sought to identify the nature and sources of political participation and 
abstention in order to make recommendations aimed at increasing electoral turnout, 
and hence to enhance democratic legitimacy. The authors noted that, although 
participation varies across the different levels of governance, previous research in this 
area had usually focused only on national level elections, or had occasionally ventured 
one step further to include either sub-national or supranational elections (Lyons and 
Sinnott 2003a). In contrast, this project set out to investigate turnout in elections at all 
levels of government in the then 15 member-states of the European Union. Because 
some of the original ambitions were ultimately not achieved, it is worth looking at this 
project in more detail.  
Despite the intention to include 15 countries in the analysis, it appears that a lack of 
suitable data constrained this original aim; and the resulting ‘working papers’ which 
reported on multi-level turnout only covered six of the EU member-states (Denmark, 
France, Germany, GB, Ireland, and Spain). Even in this restricted group of countries, the 
aims to include all types of elections were not always met. For example, for France none 
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of the three types of sub-national elections (municipal, departmental, or regional) were 
included (Abrial, Cautres et al. 2003). For Germany, national, EP, and Land parliament 
elections were included, but municipal elections were not (Rattinger and Wagner 2003). 
In Ireland, municipal elections were only considered by way of country-level turnout 
data (Lyons and Sinnott 2003b).  
Reference to the separate country studies provides some evidence that there are 
differences in how various factors are associated with turnout, depending on the type of 
election being considered. For example, in England, variables such as age and education 
appeared to be useful in differentiating between voters and non-voters in national 
elections; but were less useful in the case of local elections, and not at all for EP 
elections (Rallings and Thrasher 2003). Further, some variables (or groups of variables) 
were sometimes found to have different effects from one election type to another.  
Thus, for France, one group of variables (derived by factor analysis) which the authors 
christened ‘social constraint’ was shown to have an opposite direction effect in EP 
elections to that found in national elections (Abrial, Cautres et al. 2003). Similarly, in 
Denmark, higher levels of education were found to be associated with higher turnout in 
EP elections, but with lower turnout in municipal elections (Svensson and Thomsen 
2003).  
However, because different units of analysis were sometimes used for different 
elections, or even within a single type of election (for example, Abrial, Cautres et al. 
2003; Rallings and Thrasher 2003), the interpretation of results for individual countries is 
not always straightforward. Further, different sets of explanatory variables were used in 
different countries, and occasionally even for different types of elections within a single 
country. When there were few such variables, their individual effects were examined by 
means of bi-variate and/or multi-variate methods. However, for Denmark, France, and 
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Germany, the lists of independent variables were more extensive; and for these 
countries, the respective authors opted for factor analysis (supplemented by cluster 
analysis in the case of Germany), with the resulting factors then being subjected to 
regression analysis (Abrial, Cautres et al. 2003; Rattinger and Wagner 2003; Svensson 
and Thomsen 2003).  It is obviously difficult to draw conclusions about the influence of 
individual variables once they have been combined with one or several other variables 
by means of factor analysis; even more so to compare the results from one country to 
another. 
The combination of data availability problems and a lack of methodological consistency 
probably explains, at least in part, the absence of any comprehensive, over-arching 
conclusions to this project. Further, the stated intention of going beyond national 
elections to include both supranational and sub-national elections was, at best, only 
partially fulfilled. Indeed, the latter phase of the project seemed to focus only on EP 
elections; and even this lacked any attempt to draw together the findings from the 
different strands of research carried out in the individual countries. In summary, then, 
despite the authors’ initial criticisms of previous work as often lacking in coherent and 
consistent research design (Lyons and Sinnott 2003a:10), their own project seemed 
constrained by these very same limitations.  
There are three valuable lessons to be learned from the eventual shortcomings of the 
DEMPART project. Firstly, it would be easier to draw meaningful conclusions regarding 
the factors which are associated with patterns of turnout if the same units of analysis 
were used for all types of election within each country. In this way, we would be more 
confident that any differences in the associations between turnout and the explanatory 
variables which we discovered were real, rather than being artefacts of using different 
units of analysis. Secondly, conclusions about the role of the explanatory variables would 
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be more reliable were we to maintain the same set of variables across all election types 
and for all of the individual countries under consideration. Thirdly, interpretation of the 
results would be more straightforward were we to adopt a consistent methodological 
approach for all types of elections and all countries.  
These aims are, of course, contingent on having suitable data to work with. Two recent 
developments mean that, for the first time, it has become possible to construct a 
dataset in which we can maintain the same sub-national geographical basis for turnout 
in all types of elections within each country, and to characterise the corresponding 
electorate using the same socio-demographic characteristics, measured in the same way, 
across multiple countries. Firstly, EUROSTAT (the statistical service of the European 
Union) has compiled, and made easily available, census data for the individual 
geographical units – known as NUTS units – within member countries. Secondly, a 
number of European countries have shown increasing enthusiasm to make available 
election results for different types of elections in considerable geographic detail. Further, 
the geographical basis for these results often corresponds to, or can be aggregated to, 
the NUTS units used in the Eurostat database of socio-demographic statistics.  
We have drawn on these resources in order to construct an original dataset (described in 
more detail in Chapter 4) which combines characteristics of the electoral systems, 
election turnout, and selected socio-demographic variables. We have assembled 
information for a total of 66 elections in ten western European countries: Belgium, 
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and England. For all 
but one country, we have been able to include instances of first-, second-, and third-
order elections. For each country, turnout for all types of elections is aggregated to the 
same geographical units. There are over four hundred of these component units in total, 
and for each of them we have the same core set of socio-demographic variables.  
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Thus, we will be able to investigate whether the effects of our institutional and socio-
demographic variables are similar across different types of elections; or, if they differ, 
whether they do so in a systematic way with varying levels of turnout. Further, and in 
contrast to most previous comparative studies, there are sufficient data to allow us to 
examine variations in turnout across regions and elections within five of the countries.  
This is especially important when considering the findings of previous comparative 
research which used country-level data. Such research has suggested a number of 
factors which are associated with variations in turnout between countries; these factors 
may well exhibit similar associations with turnout variations within countries, but it 
would be cavalier to infer that this is so. Indeed, it is known that using different 
geographical scales can sometimes lead to quite different research findings: a 
phenomenon which has come to be known as the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem 
(MAUP). This, and the related fallacies of cross-level inference, will be discussed in the 
following section.  
Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP)  
The MAUP states that ‘the results of cartography, statistical analysis, and any spatial 
modelling are dependent on the definition of the studied units’ (ESPON 2006:xix). In 
effect, the choice of the spatial unit can act as a filter which can lead to changes in the 
statistical results, and thus places limitations on the generalisability of results from one 
scale of observation to other scales. A pragmatic approach is to use the data from the 
lowest possible level (ESPON 2006:xxxiii); although this does not necessarily lead to a 
minimisation of the MAUP. In general, though, the lower the level of aggregation to 
which the data relate, the better: both from the point of view of the number of cases 
available for analysis and from the point of view of getting at the substantial variation 
that can occur within higher level units (Kavanagh, Mills et al. 2004). The Eurostat socio-
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demographic data used herein are indeed at the lowest possible level commensurate 
with the available electoral turnout data.  
 
However, there are also two closely related statistical traps of which we must be aware 
when considering different levels of measurement (Achen and Shively 1995; 
Subramanian, Jones et al. 2009). Both relate to the incorrect cross-level inferences which 
may be drawn when the correlations between two variables are not the same at 
different levels of measurement: firstly, the ecological fallacy may be committed when 
we incorrectly ascribe otherwise unobservable lower level relationships from higher 
level data (Robinson 1950, 2009). The second is the atomistic fallacy, where we commit 
the reverse error, of incorrectly inferring higher level relationships from lower level data 
(Hox 2010)6. A simple example will serve to demonstrate both of these fallacies. 
 
Figure 1.2 is a scatter plot of (fictional) data showing the relationship between variables 
X and Y for three countries, as shown by lines 1, 2, and 3. In each country, there is a 
clear, negative relationship between the variables: in all three countries, as X increases, 
Y decreases. However, when we consider all data pooled together (or we consider only 
the mean values of X and Y for each country, as would be the case with country-level, 
aggregate data), a second relationship is apparent, as represented by line 4. Here, the 
relationship between the variables X and Y is positive; that is, the reverse to that 
observed for each of the countries when examined individually.  
 
 
                                                             
6
 It is not uncommon for those keen on multi-level analysis to cite these two fallacies as the very reason to 
use multi-level regression approaches when investigating nested or hierarchical data. However, multi-level 
regression analysis makes sense only when there are sufficient upper level units, typically at least 100 (Hox 
2010:48). Here we have a maximum of ten (countries). 
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Figure 1.2 : Stylised scatter-plot - Cross-level inference 
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Clearly, were we to have relied only on country-level data, we would have fallen foul of 
the ecological fallacy had we inferred that a positive relationship also existed within each 
of the individual countries. To guard against making such an error, our analyses in 
Chapter 5 will begin with a comparison of analyses based on both country-level and 
regional-level data. 
 
The structure of this thesis 
In this introductory chapter, we have laid out our broad aim to contribute to the 
understanding of electoral participation by systematically investigating the levels of 
turnout in different types of elections and within different countries. We have briefly 
noted that electoral participation can vary according to the electoral system and rules, 
and the importance of the election, and the characteristics of the electorate. In Chapter 
2 we will review in more detail the relevant literature concerning turnout in elections. 
We begin with rational choice theory and the ‘calculus of voting’, and show that 
empirical evidence supports the idea that people are influenced by the various costs and 
benefits associated with different institutional arrangements. However, although the 
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institutional determinants of voting have measurable effects on turnout, they do not tell 
the whole story. We then examine a number of socio-demographic factors, and discuss 
how turnout varies with the relative importance of different types of elections.  
In Chapter 3, we provide a brief, descriptive overview for each country included in our 
dataset, and place their contemporary layers of elected government in historical 
context. The role and status of sub-national government varies from country to country, 
and we attempt to quantify these differences in terms of population, number of 
employees, and tax raising powers. Similarities and differences are then discussed in 
light of the various typologies which have been suggested by previous authors. These 
characteristics are necessarily measured at the country-level; but we also use Keating’s 
(1998) measure of ‘regionalism’ to look at variations within countries. We then provide 
details of the ‘rules of the game’ which apply to the national, sub-national, and 
supranational elections which are held in each country.  
Chapter 4 will discuss the data and methods which will be used in our analyses. We 
begin by showing that some of the variables used in previous comparative research, 
which included both developed and less-developed countries, are of limited use when 
examining turnout variations in Western European countries. We then describe the 
construction of the dataset, and develop hypotheses for each of the variables which will 
be examined. Descriptive statistics for turnout in elections and for the socio-
demographic variables are provided, before concluding the chapter with a discussion of 
the methods which will be used to test our hypotheses.  
 
In Chapter 5, we present our first series of regression models, for which data from all 
countries are included. We begin by examining the institutional variables, and compare 
the results we obtain when using country-level and regional-level data. We then add our 
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core set of socio-demographic variables and discuss the effects of these variables in light 
of previous research. Because they are often considered as being markedly different in 
character to other elections, we then exclude EP elections from the model, and examine 
the differences in the resulting regression analysis. This is followed by regression models 
which examine EP, municipal and lower house elections individually. 
In Chapter 6, we look at how well our model predicts turnout for individual countries, 
and find that there are substantial country-to-country differences. We seek to improve 
the model by testing additional variables: beginning with the geographical coverage of 
political parties, and the membership of a trade union or political party. Next, we 
investigate the effects of public employment, tax raising powers, and mayoral strength. 
We then shift to the European level to see whether those regions with representative 
offices in Brussels have a higher turnout in European elections. Finally, we consider how 
turnout varies across different election types according to a measure of ‘regionality’. 
The first section of Chapter 7 takes advantage of our regional-level data to take a closer 
look at the associations between turnout and our socio-demographic variables across 
different types of elections within five countries. These results are discussed in light of 
our findings in Chapter 5. We find that although some of the variables have similar 
effects across all five countries, the other variables are far less consistent. Further, we 
will see that, more often than not, two of our variables have the opposite effect within 
countries to that found when we considered all countries together. In the second 
section, we examine different aspects some of the variables, and find that these also 
vary in their effects from country to country.  
In Chapter 8 we summarise our findings from previous chapters, and pull together what 
we have learnt about variations in turnout across different elections, and from country 
to country. We examine the implications of our findings in light of past research; discuss 
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the limitations of our own approach, and suggest avenues for further investigations into 
the factors which influence turnout in elections.  
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Chapter 2 : Voting and its Determinants 
 
Introduction - Turnout in elections 
Aside from obeying the law, citizens in liberal democracies are expected to play their 
part by voting in elections (Saward 2006). That not all citizens vote in any given election 
is nothing new; indeed, the manipulation of participation rates, either by means of 
compulsion or by postal voting, was considered as long ago as the Roman Empire 
(Staveley 1972). Similarly, it has long been known that participation rates can vary not 
only with different electoral systems, but also with the characteristics of different 
members of the population (Gosnell 1930).   
As early as the 19th century, political scientists were making predictions of turnout at 
elections based on the prosperity and education of the prospective voters. They 
reasoned that the well-off and the well-educated would conclude that the effects of 
their vote would be drowned out by those of the newly enfranchised masses, and thus 
not bother to vote (Lijphart 1997 citing Gosnell and Tingsten). Although this prediction 
was subsequently shown to be wrong, the idea that participation rates would vary 
according to the different characteristics of the population clearly has a long history. 
However, prior to the development of Rational Choice Theory (RCT), the act of voting 
itself (rather than the choices expressed by that vote) was generally assumed to be 
‘normal’ with non-voting seen as aberrant, and often linked in some way to ideas of 
social alienation (Blais 2000).  
Rational choice theory turned this proposition on its head, and suggested that the act of 
voting was irrational. This  presented a number of challenges, not least to the workings 
of democracy itself: although it is possible to imagine a system of government where 
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representatives (along with all other roles in society) are selected by chance (Borges 
2000), contemporary systems of representative democracy rely on the active 
participation of individual voters.  
Fortunately for democracy, many people do vote. This apparent paradox has led some to 
dismiss rational choice theory in its entirety. Others, though, consider that rational 
choice theory can usefully be retained, but that it needs to be supplemented with other 
approaches which, in one way or another, take account of the fact that humans are 
social animals who interact with others and are influenced by them. Subsequent theories 
of voting, such as the party identification model or the sociological model, developed 
these ideas, and proposed that electors identify with a political party, or vote in a 
manner that reflects the social group to which they belong (Heywood 2002:242). Many 
such theories, though, seek to explain ‘how people vote’ – that is, what choices they 
make between the candidates and policies on offer.  
This chapter will firstly consider the more fundamental question of why people bother to 
vote at all. We begin with rational choice theory, and more specifically with the ‘paradox 
of (non) voting’, and we show that, despite the criticisms and controversy that rational 
choice theory has attracted, the decision of whether or not to vote does seem to be 
influenced by the costs and benefits involved. However, rational choice theory appears 
to offer but a partial explanation, not least because, whilst the formal rules do appear to 
affect people’s behaviour, individual voters are also exposed to a range of social, political 
and economic environments which impinge on their decisions. Indeed, although the 
institutional determinants of voting have substantial effects on turnout, they are 
generally unable to account for the patterns of turnout which are seen within countries. 
To explain these variations, previous authors have identified a number of socio-
demographic determinants of turnout; however, it will be shown that the findings of 
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previous research are often less consistent than is the case for the institutional 
determinants of voting. 
We then turn to the relative importance, or ‘salience’, of different types of elections. 
Previous comparative research has generally been limited to examining the turnout 
differences in elections for the national legislature and/or for the European Parliament; 
and, in general, more people bother to vote in the former than in the latter. However, 
the differences in turnout vary from country to country in ways not fully explained by 
the local electoral arrangements; indeed, voters do appear to respond differently to 
these arrangements depending on the importance of the election. 
Finally, we consider the limitations of previous research, be it based on survey or 
aggregate data. 
Why people vote 
Half a century ago, based on the work of Kenneth Arrow, Anthony Downs developed the 
idea of the rationally self-interested voter who makes voting choices on the basis of 
individual cost-benefit calculations (Arrow 1951; Downs 1957). In deciding whether to 
vote or to abstain, the voter calculates the difference in expected benefits between two 
candidates (B), the probability that their vote will be decisive (P) and the costs (C) of 
voting, according to: 
R = PB – C>0 
And hence will decide to vote if the net expected utility of voting (R) is positive.  
It would seem that the idea of a cost-benefit calculation does have some grounding in 
actual voter behaviour:  various attempts at ‘electoral engineering’ (Norris 2004) are 
predicated on reducing the costs of voting, or of increasing the costs of non-voting. The 
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simplest example is that of ‘compulsory’ voting, where failure to participate in any given 
election results in sanctions against the abstainer. Although such sanctions can take 
various forms, and are often imperfectly implemented, perhaps the most obvious is that 
of a fine. The relatively small monetary amounts, for example, a 50 euro fine for a first 
offence in Belgium (The Electoral Commission 2006), nevertheless appear to result in 
higher levels of turnout. Alternatively, a number of proposals have focused on reducing 
the costs of voting, for example by introducing weekend (rather than weekday) voting, 
or by providing the opportunity to vote by means of a postal ballot prior to the election 
date, rather than having to present at the polling station on a particular day (Rallings and 
Thrasher 2007; Ministry of Justice 2008). However, because individual members of the 
electorate take into account the likelihood that their vote will actually make a difference 
to the outcome, abstention can be seen as rational – and conversely, the act of voting 
can be seen as irrational.  
Clearly, this is a paradoxical finding: people do vote (Green and Shapiro 1994:50), an 
observation which has prompted some to question the usefulness of RCT in explaining 
voter behaviour.  Downs himself considered his homo politicus as something of an 
abstraction, and postulated that voters may turn out to vote in order to assure the 
survival of the democratic system (a ‘consumption’ benefit). Nevertheless, the idea that 
voting is never without cost to the voter has prompted much research into participation 
rates. 
In order to address the paradox of (non) voting, Riker and Ordeshook (1968) developed 
Downs’ idea of consumption benefits  into the concept of ‘citizen duty’, a somewhat 
nebulous term which nevertheless encompassed a number of purported ‘satisfactions’ 
which, critically, were neither dependent on the outcome of the election, nor on the 
probability that the individual voter would cast the deciding vote. Such satisfactions 
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include those of taking part in and supporting the democratic tradition, affirming a 
partisan allegiance, and of the act of voting itself (the latter thus being re-classified as a 
benefit, rather than as a cost of voting). The introduction of this citizen duty term, 
though, is not without its own difficulties: indeed,  the calculus of voting is thus reduced 
to the situation where people vote simply when D (duty) is greater than C (costs of 
voting), leading Hasen (1996:2135) to consider the modified calculus of voting to be 
‘virtually devoid of explanatory power’.  
More generally, RCT has been criticised as lacking a plausible account of how people’s 
preferences are actually formed, of how they make decisions, and how these decisions 
are put into action (Green and Shapiro 1994; Tilly and Goodin 2006). In response, a 
‘myriad of theoretical models’ (Geys 2006b:27) has been developed, each of which 
attempts to address the shortcomings of the pure RCT approach7. Others are ‘slightly 
more sanguine’ (Blais 2000:141), and consider the calculus of voting to offer a useful, 
though partial, contribution to our understanding of the voting decision; a decision 
which is seen as a tough test for RCT because it has minimal consequences for the voter.  
Where others had sought to augment the calculus of voting by adding various terms to 
overcome the inherent paradox, Blais (2000) took a rather different approach and 
considered that the roots of the problem lay with P (the probability that one’s vote 
would be decisive to the outcome), and the nature of the interaction of this term with B 
(the benefits of voting). Based on his own work and a review of previous studies, Blais 
considered that both strategic voting and the effects of the closeness of elections both 
                                                             
7
 Such models include ‘mini-max regret’, information based models, and game-theoretic approaches, each 
with their own sometimes questionable assumptions. More promising are those based on the ‘ethical voter’ 
who takes into account the well-being of others, or more general group-based models (Franklin 2004; Geys 
2006b). However, it appears that, in considering man as a social model who interacts with, and is influenced 
by, others, such models also rely to a certain extent on individual values and norms being influenced by 
other group or societal members; this process of ‘socialisation’ is discussed below. 
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provide evidence that people have at least a vague notion that their vote could make a 
difference to the outcome of an election.  
When voters vote strategically, they do so because they have judged that their first 
choice candidate has no chance of winning; and rather than wasting their vote, they 
instead vote for their second choice candidate if they have a better chance of winning. 
Because strategic voters do take some account of the probability that one or another 
candidate could win an election, Blais suggests that probability should also be included 
in the calculation of whether to vote at all. Further, Blais considered that various studies 
have shown turnout to be higher when the outcome of an election is finely balanced; 
and suggests that although people may not be aware of the actual probability of casting 
the decisive vote, they do have a ‘vague feeling that each vote counts more’ in a close 
election (Blais 2000:78).  
However, because most people vote in a national election even if it is a foregone 
conclusion, Blais considers the P term to matter only marginally: indeed, he considers 
that people do not, as is suggested by the calculus of voting, multiply the P and B terms; 
rather, ‘they simply add them’ (Blais 2000:138). Blais found that, among those with a 
weak sense of citizen duty, the benefits and costs of voting, and probability of casting 
the decisive vote, each has a smaller effect than RCT would suggest. Further, people with 
a strong sense of duty, about half of the electorate in Blais’ study, simply do not make 
the cost-benefit calculation suggested by RCT8 (Blais 2000).  
                                                             
8
 We should also note here that views differ as to the usefulness of rational choice theory when we consider 
elections other than those for national government. Blais is happy to accept that rational choice theory will 
do less well in less important elections when trying to explain who votes (Blais 2000), yet others suggest 
that, in fact, voters in lower-order elections make similar cost-benefit calculations, but arrive at a different 
result because the election is less important (Rallings and Thrasher 2007). Participation in different types of 
elections is considered later in this chapter. 
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Clearly, the sense of duty varies across different sections of the electorate; which raises 
the question of where an individual’s sense of duty comes from. For Riker and 
Ordeshook, at least some of the satisfactions which a person may derive from the act of 
voting rely on ideas of political socialisation (1968:28). This process, whereby individual 
attitudes and beliefs regarding the political system are acquired and developed, can be 
‘particularly important in influencing the degree of political participation that is expected 
of groups and individuals‘ (Ball and Peters 2000:83). As Assmann notes, people ‘do not 
only live in the first person singular, but also in various formats of the first person plural’ 
(2006:223), and their values are subject to various formal and informal influences. In 
childhood and adolescence, these influences include the family and school, and later in 
life, workplace and voluntary associations. In a similar vein, Franklin considered Riker 
and Ordeshook’s version of the calculus of voting to be incomplete, because voters are 
not ‘atomized’; but rather should be seen as members of social networks and of 
potentially winning coalitions (Franklin 2004:202).  
Although various aspects of socialisation theory are disputed9, it is clear from empirical 
evidence that different groups within a society do exhibit different degrees of 
participation, including, but not limited to, voting in elections (for example, Lijphart 
1997; Burns, Schlozman et al. 2001; Franklin 2004). These groups can be defined in 
various ways, usually by means of demographic and/or socio-economic criteria. The last 
twenty years, in particular, have seen a growing number of studies which systematically 
compared electoral behaviour between countries. Some comparative studies have not 
considered turnout directly, and instead examined the political consequences of 
electoral systems – such as the proportionality of seats compared to votes, the type of 
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 It has also been suggested that invoking socialisation theory in order to account for differences in electoral 
participation simply dodges the issue; if behaviour is influenced by parental habits, the question then arises 
as to why the parents behave in the way that they do (see Franklin 2004:22). 
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party system (Rae 1967; Lijphart 1994), or the congruence between voters’ preferences 
and policy outcomes (Powell 2000). However, the perception that turnout is declining in 
a number of western democracies, and that low turnout can exacerbate the problems of 
unequal participation (Lijphart 1997; Curtice and Seyd 2004), has led to increased focus 
on electoral turnout itself, and the factors which can influence it. The following two 
sections examine selected institutional and socio-demographic determinants of turnout 
in elections10.  
Institutional determinants of turnout 
A number of institutional determinants of voting have been suggested in previous 
research. Here, we focus on compulsory voting, the use of proportional representation, 
weekend voting, and the holding of more than one type of election simultaneously. 
According to rational choice institutionalism, these various arrangements directly affect 
the behaviour of citizens, including their decisions as to whether or not to vote in an 
election (Norris 2004). Hence, each of these factors will be discussed in relation to the 
costs and benefits of voting, as discussed in the previous section. 
Compulsory Voting 
In the first study to directly investigate how and why turnout varies between countries, 
Powell (1980) examined average turnout in the legislative and presidential elections in 
thirty countries between 1968 and 1978. Compulsory voting was associated with around 
ten per cent higher turnout (with changes of a similar magnitude being reported in 
countries where compulsory voting was introduced or withdrawn). Several subsequent 
analyses, which also investigated turnout in legislative or presidential elections, have 
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 A further group of factors concern aspects of party competition. Though these have been shown to be 
important in explaining the change in turnout between elections, they will not be considered further here (in 
particular, see Franklin 2004) 
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largely confirmed the effects of compulsory voting first reported by Powell. Although 
differing in the time periods and countries considered, and the other variables included, 
compulsory voting is consistently associated with higher turnout, usually in the range of 
10 to 20 percentage points compared to elections where voting is not compulsory (for 
example, Crewe 1981; Jackman 1987; Colomer 1991; Jackman and Miller 1995; Blais and 
Dobrzynska 1998; Blais 2000; Perez-Linan 2001; Siaroff and Merer 2002). The 
explanation for this is not particularly contentious: the threat of sanctions for not voting 
has a direct impact on the potential voter’s cost-benefit calculation11.  
Weekend Voting 
Rather than increasing the costs of abstention, electoral arrangements may serve to 
reduce the costs of voting. Weekend voting has been shown to influence turnout, with 
the usual explanation being that people have more spare time at the weekend than 
during the week when they may be working or otherwise busy, and hence are more 
likely to vote as the (opportunity) costs are lower at the weekend. Although the effects 
are generally less marked than for compulsory voting, weekend voting has been 
associated with turnout up to ten per cent higher than in countries where elections are 
held on weekdays (Oppenhuis 1995; Mattila 2003).  
However, it should be noted that some studies have failed to find an effect for weekend 
voting. For example, in a study which included national election results from 37 
countries, Franklin (1996) found weekend voting to be associated with around five per 
cent higher turnout, but he later cast doubt on the reliability of this finding (Franklin 
2004). Siaroff and Merer (2002) conducted separate bivariate analyses for weekend and 
for Sunday voting in national legislative elections, and found that weekend voting was 
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 Though it has also been noted that the nature of the sanction, and degree of enforcement, are important 
aspects of compulsory voting (Siaroff and Merer 2002). 
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not significant. Contradicting much previous research, Sunday voting was actually found 
to have a negative effect 12. Further, Blondel et al. (1997), although finding that fewer 
people cite ‘lack of time’ as the reason for not voting in EP elections held on a Sunday, 
also found that, for some people, weekend voting can actually decrease the chances of 
voting.  
Proportional Representation (PR) 
The type of electoral system employed has also been linked to differences in turnout. 
The goal of any electoral system is to convert the votes into seats, but some methods are 
more proportional than others. PR systems, because they tend to provide more choice 
and lead to fewer wasted votes, are usually associated with higher levels of turnout 
(Franklin 1996; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Brockington 2004). There are several 
measures of disproportionality, which, although they differ in the specific computations 
used, and in how they treat minor parties, seek to measure the difference between the 
proportion of votes cast for each party and the proportion of seats which each party 
wins (for a useful survey, see Kestelman 1999). It should be noted that although systems 
such as First Past The Post (FPTP) tend to produce more disproportional results than the 
various PR systems, this is not necessarily entailed by the system itself, but depends also 
on the territorial distribution of electoral support for the various political parties 
(Rallings and Thrasher 1997), and the potentially complex interaction between electoral 
system and district magnitude (Benoit 2001).   
That said, the important distinction remains between PR and non-PR systems: although 
variations on the PR theme do lead to different levels of proportionality, these 
differences are minor when compared to the high levels of disproportionality which tend 
to be exhibited by majoritarian or plurality systems (Blais and Carty 1990). Not 
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 They did not, however, include either measure in their subsequent multivariate analyses 
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surprisingly, proportional representation has been investigated in several studies, 
indeed, Blais and Carty (1990) specifically set out to investigate the effects of PR on 
turnout. In an analysis which included a range of (country-level) control variables for 
other aspects of electoral systems, and which examined lower house elections since 
1847 in 20 industrialised countries across three continents, the authors found PR to be 
associated with up to eight per cent higher turnout when compared to plurality systems.  
Several other studies have revealed similar effects of PR systems (or the closely related 
negative effect of disproportionality) on turnout (for example: Jackman 1987; Blondel, 
Sinnott et al. 1997; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Perez-Linan 2001; Kostadinova 2003). 
Simultaneous Elections 
Although many previous comparative studies of turnout have focused on a single type of 
election (such as for national legislatures, or for the European Parliament) some authors 
have noted the effects of other elections within a given country. It has been noted that 
the turnout in elections for other than the national legislature can vary according to 
where in the national election cycle they are held. This can be for reasons of electoral 
fatigue, or because electors may take the opportunity presented in a less important 
election to send a message to the national government. However, the greatest effect is 
when two (or more) elections are held simultaneously.  
When two (or more) elections are held at the same time, the costs of voting (at least in 
terms of turning up at the polling booth) are no different than voting in one election. 
Thus, we would expect turnout to be higher where elections are held simultaneously. 
Indeed, this expectation has been borne out in a number of studies: for example, 
Franklin (1996) noted that turnout in EP elections is some 18 percentage points higher 
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when an EP election coincides with a country’s elections for the national legislature13. 
Substantial effects have also been reported by Matilla (2003) and Blondel et al. (1997).  
 
The institutional arrangements discussed in this section clearly have substantial effects 
on turnout; but they do not tell the whole story: within any given election, where the 
institutional environment generally remains constant for all voters in a country, some 
people vote and some do not. Clearly, the institutional factors which are generally 
constant at a country level (at least in any given election) cannot account for the 
substantial variations in turnout that occur within countries (Blondel, Sinnott et al. 
1997). However, the choices which people make as to whether to vote or to abstain are 
not random; there are patterns of voting and non-voting within particular sections of 
society (Nevitte, Blais et al. 2009:86). The following section focuses on several socio-
demographic factors which previous research has identified as affecting turnout in 
elections. 
Socio-demographic determinants of turnout 
Even though voting is the least demanding form of political participation, individuals still 
need  a minimum level of resources and interest in politics (Brady, Verba et al. 1995). In 
comparative studies, it is usually not possible to measure resources or interest directly, 
and, instead, a number of socio-economic and demographic variables have been 
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 However, when they are not simultaneous, the fact that other elections exist may be associated with 
reduced turnout in elections for the national legislature. This may be particularly so where there are strong 
elected presidents, upper houses, or regional governments, since their presence suggests that the national 
legislature enjoys a reduced monopoly of power than would otherwise be the case (Blais and Dobrzynska 
1998; Siaroff and Merer 2002). Further, some authors have detected the influence of upcoming national 
legislature elections on the turnout exhibited in other elections (Reif 1985). It has been suggested that 
voters may use local or EP elections, for example, as a means of ‘sending a message’ to the national 
government, and thus the effect depends on how close the local election is to the upcoming national 
legislature election. 
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suggested as affecting turnout in elections. These variables comprise two broad types: 
individual and aggregate. Individual variables are those which relate to the 
characteristics of the individual voter, such as their age, or educational attainment. 
Aggregate variables are characteristics of the group as a whole, and which cannot be 
disaggregated to the individual level, such as regional GDP, or population density.  
It is important to note that, here, ‘individual’ and ‘aggregate’ refer to the type of 
variable, and not to the type of data.  As we shall see, it is not unusual to use aggregate 
data when seeking to investigate the effects of individual characteristics. For example, 
rather than having information on the educational attainment of every individual voter, 
we may use aggregate data, such as the percentage of the electorate which has a degree 
level qualification. If we expect that the tendency to vote increases along with 
educational attainment, we would also expect that a higher percentage of degree 
holders would, other things being equal, be associated with increased turnout.  
In this section, we firstly examine those variables which relate to the characteristics of 
the voter, which previous research has suggested as influencing the likelihood that they 
will, in fact, vote. The main focus will be on education, age, death rate, occupation, 
unemployment, and length of residence. Then, we will consider aggregate level variables 
which have been shown to be associated with the level of turnout; specifically, GDP and 
population density. As will become clear, and especially when compared to the 
institutional determinants of voting identified in the previous section, the effects of 
socio-demographic factors on turnout are often the subject of continuing debate.  
Education 
The link between education and turnout appears to be well established: the better 
educated are more resource-rich, better informed, and thus more likely to vote in 
elections. Further, the better educated are more likely to have been socialised into the 
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norms of participation in elections (Lijphart 1997; Johnston and Pattie 2006; Nevitte, 
Blais et al. 2009)14. Indeed, Blais considers the evidence to show that turnout is 
‘substantially higher among the better educated’ (2007:631). However, in making this 
claim, Blais cites two, very different, studies. Because these studies operationalise 
‘education’ in two very different ways, it is worth considering them both here in more 
detail.  
Firstly, Blais cites Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), who showed that educational 
attainment has a substantial effect on turnout in elections, with holders of college 
degrees being, on average, 38 percent more likely to vote than those with minimal levels 
of schooling. The explanation for this finding is threefold: firstly,  that education is a 
resource which, by increasing the skills necessary to acquire and process political 
information, decreases the costs of voting; secondly, that the better educated have a 
greater sense of civic duty and derive more gratification from the act of voting; and, 
thirdly, that schooling increases the skills necessary to overcome the bureaucratic 
hurdles associated with voting, and, more particularly, with registration. However, 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s study focused on voting behaviour in the United States, and 
subsequent research has questioned how generalisable these findings are to other 
countries.  
For example, Powell’s (1986) analysis of survey data in nine industrialised democracies 
did show increasing participation with increasing educational level. However, Powell also 
noted that this effect was more marked for American respondents than for the other 
countries in his analysis (with the vagaries of voter registration in America being 
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 Though for a more nuanced relationship between affluence and education, see Jackson (1993). 
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suggested as a major reason for this difference15). Further, increasing education was 
sometimes associated with decreased turnout, depending on the countries and variables 
included in the analysis.  
In an analysis restricted to turnout in 16 Western European countries between 1960 and 
1992, Topf (1995) calculated the ratios of turnout between the lowest and highest 
educated cohorts for each country. His findings questioned the purported link between 
education and turnout, and he concluded that Western European citizens, be they of 
high or low educational attainment, are equally as likely to vote in national elections. 
Finally, Milligan et al. (2004) used survey and turnout data for November elections in the 
US and general elections in the UK to investigate the role of education on political 
participation. They found that increasing education does have a significant and positive 
effect on turnout in the US, but also found that this was not the case in the UK. In line 
with previous authors, Milligan et al. cited US procedures for voter registration as the 
main reason for the difference.  
The second source that Blais cites is ‘To vote or not to vote’ (Blais 2000), in which he 
suggests that a minimum level of education may be required in order to participate in 
elections. Although voting is the least demanding form of political participation (Brady, 
Verba et al. 1995:282), a minimum level of skill is required in order to cast one’s vote. 
When a country’s literacy rate is taken as a measure of the proportion of the population 
with the requisite skills, higher literacy rates are indeed significantly associated with 
higher turnout in elections (Blais 2000 24). However, as with GDP, such a measure is 
closely linked with a country’s level of development; and the main difference is between 
developed and less developed countries. When only those countries with above average 
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 It should be noted here that the effects of registration procedures only become apparent when turnout is 
calculated on the basis of the voting age population, rather than on the basis of registered voters. This point 
will be discussed more fully in Chapter 4. 
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literacy are considered, the effects of increasing literacy are very small (Blais and 
Dobrzynska 1998).  
Clearly, the literacy rate would be of limited use when examining differences in turnout 
among developed, Western European countries. However, it is worth retaining a 
measure of educational attainment, not least because the evidence suggests that, 
although often associated with higher levels of turnout (for example, Franklin 2004), the 
effect of education does vary from country to country (Nevitte, Blais et al. 2009)16.  
Age 
Young people generally vote less than older people, even after controlling for other 
factors such as education (Goerres 2007). Young, first-time voters may not know where 
to vote, or even how to vote; or they may lack a sufficient grasp of the parties, 
candidates, and key issues. In short: ‘As young citizens confront their first election, all of 
the costs of voting are magnified…’ (Plutzer 2002:43). However, with increasing age, 
people often acquire the skills and resources needed to overcome these costs as political 
knowledge and social ties increase. Further, people become more motivated to vote as 
the effects of government policy, and the taxation which funds them, are more directly 
felt (Rose 2007). Although some have suggested that with the onset of old-age people 
become less likely to vote, perhaps because of increasing physical infirmity, Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone (1980) found that propensity to vote continues to rise with increasing 
age, albeit at a slower rate than in middle-age. Using survey data from 32 national lower 
house elections in 23 countries, Nevitte et al. (2009) also found that age was significantly 
and consistently associated with higher turnout. However, it should be noted that, 
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 There is some evidence that in certain countries, the higher educated are actually less likely to vote (Perea 
2002, citing Corbetta and Parisi). 
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though the authors claim this effect was ‘consistent’, age was, in fact, not statistically 
significant in about a third of the countries when analysed separately.   
Death Rate 
A measure somewhat related to the age of the population is that of life expectancy. 
However, this is a measure that is often used as an indicator of the ‘quality of life’, with 
the assumption that a minimum quality of life is necessary before people feel able to 
participate in politics (Blais 2000). As with literacy rates, this measure may be more 
useful when comparing developed and less developed countries. 
It is known that the gap between the incomes of the poorest and wealthiest in a society 
is related to mortality; and that the death rate is higher among the poorer and more 
marginalised groups (Kennedy, Kawachi et al. 1996; Hwang, Wilkins et al. 2009). These 
groups are among those less likely to have the resources necessary to vote in elections. 
We could expect, then, that regions with a higher death rate would be associated with 
lower turnout in elections.  However, a higher death rate may also reflect a more elderly 
population; and increasing age has also been shown to be associated with an increasing 
propensity to vote.  
Occupation and Unemployment 
Using American survey data, Verba and Nie (1972) showed that those with higher socio-
economic status were more likely to participate in politics17. Closely related to socio-
economic status is the idea of ‘class’, and though the role of class in electoral choices has 
generally declined, it has not disappeared. Because there are difficulties in 
operationalising ‘class’ as a variable, it is usually linked in some way to the occupation of 
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 Verba and Nie suggested that ‘civic attitudes’ – various factors conducive to participation - were an 
intervening effect. Such factors include a sense of efficacy, psychological involvement in politics, and a 
feeling of obligation to vote. As such, these civic attitudes seem to occupy similar ground to the ‘sense of 
duty’ in Riker and Ordeshook’s modified calculus of voting, and to that of socialisation theory. 
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the voter (Evans 1999), with different types of occupation being categorised into 
different classes. For example, semi- and un-skilled workers could be considered as 
‘working class’, whereas professionals and administrators could be considered as ‘upper-
middle class’. Some types of occupation, as well as providing further opportunities for 
social interactions and hence exposure to behavioural norms, may encourage the 
development of skills in bureaucratic and abstract tasks. In addition, some jobs may 
expose individuals to particular political issues, policies, and actors (Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980). Occupational type, is of course, linked to income, and higher income 
groups have been shown to vote more than lower income groups (Norris 2004:175). 
However, there is some evidence that, even when we consider the same category of 
workers, there are differences between countries. In one of the few comparative studies 
to consider turnout in local elections, it was shown that a higher proportion of manual 
workers is associated with increased turnout in France, whereas in England the effect is 
negative (Hoffmann-Martinot, Rallings et al. 1996). 
As well as suggesting that a person’s occupation can influence the likelihood that they 
will vote, previous research has also shown that electoral participation can vary 
depending on whether their employment is in the public or private sector. For example, 
it is known that public employees may be better informed about policy issues and 
choices, and therefore tend to vote at a higher rate than private employees (Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone 1980; Braconnier and Dormagen 2007).  
At the other extreme, an absence of occupation, that is unemployment, has long been 
associated with reduced turnout in elections (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; 
Rosenstone 1982; Brady, Verba et al. 1995), not only because the unemployed have 
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fewer resources, but also because they have less desire to participate 18.  However, this 
too has been shown to vary from country to country (Radcliff 1992; Nevitte, Blais et al. 
2009), and also seems to show a greater effect in the recently unemployed than in the 
longer term (Rosenstone 1982).  
Membership of a trade union or political party.  
The very act of joining a political party not only represents a form of political 
participation (Scarrow 2007), but also implies a certain degree of partisanship on the 
part of the member. As such, we may expect that party members would be more likely, 
on average, to undertake the relatively easy task of casting a vote in an election. and this 
has been shown to be the case in comparative studies (Siaroff and Merer 2002). 
Although a worker may join a trade union for non-partisan reasons, unions themselves 
are inherently political organisations that lobby governments and fund political 
campaigns; to be a union member, then, is to implicitly take part in politics (Burns, 
Schlozman et al. 2001:58). Further, being a member of a political party or a trade union 
can increase involvement in social networks, exposure to group norms, and lead to a 
greater awareness of political issues. Not surprisingly, then, membership of either type 
of organisation has been linked to increased turnout in elections (Blais 2000; Siaroff and 
Merer 2002).  
Length of residence 
As noted by Sharp (1955), the act of voting appears to be related to the length of 
residence in a particular community. People who have lived in a place for longer periods 
of time are more likely to feel more involved, be better informed about local political 
issues, and thus more likely to participate in politics generally, and to vote in elections 
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 Lower levels of participation among the unemployed are considered by some to be evidence that larger 
amounts of ‘free-time’ do not lead to increased turnout (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980:29) 
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(Geys 2006a:644). Conversely, as the turnover of the local population increases, the 
more any sense of community may be undermined, and the greater the social distances 
between individuals (Ashworth, Heyndels et al. 2002) 19. Different measures have been 
used in previous research in order to take account of the stability of the population, such 
as population growth, or the level of home ownership20. Whichever measure is used, the 
results are generally consistent, with more stable populations being, on the whole, more 
likely to vote in elections (Hoffmann-Martinot, Rallings et al. 1996; Geys 2006a).  
 
Having considered those variables which relate to the characteristics of the individual 
voter, we now turn to the aggregate level variables – GDP and population density. 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
There are competing views as to the effects of the economic situation (usually measured 
by GDP or GNP21) on turnout (Bengtsson 2004). On the one hand it has been argued that 
when times are tough, those most adversely affected would be more likely to blame the 
government and hence be more motivated to vote as a means of expressing their 
dissatisfaction. On the other hand, those faced with financial difficulties may be less 
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 This may be particularly the case when considering local elections, rather than national elections where 
new arrivals from within the same country will have an equal chance of being informed as to the salient 
issues as will the pre-existing residents of a particular locale. Local elections are more likely be more 
concerned with local issues. This effect does not appear to have been examined in previous comparative 
research. 
20
 Although home ownership may indeed be a measure of population stability, home owners may also be 
more likely to vote in elections as they may be more affected by policy decisions (Geys 2006a). Further, 
population growth may be organic (increased local birth rate and or declining local death rate) or the result 
of higher net migration; the former would necessarily result in an increase in younger age groups, whereas 
the latter could, for example, be the result of more retired people moving to a particular area. An additional 
difference may occur when we consider different types of elections; local elections are more likely to involve 
local issues, with new arrivals perhaps being less informed and hence less likely to vote. In the case of 
national elections, however, new arrivals (from within the same country) would be equally likely to be 
informed of the national issues as the existing residents). 
21
 Both GNP (Gross National Product) and GDP are derived from a country’s national accounts, with GDP 
being the more common measure nowadays. The major difference between the two measures is that GDP 
includes production within a country even when the resources used to generate that production are not 
owned by a country’s residents. GNP only counts production from resources owned by a country’s residents 
(Waring 1999). 
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likely to vote, as they are preoccupied with day to day survival and the immediate 
challenges of making ends meet (Rosenstone 1982).  
GDP is often used in a rather different way in comparative studies; that is, to 
differentiate between groups of countries on the basis of their economic or industrial 
development. Indeed, Powell (1980) simply divided his set of countries into two groups – 
‘developed’ and ‘developing’ – and reported that turnout in developed countries was 
some 12 per cent higher than in the developing countries. However, around the same 
time, Crewe noted that the correlation between turnout and GDP was very weak; and 
wondered just what the effects of GDP were, as turnout in most countries had remained 
‘unswervingly flat during a period of unprecedented economic growth...’  22 (Crewe 
1981:259).  
In a more recent and sophisticated analysis, Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) also found that 
higher GNP per capita (measured at the country level) was associated with higher 
turnout, but that this effect was most marked when comparing very low GNP countries 
to all others – and had a much smaller effect within that group of countries with above 
average GNP per capita23.  In their bivariate analysis of lower house elections in 38 
developed (European) countries, Siaroff and Merer (2002) found GNP to have a 
significant, positive effect on turnout; however, GNP was not included in their 
subsequent multivariate analysis.  
The foregoing suggests that GDP may be a useful basis on which to ascertain how 
developed a particular country is, but may be less useful as a determinant of turnout 
when comparing only developed countries. Although the evidence generally supports 
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 Crewe referred to the puzzle of turnout being related to education and income at the individual level, but 
not at the aggregate level (Crewe 1981:260). 
23
 Further, high economic growth did not appear to result in significantly higher turnout (reflecting Crewe’s 
concerns two decades earlier). 
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the view that increasing economic adversity depresses turnout, it has also been shown 
that there are variations, even between developed countries, depending on the extent 
and nature of the welfare systems which they have (Radcliff 1992). Further, Colomer 
reported that countries with higher public expenditure (relative to the GDP) have, on 
average, higher turnout than countries with lower public expenditure (Colomer 1991). 
Population and Population Density 
It has been suggested that countries with smaller populations have a greater sense of 
community, and hence will have higher turnout than more populous countries. 
Alternatively, in terms of the calculus of voting, in a smaller population of voters, the 
chances of casting the deciding vote are higher. Whatever the mechanism, the 
relationship between population and turnout has been confirmed in a number of studies 
(Blais and Carty 1990; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Blais 2000)24. It has also been argued 
that where population density is higher, turnout will be higher because individuals will 
be less dispersed, feel closer to their fellow citizens and hence more likely to be exposed 
to group pressures and efforts at mobilisation. On the other hand, others have argued 
that increasing urbanisation undermines the social pressure to vote, as interpersonal 
bonds and social structures are weaker. Perhaps it is not surprising, given these 
competing theoretical views, that the evidence for this effect is somewhat mixed in 
studies which have measured population density at the country level. For example, Blais 
(2000) reports only a weak relationship between turnout and population density (see 
also Blais and Dobrzynska 1998). Siaroff and Merer (2002) found that, although 
population density was associated with increased turnout in their bivariate analysis, this 
relationship was not significant in any of their subsequent multivariate analyses. In a 
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 It has also been argued that communication between citizens is easier, and thus it is more likely that 
political interest would be heightened in smaller communities. However, these effects may be questionable, 
as even in a small community of, say, 1000 citizens, the chances that two randomly chosen people indeed 
communicate is actually rather small (Ashworth, Heyndels et al. 2002). 
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study confined to Eastern European countries, Kostadinova  (2003) also found urban 
population to be non-significant (although in this case the coefficient was negative). In 
an analysis based on turnout in municipal elections in the United States and a number of 
Western European countries, and using seven categories of municipality population size, 
Morlan (Morlan 1984) found that in general, turnout declines as population increases25.  
Rather than using the simple population density measure, some studies have used 
descriptive categories, such as urban-rural, or centre-periphery. Even within a single 
country, there has been considerable debate as to whether rural dwellers are more or 
less likely to vote than residents of cities, a controversy which is sometimes complicated 
by the assumption that people who do not live in cities are all farmers (who have been 
shown more likely to vote than other occupational groups; see Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980:30). Indeed, the simple urban-rural classification may be too simplistic: 
as shown by some studies which have taken into account the size of town in which 
people live (either as defined objectively by arbitrary  categories based on population 
size, or subjectively chosen by survey respondents from lists such as ‘village, town, or 
city’) (Oppenhuis 1995; Nevitte, Blais et al. 2009). As with some other variables discussed 
above, there appears to be a difference between America and Europe: with mid-sized 
towns in America being associated with lower turnout than large cities, suburbs, or rural 
areas; whereas in Europe it is large cities which are associated with lower turnout than 
smaller towns or villages. However, although Oppenhuis reports this effect to be very 
similar across the European countries in his analysis, no such pattern is revealed in the 
individual country analyses performed by Nevitte et al. (Nevitte, Blais et al. 2009); 
                                                             
25
 Although Morlan cautioned against taking his findings as support for explanations based on a greater 
sense of community in smaller units. Further, when he examined turnout in territorial units which had been 
subject to the then fashionable amalgamation of municipalities, Morlan found that such amalgamation had 
not had any significant effects on turnout. 
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indeed, in the latter study, in most countries none of the categories (town, suburb, city) 
is statistically significant. 
This section has identified a number of institutional and socio-demographic factors 
which previous research has identified as influencing the level of turnout in elections. 
However, not all types of elections attract the same level of turnout. In the next section, 
we discuss the relative importance of elections in the eyes of the voter.  
First-, Second- (and Third-) Order Elections 
As Miller noted concerning the public’s view of local elections in Britain, ‘their 
expectations were not high and their disappointment was not intense’ (1988:244). This 
view is not confined to Britain, and it has long been known that electorates view national 
elections differently to the other elections which are held within a country (for example, 
Gosnell 1930:Ch 7). More recently, in a comparison of turnout in national and local 
elections in 14 countries, Blais (2000) found, that on average, turnout in local elections 
was some 13 percentage points lower than in national elections.  
Even within the European countries in Blais’ analysis, though, there was substantial 
country-to-country variation; in Britain, average turnout in local elections was found to 
be over 30 points lower than turnout in national elections; in Belgium the difference was 
less than half of one percent. A simple explanation for the small difference in Belgium is 
that voting there is compulsory in both national and local elections. However, if we 
consider France, where voting is not compulsory, the difference in turnout between the 
two election types is still less than two percentage points 26 (Blais 2000).  A number of 
explanations have been suggested to account for variations in the patterns of local-
national election turnout in different countries. These include differing views as to the 
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 Similar observations were made by Gosnell (1930) two generations prior – evidence for a remarkable 
stability in these differences, despite the intervening changes to franchise and suffrage in these countries. 
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relative importance of national and local governments, or the degree of politicisation 
and mobilisation. However, none of these is able to fully account for the variations in 
this turnout gap 27 (Blais 2000:39). 
Electors are not limited to casting their votes in national and local elections. Indeed, with 
the advent of direct elections to the European Parliament (EP) in 1979, voters in the 
member states of the European Community were presented with an entirely new set of 
elections; and new avenues of research presented themselves to political scientists. To 
those with an interest in voting behaviour, these elections were of particular interest 
since, although they occurred more or less simultaneously across all member states, a 
variety of electoral systems and rules were used28.  
In the first study to compare turnout in EP elections to turnout in the respective 
country’s national legislative elections, Reif and Schmitt (1980) coined the phrase 
‘second-order’  to describe those elections where there is, in some sense, less at stake. 
Simply put, second-order elections play no role in deciding who governs the country. 
Hence, fewer calculate that the costs of voting are outweighed by the benefits, and 
turnout is lower than in first-order elections for the legislature. However, ‘some second-
order elections are evidently more second order than others’ (van der Eijk, Franklin et al. 
1996:162). Voters in many countries behave as if there was even less at stake in EP 
elections than in other second-order elections, and the very low turnout for EP elections 
in some countries supports the notion that European Parliament elections be considered 
as third-order (Marsh 1998; Heath, McLean et al. 1999; Rallings and Thrasher 2005).  
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 Blais suggested that the difference may be linked to the degree of urbanisation: turnout in municipal 
elections has been shown to decrease as the size of municipality increases (cited by Blais 2000:39); and it is 
possible that this effect is smaller in national elections. However, Blais was not able to test this hypothesis. 
28
 This was more marked in early elections to the EP, when both plurality/majoritarian and PR systems were 
used. More recently, all countries have used PR systems, but the specific arrangements used (for example 
compulsory voting, or weekend voting) do still vary from country to country. 
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The first-, second-, third-order distinction, then, appears to be justified by empirical 
evidence. However, as we will see in later chapters, even after taking into account the 
various institutional and socio-demographic characteristics which were discussed 
previously, there remain between- and within-country differences in the levels of 
turnout for any given type of election. These differences may reflect the national or 
regional factors which influence the context in which the voter is situated, and thus 
which enhance the visibility or perceived importance of the election.  
We discuss these factors in more detail in Chapter 4, but note here that they may well be 
specific to a particular type of election.  For instance, at the local level we will investigate 
two factors, both of which can be seen as affecting what is at stake in the election. 
Firstly, the level of local taxation, and the autonomy that municipalities enjoy in setting 
these taxes, varies from country to country. Local taxes are directly felt by the 
electorate; and the services which they fund relate to the locality in a way that is not the 
case with taxes levied by central government. Higher taxes serve to increase the 
differential benefits that the rational voter takes into account, so we would expect the 
level of local taxes to have an influence on turnout in municipal elections. We are not 
aware of previous comparative research in this area; although it has been shown that 
the level of public spending (usually funded at least in part by taxes) has been shown to 
be associated with the level of turnout: countries with higher public spending tend to 
exhibit higher turnout in national, first-order elections (Colomer 1991). The second 
factor we will investigate at the local level relates to the powers enjoyed by the mayor; 
which can vary substantially from country to country (Bäck, Heinelt et al. 2006).  As 
Evans has pointed out, various institutional and individual characteristics may be 
important predictors of turnout in elections, but may have much less influence if the 
outcome of the election is a powerless representative (Evans 2004:169). Where the local 
mayor wields substantive powers, he or she is more likely to make decisions which 
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directly impact the lives of the electorate. Compared to countries where the mayoral 
powers are more limited, or even purely ceremonial, there is more at stake in the 
election, and we would thus expect turnout to be higher.  
In the case of supranational elections, that is, those to the European Parliament, 
measures related to the power of the elected representative or to levels of taxation are 
of limited applicability. However, the salience of the European Union, and by implication, 
that of the European Parliament, may vary from region to region within European 
countries. For instance, in order to better promote their interests within the policy 
making arenas of the European Union, many sub-national regions have decided to invest 
resources in establishing a permanent representative office in Brussels (Nugent 1999). 
That not all regions have such an office implies that some regions view the EU as more 
important than do others. This may be a view confined to the political elite, but it could 
also reflect, or encourage, similar feelings among the electorate as a whole. Were this 
the case, we would expect that turnout in EP elections would be higher in those regions 
which have a representative office in Brussels. 
For elections to the national legislature, we will consider the mobilising effect of  
‘nationalised’ party systems; that is, how widely the major parties contest the total 
number of constituencies in the country. Historically, the growth in the territorial 
coverage of political parties was often driven by the desire to mobilise increasing 
numbers of voters. As parties contested more and more constituencies, local support 
networks grew and campaigning became more efficient. This growth in the territorial 
coverage of political parties was often associated with a strengthening of the left-right 
cleavage (Caramani 2005).  There are two reasons, then, to expect that turnout would be 
higher, at least in elections to the national legislature, in those countries where the 
major political parties contest all, or nearly all, of the total constituencies. Firstly, the 
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increased efficiency of campaigning by political parties serves to increase the proportion 
of the electorate who, even if they have not been contacted directly by a political party, 
are aware of the campaign issues, or even of the election itself. Secondly, the increased 
importance of the left-right cleavage serves to both clarify and simplify the choices on 
offer, thus reducing the information costs associated with voting.   
Despite the historical nationalisation of party systems in several countries, some 
consider that voting behaviour is still affected by regional contexts; or, indeed, that in 
some cases the previous trend towards a territorial homogenisation of politics has been 
reversed (Keating 1998:101). As we will see in Chapter 3, over the past few decades, a 
number of Western European countries have undergone significant reorganisations of 
their territorial politics, and in some cases this has led to the strengthening or creation of 
regional level governments. However, the various regions within European countries 
also differ in terms of other factors, such as their culture and identity, or their patterns 
of economic development (Keating 1998). These factors combine and contribute to the 
regional context; and, where they coincide and reinforce each other, the result is strong 
‘regionalism’. We would expect, then, that differing levels of regionalism would be 
associated with differing patterns of turnout in regional elections. However, there is 
reason to expect that regionalism may be associated with different patterns of turnout 
in other types of election, because there is evidence that turnout for national elections 
tends to be lower where strong regional governments also exist (Blais and Dobrzynska 
1998; Siaroff and Merer 2002). 
Discussion 
This chapter has provided a review of the literature relating to voting in elections. After 
considering the usefulness, and the limitations, of rational choice approaches, we 
identified several institutional and socio-demographic factors which have been 
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suggested as having an influence on turnout. Although there are exceptions, previous 
research suggests that the institutional variables are somewhat more consistent in their 
effects than are the socio-demographic variables.  
However, even within a single type of election, and when both institutional and socio-
economic variables are included in multivariate analyses, substantial country differences 
can remain, as evidenced by the frequent use of dummy variables by several authors. 
The ‘usual suspects’ are the USA and Switzerland (for example, Powell 1986; Jackman 
1987; Blais 2000); but a number of other countries have also been subject to this 
treatment (or even continents, see Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Siaroff and Merer 2002). 
Further, with the possible exception of compulsory voting, none of the suggested 
determinants of voting is ‘omnipresent’ in the literature: not only do findings differ as to 
whether a particular variable is statistically significant; but in many cases there are 
contradictory findings as to the direction of the effect that a particular variable may have 
(Blais 2000; Geys 2006a). This is, at least in part, a reflection of the differing aims of 
previous researchers, the differing sets of variables which they used, and the countries 
which were included in their analyses.  
It should also be noted that most comparative research into turnout in elections which 
has relied, in full or in part, on aggregate data, has been confined to the country level of 
analysis.  Indeed, in a recent review of such studies over the previous three decades, 
only two used turnout in sub-national geographical units (both of which only compared 
turnout in two countries, and each was limited to a single type of election, see Geys 
2006a). Although this may not present too many difficulties when we consider the 
institutional determinants of voting (which tend to remain constant for all voters in a 
country within a given election), the use of country-level data severely limits the 
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opportunity to investigate whether various social groups respond in the same way to 
these differing institutional arrangements (Kostadinova 2003).   
More generally, findings based on country-level data may not necessarily apply within 
the countries included in the analysis. These within country variations have generally 
been left to those who employ individual level survey data (for a rare exception see 
Hoffmann-Martinot, Rallings et al. 1996 who used turnout and explanatory variables 
aggregated to the level of the local government unit for local elections in France and 
England). The results of such individual level research have often brought into question 
the findings based on aggregate level research, even for those variables which have 
generally been taken as robust in their effects. For example, based on CSES survey data, 
Nevitte et al. (2009) concluded that both age and education have significant and 
consistent effects on turnout in elections. However, these effects are, in fact, apparent 
in only two-thirds and just over one half, respectively, of the 29 countries included in 
their analysis. Support for ‘consistent’ effects of other variables in their analysis (such as 
size of population, or employment status) is even weaker29.  
Of course, survey data is subject to its own limitations, particularly those of selection 
bias and the tendency of respondents to over-report their voting in elections. The 
former means that voters tend to be over-represented among the respondents to 
election surveys. This obviously presents difficulties when investigating the differences 
between voters and non-voters; and these difficulties are compounded because this 
over-representation of voters has been shown to increase with declining response rates 
                                                             
29
 There is a further difficulty when considering individual and aggregate variables: even when they appear 
to be measuring aspects of the same particular characteristic, the links between the two are tenuous at best. 
For example, the educational attainment of a particular individual contributes, albeit in a near trivial way, to 
the proportion of the population with that given level of education. However, the aggregate value is often 
considered as also having contextual effects, which may or may not interact with the individual level 
measure.  
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(Burden 2000). However, the latter can also be a substantial problem, and has been 
shown to be of the order of 30 per cent (Milligan, Moretti et al. 2004). Further, this 
effect is not constant either, appearing not only to be generally higher in countries with 
higher participation rates, but also to vary within countries in ways related to the socio-
economic status of the respondent (Milligan, Moretti et al. 2004; Karp and Brockington 
2005).   
In order to explore within country variations in turnout whilst avoiding the inherent 
limitations of survey data, we need an alternative approach. An obvious avenue is to use 
aggregate turnout and socio-demographic data for geographical units within countries. 
In Chapter 4 we will describe the development of a such a dataset.  
As we have also seen in this chapter, people respond differently to different types of 
election; unsurprisingly, more people vote in more important elections. Previous 
comparative research has rarely investigated elections other than those for the national 
legislature or the European Parliament. We are able to go further, and include elections 
for sub-national governments. The organisation of territorial government varies 
considerably from country to country, as do the systems and rules pertaining to each 
type of election. This will be the subject of Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3 : Governments and Elections 
Introduction 
All Western European countries are now democracies, but they reached this status at 
different times, and by different routes. Indeed, state-building itself is not a ‘once and 
for all process’ (Jessop 2006:114). Rather, it has often entailed successive waves of 
centralisation and decentralisation, tempered by the persistence of old customs, 
practices and values, and has been subject to external, as well as internal influences. 
Even in countries where the state is strong and centralised, the powers of a government 
are never all-embracing, and governing has always had a territorial dimension (Hague 
and Harrop 2004:228; Thoenig 2006). Because of their particular histories and cultures, 
and their differing settlements following internal struggles between the centre and the 
periphery, Western European countries differ widely in the organisation of territorial 
decision making processes, and, in particular, in their arrangements for sub-national 
government. 
Of course, historical influences are not limited to the development of various levels of 
government, but also to the arenas in which candidates compete. Electoral systems and 
rules are not ‘a given’, but are also subject to change: not only in response to changing 
societal values or to the shifting allegiances within political parties, but also because 
political actors often seek to influence the particular systems and rules which are chosen 
(and for compelling empirical evidence, see Colomer 2005; Freeman 2006; 
Rueschemeyer 2006; Tilly and Goodin 2006; Blais 2008). Of course, such shifts in 
electoral systems are often presented by their proponents as having some greater 
democratic virtue, and merely have the ‘happy coincidence’ of awarding more seats to 
previously ‘under-represented’ parties (Bowler 2006:587). Whatever the underlying 
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causes, electoral arrangements in Western European countries often differ markedly, 
not only between countries, but sometimes within them. 
In this chapter, we firstly present a brief historical synopsis for each country, and identify 
the major internal and international factors which have influenced the development of 
the different levels of government which exist today. Selected characteristics of each 
level of government are then provided, and, in the case of local government, these 
characteristics are discussed in relation to the typologies suggested by previous 
researchers. This will lead to a particular focus on those characteristics of governments 
which were suggested in the previous chapter as influencing the context in which the 
voter is situated, and which will be included in our subsequent analyses, specifically: 
levels of public sector employment and the tax raising powers of sub-national 
governments, as well as the powers enjoyed by the local mayor in each country. These 
characteristics are necessarily measured at the country-level; but several of the 
countries examined here display a degree of variation when we consider their 
component regions. In order to explore aspects of this ‘regionalisation’, we draw on the 
work of Keating (1998) and develop a numerical score for each region in each country. 
We then turn to the systems and rules which are used for electing each type of 
government in each country; with a particular emphasis on the institutional 
determinants of voting that were identified in Chapter 2. 
It is appropriate here to make a brief comment on nomenclature: ‘local’ and ‘municipal’ 
are used interchangeably, and refer to the lowest level of sub-national government 
which we will consider. The ‘intermediate’ level lies between the local and national 
levels (Larsson, Nomden et al. 1999), and corresponds to, for example, the county 
councils in Sweden. However, a number of countries exhibit two tiers of government 
within the intermediate level; for example, France has departmental and regional levels 
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of government. Where this is the case, the lower and upper levels of intermediate 
government are identified accordingly. Note that ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ here refer simply to 
the geographical extent of the two tiers (with lower level units typically nested within 
upper level units), and, as the following discussion will make clear, do not necessarily 
imply hierarchical power relationships. 
Country synopses 
The following section will provide a brief overview of the historical development and 
present form of national and sub-national government for each country. The sheer range 
and complexity necessitates a degree of simplification; the aim here is to provide some 
context to the present arrangements. Although many systems of sub-national 
government can trace their roots to traditions of self-government in towns and cities, 
and to nineteenth century nation-building, it is important to recognise that each system 
is evolving from a different starting point (Norton 1991). Further, each country has also 
had to deal with its own specific challenges, and may have responded differently to 
similar international and European influences. Indeed, ‘decentralising tendencies which 
may be observed in some traditionally highly centralised systems may still leave them 
more centralised than some other countries in which local autonomy is being eroded’ 
(Blair 1991:42).  
Belgium 
Prior to its formation on breaking away from the Netherlands in 1830, the territory 
which was to become Belgium had long been marked by strong and independent cities; a 
history reflected in the decentralist legislation of 1836 which, as well as providing for the 
existence and finance of the provinces, gave formal recognition to the important role 
played by municipalities (Halvarsson nd). In the post-war period, rather more attention 
has been paid to cultural autonomy based on ancient language boundaries, the tensions 
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between which were eventually to lead to a federalised state in 1993, governed by the 
Constitution of 1994 (which itself has been subject to subsequent modifications).  
The Constitution recognises the existence of four ‘language territories’ (German, French, 
Dutch, and the bilingual Brussels-Capital) and three language Communities (German, 
Flemish, and French). In addition, Belgium is divided into three geographical regions: 
Walloon, Flemish, and Brussels-Capital. At the top level, the three Communities and the 
three Regions are considered as legally equal to the Federal State itself. In addition, the 
Communities and Regions have their own directly elected assemblies. In this rather 
complex system, each level of government holds some exclusive powers, but is also 
obliged to cooperate and consult with other levels of government. Within these 
arrangements, each Region is responsible for applying existing legislation (and has the 
power to enact new legislation) concerning its provinces and municipalities. The ten 
provinces have few formal powers, though they play important roles in complex policy- 
making networks. The provincial councillors are directly elected, but the politically well-
connected provincial governor is directly appointed by the region. The region may also 
appoint the municipal burgomaster (Halvarsson nd).   
In the post-war years, the number of municipalities steadily grew, but since the 1970s, 
successive rounds of rationalisation and amalgamation have reduced their numbers 
markedly. Compared to several other European countries, Belgian municipalities control 
a relatively small portion of total public spending, and derive financial resources via a 
mixture of taxes and levies, and from allocations from central, regional and community 
governments. In the 1990s, growing dissatisfaction over control and coordination of 
various tax levying powers, and the influence of New Public Management (NPM), led to 
changes in the relationship between central and sub-national governments; however, 
similar to the situation in Spain (see below) this resulted in a centralisation of powers at 
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the regional and community levels, rather than a delegation of powers to local 
governments. The linguistic communities, regions, and provinces are constitutionally 
protected. Legislation for the municipalities is provided by the Municipalities Act of 
1989. Belgium took part in the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979 
(CoE 1998a; Hendriks 2001a; Plees 2005). 
England 
In contrast to all the other countries in the present analysis, England (as part of the 
United Kingdom) does not have a single document called ‘The Constitution’ (Gallagher, 
Laver et al. 2006); and the powers, structure, workings, and indeed the very existence of 
the various levels of government are subject to the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty. As such, there is no formal constitutional protection for sub-national 
government in England, arrangements for which can be, and have been, altered by 
means of normal legislation. Local government developed sporadically in response to 
social changes, including industrialisation and the attendant growth of cities, into a 
patchwork of councils of different types and sizes, but all being constrained to perform 
only those duties specifically provided for by parliament. Various metropolitan county 
councils were abolished in the 1970s. Following the election of a Conservative 
government in 1979, further metropolitan councils were abolished, and the remaining 
councils of all categories saw their responsibilities and budgets decline. NPM practices 
were introduced30, including the imposition of compulsory competitive tendering, along 
with unprecedented central control over local government expenditure and the hiving-
off of various tasks to centrally appointed agencies. Further reforms in the 1990s aimed 
                                                             
30
 Indeed, the UK was one of the first countries to introduce NPM practices after its initial launch in New 
Zealand  (Kettl 2006) 
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at increased efficiency and accountability saw some county and district councils 
consolidated into new unitary authorities (although with questionable success, see 
Chisolm 2000). Following the election of a Labour government in 1997, a London 
Assembly and directly elected mayor were established (along with a Scottish Parliament 
and a Welsh Assembly). Legislation in 2000 provided for local authorities to choose 
alternative management structures, including the introduction of directly elected 
mayors. However, the central government retained its strong position in relation to local 
government through tight control of grants, and the imposition of targets and various 
inspection regimes. Local government still accounts for a substantial portion of total 
public expenditure, but there is minimal opportunity for discretion to be exercised at the 
local level. The relatively large size of local authorities (compared to many European 
countries) means there has been less perceived need to encourage cooperation between 
authorities. Legislation in 1998 did provide for administrative regions with indirectly 
elected assemblies, but the aim of establishing directly elected regional governments for 
England was unsuccessful, hindered at least in part by the lack of strong regional 
traditions and identities, and of clear geographic boundaries (but see Garside and 
Hebbert 1989). Indeed, the only referendum held, in the North East of England, resulted 
in an emphatic rejection of proposals for an elected regional assembly. The national 
second chamber (the Lords) is not directly elected. The United Kingdom took part in the 
first direct elections to the European parliament in 1979. Unusually in the European 
Union, England (as part of the UK) did not use a proportional representation system for 
elections to the European Parliament until 1999 (Loughlin 2001c; BBC 2004; Wilson 
2005). 
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Finland 
After seven centuries as part of Sweden, and a century as a semi-autonomous duchy 
within the Russian Empire, Finland became independent in 1917. In 1919, following a 
bitter civil war, a constitution was adopted which contained French, American, and 
Swedish influences and provided for a division of powers between parliament and 
president. Reflecting the Nordic tradition of local self-government, and recognised in the 
constitution (CoE 2009), local authorities enjoy considerable powers. In the 1980s, more 
functions were transferred to local authorities from the central state. In the 1990s, in 
reaction to economic contraction as elsewhere in Europe, and to the loss of the Soviet 
Union as a major trading partner, mergers between local authorities were encouraged 
by the central government. Local authorities have both general and special 
competencies, the latter being delegated from central government and regulated by 
specific laws. Local authorities levy their own taxes, but with agreement with central 
government and associations of local authorities. There are also block grants from 
central government. The 1919 Constitution provided for an intermediate level of 
government, but (in contrast to Sweden), this has not been put in place (except the 
special case of the Åland archipelago). However, prompted at least in part by the need 
to administer EU structural funds, there have been 19 indirectly elected regional councils 
since 1994 (Lidström 2001a; Rose and Ståhlberg 2005). There is no national second 
chamber. Having held a one-off election in 1996 after joining the Union in 1995, Finland 
took part in the European Parliament elections of 1999. 
France 
France has often been considered as one of the most centralised states in Western 
Europe, but the Revolutionary image of a one and indivisible republic was something of a 
reaction to the high degree of cultural and social diversity, which exists to the present 
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day. At a national level, the constitution of the Fifth Republic divides power between the 
directly elected president and the parliament, which consists of the directly elected 
Assembly and the indirectly elected Senate. Following the Revolution, France possessed 
local administration rather than real local government, but, driven in part by massive 
social change and exodus from countryside to towns and cities, the powers of local 
actors increased in the post-war years. This process was accelerated by the 
decentralisation reforms of the 1980s. As well as granting greater autonomy and 
financial resources to municipalities, and reducing the powers of the state-appointed 
prefects, these reforms also created the present-day regional (upper intermediate) level 
of government. The departmental (lower intermediate) level of government, along with 
its directly elected councils, was left in place despite the newly created regions. 
However, although the departments continue to employ a greater number of people, 
many view the regional councils as being the more powerful political actors. French 
people are among those most attached to their locality, and identify much more strongly 
with their municipality than the state, which goes some way to explaining why so many 
municipalities have survived despite their small size, and in the face of various attempts 
by central government to abolish or amalgamate them. Although private companies had 
long held an important place in the local delivery of services, further privatisation and 
deregulation pressures, and the curtailment of the powers of the prefects, led to new 
windows of opportunity for sub-national actors, in particular the mayors and local 
politicians. The key figure in the municipality is the mayor, who may also hold other 
elected offices. This quasi-systematic practice (cumul des mandats) is a singularly French 
phenomenon, and, until 1985, it was possible to hold elected office at the municipal, 
departmental, regional, and European level, as well as in either the lower or upper 
house. Legislation in 1985 limited to two the number of offices held simultaneously: it is 
worth noting that, in 1990, nearly 90 per cent of parliamentarians held at least one other 
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elected position (Mény 2008:120). Local government expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP is relatively low but discretionary authority for local authorities is high, and the 
ability to levy local taxes has risen, leading some to see parallels between French local 
authorities and those in the Scandinavian countries. Sub-national governments in France 
now account for some 70 per cent of all public investment. However, there exist 
complex networks and overlapping policy competencies; and the central government 
retains its abilities to shape the various political and administrative institutions. The 
status of communes and departments are constitutionally protected, whereas the 
regional level is covered by ordinary legislation. France took part in the first direct 
elections for the European Parliament in 1979 (Lorrain 1991; CoE 1998b; Loughlin and 
Seiler 2001; Borraz and Le Galès 2005; Mény 2008). 
Greece  
In the 19th century, following four centuries of Ottoman rule, newly independent Greece 
established a centralised state along the French Napoleonic model (including provincial 
level prefects). However, a blend of western and non-western cultures has continued to 
affect the nature and practice of democracy. Territorial disputes, struggles for liberation, 
and the presence of hostile neighbours all contributed to an emphasis by political elites 
on territorial unification and centralism. In 1912, legislation abolished the previous 
municipalities, and established new municipalities and communes with weaker local 
power bases. Municipal elections were suspended during subsequent periods of 
dictatorship, war, and military junta. With the fall of the military junta in 1974, municipal 
(urban) and communal (rural) elections resumed, and have been held every four years 
since. Of the 5775 municipalities and communities which existed in 1993, almost 80 per 
cent had a population less than a thousand. As such, many local authorities were too 
small to adequately perform their assigned functions, and were largely dependent on 
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the prefectural level. Reforms in the 1980s reduced prefectural control, and for the first 
time local authorities sent representatives to sit on the prefectural (intermediate level) 
councils. Since 1995, prefectural councils have become directly elected (elections taking 
place on the same day as municipal elections). In 1997, central government legislated to 
merge the municipalities and communities, reducing their numbers to 113 and 900 
respectively). Though some have claimed that Greece became a much more 
decentralised state during the 1990s, Loughlin (2001a) considers that (though some 
progress has been made) these claims must be treated with some caution. Local 
government is protected by the 1975 constitution. Greece became a member of the 
European Union in 1981, held a one-off election for members of the European 
Parliament in the same year, and then joined other member states for the 1984 EU-wide 
elections (CoE 2001; Loughlin 2001a). 
Ireland  
In the nineteenth century, Ireland followed a similar path to democratisation as the rest 
of the United Kingdom, resulting in a two-tier structure of sub-national government. 
With much of the character and nature of its local government system inherited from 
the British model, the creation of the Irish Free State in 1922, and of the Republic of 
Ireland in 1937, heralded a further centralisation of powers and the reduction by three-
quarters in the number of local authorities. The post-war expansion of the welfare-state 
eventually led to calls for greater efficiency and resulted in further increases in central 
government control, exacerbated by the abolition of local domestic rates. In the 1960s, 
various (non-elected) regional level administrative bodies were created, but lacked any 
common geographical basis. In 1994, following criticism from the European Commission, 
indirectly elected regional authorities were established. Ireland benefited enormously 
from the European Regional Development Funds (ERDF) and enjoyed rapid economic 
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growth in the 1990s. But the benefits remained unevenly distributed, with much poverty 
concentrated in rural areas and some districts of the towns and cities. Ironically, since 
the whole country was declared an Objective One region (and thus entitled to receive 
substantial EU funds directed at regional development), the centralised nature of Irish 
state was, if anything, enhanced. In 1985, the government announced a series of 
reforms designed to devolve power to local authorities, but none of the main aims was 
achieved prior to that government losing office. In 1990, Ireland ranked lowest in Europe 
in terms of local government spending as a percentage of national output; although this 
position improved somewhat in the late 1990s, with local government receiving local 
motor tax revenues and a dedicated portion of national revenue. Despite further 
reforms announced in 1996, and eventually gaining constitutionally protected status in 
1999, Irish local government remains weak in a highly centralised state. The national 
second chamber is not directly elected. Ireland took part in the first direct elections to 
the European parliament in 1979 (Barrington 1991; Loughlin 2001c).  
Italy  
Italy is still characterised by the deep north-south differences which existed at the time 
of its unification in the late nineteenth century. Centre-local relations have tended to be 
conflictual, with the central state generally reluctant to cede powers or financial 
autonomy.  However, internal political crises in the 1990s led to changes in the 
relationship between centre and periphery. Despite coming into being at different times 
and with different constitutional status, by the late 1970s, all 20 of the Italian regions 
(upper intermediate level) had held direct elections and they now occupy an important 
place in the Italian political landscape. Provincial (lower intermediate level) governments 
have also been directly elected since 1993, but enjoy few powers. The system of local 
government was originally based on the Franco-Napoleonic model, in which local 
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government exercised only marginal powers; and by the 1970s, they had become almost 
entirely dependent on centrally administered grants. At the same time as the range  of 
services which local governments were expected to provide was increased, Italy 
experienced a period of high inflation. The financial burden on local authorities 
increased greatly, and the need to control public expenditure led to the introduction of 
NPM techniques, along with the attendant vocabulary of privatisation, outsourcing, and 
performance measurement. However, a growing desire among the public for 
decentralisation led to reforms in the early 1990s. The powers and autonomy of 
municipal governments increased, partially at the expense of regional powers, but also 
through the introduction of a local property tax which now provides around 40 per cent 
of municipal revenue. Reforms also provided for the direct election of mayors, who 
often also hold important positions in national and regional politics. However, 
communes and municipalities vary greatly in size, and exercise their powers within 
intertwining central and regional competencies in almost every policy area. Proposals for 
constitutional reform in the late 1990s appeared to foreshadow further delegation of 
powers to regional and local authorities, along the lines of the Spanish model; but 
central governments, particularly under Berlusconi, have shown tendencies towards a 
recentralisation of powers. The national second chamber (Senate) comprises 326 
members, of which 315 are directly elected. Elections take place on the same day for 
both houses. Italy took part in the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 
1979 (Dente 1991; CoE 2000a; Loughlin 2001b; Bobbio 2005). 
Netherlands  
Historically, Dutch towns and municipalities had enjoyed high degrees of autonomy and 
independence, but these were drastically reduced with the introduction of aspects of the 
Napoleonic model during the Batavian French Period (1795-1813). The 1848 Constitution 
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of the new Kingdom of the Netherlands provided for three tiers of decentralised 
government. However, there is a large degree of interdependence and consensus-
building between the levels. Moves towards establishing a regional (upper intermediate 
level) level of government were made in the mid 1990s, but these remained indirectly 
elected as of the early 2000s. Provinces had been the historical building-blocks of the 
Dutch state, but suffered a reduction of administrative powers in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century. Despite being seen as the most important level of sub-
national government, local authorities are responsible only for implementing centrally 
set policies. In the half-century since 1950, central government efficiency initiatives 
reduced the number of municipalities by half, with a concurrent rise in average 
population. In the 1980s and 1990s, economic crisis and the influence of NPM led to 
decentralisation, but the delegated responsibilities were accompanied by reduced 
funding in order to promote increased efficiency. During the same period, responsibility 
for EU legislation tended to be concentrated at the national level, but the opportunities 
for influence by local actors increased. Although municipalities are involved in a wide 
range of service provision, the levels of locally sourced revenue are low by international 
standards. Municipalities do have some leeway in setting a local property tax, but their 
main revenue source is central government grants, frequently accompanied with strict 
controls on how the money is to be spent. Mayors have few formal powers but, being 
appointed by central government, often have the advantage of being politically well-
connected. In 1998, it was decided to revise the organisation of municipal government, 
concentrating administrative powers to the executive and proposing the direct election 
of mayors (though it was not clear how successful this would actually be). The members 
of the national upper house (Senat) are indirectly elected. The Netherlands took part in 
the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979 (Bekke 1991; Hendriks 
2001b; Denters and Klok 2005; CoE 2008).  
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Spain  
Prior to the democratic elections of 1977, Spain had endured four decades of 
authoritarian rule and the absence of representative institutions. Following the death of 
General Franco, a new state structure developed which had four levels of administration. 
The 1978 Constitution marked a reversal of forty years of centralism, and provided for 
the creation of Autonomous Communities (AC; upper intermediate level). By 1983, 17 
ACs had been established which enjoy different levels of autonomy, but all have similar 
institutions, including proportionally elected assemblies. The powers of the ACs and the 
central government are legally defined as being exclusive, shared, or concurrent; and 
funding is by a combination of local taxes, national taxes and grants, and EU solidarity 
funds. Legislation in the early 1990s provided for all ACs to attain a similar level of 
autonomy, and in several cases entailed a further transfer of powers from the central 
state. Members of the provincial (lower intermediate) councils are elected by the 
municipal councillors. Spanish municipalities themselves are ‘barely regulated’ by the 
Constitution (Alba and Navarro 2003:197). Although specific arrangements differ, each 
municipality has a directly elected council and an indirectly elected mayor. The municipal 
councillors derive about 40 per cent of their income from local taxes, the balance coming 
from both national and AC level grants and subsidies. Many of the municipalities are 
small, and, being regulated by both the central state and the AC, enjoy virtually no 
exclusive powers; indeed, whilst themselves being on the receiving end of powers 
transferred from the state, the ACs have tended to centralise their own powers at the 
expense of their respective municipalities. In the 1980s, the development of the Spanish 
welfare state led to increased resources and responsibilities for local governments, but 
this expansion was subsequently limited by financial constraints. In the 1990s, the 
municipalities campaigned for greater competencies and autonomy, but resulting 
legislation made provision for only very limited changes. The national upper house 
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(Senate) comprises 257 members, of which 208 are directly elected (with elections being 
held simultaneously with those for the lower house). Spain joined the EU in 1986, held a 
one-off election to the European parliament the following year, and voted with the rest 
of the Union in the 1989 elections (Mateo 1991; CoE 1997; Aja 2001; Alba and Navarro 
2003).  
Sweden 
Although sharing a history interwoven with the other Nordic countries, Sweden was 
created without the influence of foreign occupation. Still a relatively poor country at the 
end of the nineteenth century, industrialisation fuelled by the exploitation of rich 
primary resources led to major social changes in the early twentieth century. The post 
war years saw the growth of a generous welfare state and a large public sector. The 
county (intermediate) and local levels of government are constitutionally protected31, 
and both levels enjoy wide autonomy over a wide range of functions: especially after 
decentralisation reforms beginning in the 1930s. The directly elected county councils are 
mainly responsible for health care and regional development; but have no direct 
authority over their municipalities. Both of the sub-national levels of government have 
the constitutionally protected right to levy local taxes, can charge for services, and also 
receive direct grants from the central government. Although declining growth in the 
economy and other financial pressures in the late 1970s led to organisational changes, 
an increased delegation of responsibilities for service provision actually led to greater 
local government autonomy. However, in the early 1990s, Sweden faced an economic 
downturn and rising unemployment, and the central government imposed a short term 
freeze on local tax increases. Local government structure was subject to reforms, growth 
                                                             
31 But this status did not prevent drastic reductions in the number of municipalities in the 1950s 
and the 1970s 
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in the public sector was halted, and various rounds of privatisation and deregulation 
were implemented. Despite this, Swedish local government retains autonomy over 
borrowing and taxation, exercises considerable powers, and remains free to take on 
activities not otherwise regulated by central government. There are no local mayors, and 
ultimate decision-making authority rests with the full council. Since 1976, national, 
county, and municipal elections are held on the same day. The national second chamber 
was abolished in 1970. Sweden joined the European Union in 1995, elected members of 
the European Parliament in the same year, and then joined the other member states in 
subsequent elections - which are held separately from national, county, and local 
elections (Gustafsson 1991; Lidström 2001b; Baldersheim and Ståhlberg 2002; Rose and 
Ståhlberg 2005). 
Characteristics of Contemporary Sub-National Government 
As the foregoing country profiles show, the arrangements of sub-national government in 
all countries have been subject to domestic, European, and international influences. In 
general, the post-war years saw substantial growth in the size of the welfare state, which 
led to an increase in scope of activities of sub-national government.  However, societal 
and economic changes, especially since the 1970s, led to waves of structural reform in 
most Western European countries. There was a general move towards using NPM 
practices to gain efficiencies in service provision, along with a greater involvement of the 
private sector and the development of more complex patterns of decision-making 
(Denters and Rose 2005a). But, these changes were introduced at different times and 
with varying degrees of enthusiasm.   
Although most countries have tried to increase the size of municipalities (and thus 
reduce their number), substantial differences remain in the populations served by each 
level of government – not just between countries, but within them, as shown in Table 
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3.1. Some countries, often as a result of EU influences, have introduced or strengthened 
a regional tier of government; in others, though, the regional level remains little more 
than an administrative or statistical unit. Clearly, a great deal of variety exists in the sub-
national structure of government, and in the relative powers each level may exercise. 
However, a number of countries share some similarities which, as the following section 
will show, has led some authors to identify those groups of countries which share certain 
characteristics. 
Typologies of Sub-national Governments 
An early attempt to characterise the different local government types in European 
countries was made by Page and Goldsmith (1987). They distinguished three broad 
dimensions: the functions assigned to lower levels of government; the access of local 
government to central government; and their discretion, in terms of legal powers and 
local taxation. On these measures, Page and Goldsmith detected a broad north-south 
difference in the characteristics of local government types - with Britain and the 
Scandinavian countries comprising the Northern group, and France, Italy, and Spain in 
the Southern group. To Page and Goldsmith these differences, at least in part, appeared 
to reflect different historical routes taken towards centralisation and decentralisation.  
Although subsequent studies have suggested increasing the number of categories 
(discussed further below), often prompted by the difficulty of accommodating the British 
form of local government into any European typology, Page and Goldsmith’s approach 
remains a good starting point. Indeed, despite various criticisms of the Page and 
Goldsmith typology, and the changes which have occurred in a number of countries 
since they conducted their analysis (in particular the impact of New Public Management 
and Europeanisation), John (2001) largely found in favour of a broad north-south 
distinction.  
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However, in developing a more nuanced approach based on aspects of governance, John 
(2001) provided a more detailed basis on which to characterise the local government 
systems of the Western European countries. Of particular interest to the current study, 
John attempted to assign relative importance to sub-national government bodies in 
terms of their average populations, and the number of people they employed compared 
to central government.  More detailed and up-to-date data for the levels of public 
employment at each government level have become available since John’s analysis, and 
are included in Table 3.2.32 If the number of employees is indeed an indication of the 
relative power of a sub-national level of government, we would expect that this would 
be reflected in a higher turnout in elections: Further, as suggested in Chapter 2, public 
employees may well feel that there is more at stake in an election than would 
employees in the private sector; providing a second reason to expect higher turnout 
where there are higher number of public employees.  
However, the simple measure of the number of employees tells us little about the 
autonomy which the local elected body may, or may not, enjoy. For instance, central 
government may hold the purse strings, and allocate funds to the local body which is 
ring-fenced for tightly prescribed activities. In order to estimate the degree of autonomy 
enjoyed by the local body, Table 3.2 also includes details of the taxes levied by sub-
national governments as a proportion of all taxation in each country; and the proportion 
that these taxes represent as a share of all local government income (the balance 
coming predominantly from central government grants or various revenue sharing 
arrangements). Finally, some authors have examined the power relations between the 
local elected body and other levels of government, and the particular role of the local 
                                                             
32
 As noted by previous authors, it can be difficult to compile precise figures. For example, responsibilities for 
service provision, such as health, may be shared across levels. However, the aim here is to establish general 
trends. 
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mayor in these relationships. Heinelt and Hlepas (2006) drew on previous work and 
combined categories of both vertical and horizontal power relations in order to develop 
a typology of leadership types for each European country. Based on nine separate 
variables measuring different institutional factors, they then constructed an overall 
index of mayoral strength (Hesse and Sharpe 1991; Mouritzen and Svara 2002; Denters 
and Rose 2005b; Heinelt and Hlepas 2006:38). Their indices of mayoral strength are 
included in Table 3.2.  The effects on turnout of taxation and mayoral strength, along 
with the relative levels of public employment, will be investigated in Chapter 6.  
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Table 3.1 : Population Characteristics of Sub-national Government Units 
 Belgium England Finland France (1) Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Spain (1) Sweden 
           
Higher 
intermediate 
units 
3   22 13  20  17  
Population 
highest 
5,865,000   10,660,000 3,523,000  8,989,000  7,315,000  
Population 
smallest 
952,000   250,000 193,000  120,000  268,000  
Population 
average 
3,377,000   2,573,000 789,000  2,878,000  2,380,000  
           
Lower 
Intermediate 
units 
10   96 50  95 12 50 20 (3) 
Population 
highest 
1,629,000   2,531,000 3,523,000   3,460,000 5,182,000 1,873,000 
Population 
smallest 
240,000   73,000 21,000   379,000 94,400 127,000 
Population 
average 
918,000   590,000 201,000  559,000 1,367,000 809,000 451,000 
           
Local units  589 455 (4) 348 36,000 1,033 34 (2) 8,100 443 8,097 290 
Population 
highest 
459,000 1,318,000 568,000  772,000 482,000 2,791,000 743,000 3,030,000 765,000 
Population 
smallest 
92 15,000 116  272 25,000 30 947 4 2,590 
Population 
average 
17,000 ~100,000 13,000 1,578 11,200 ~100,000 7,100 37,000 4,997 31,000 
           
  
Notes: (1) ‘Metropolitan’ i.e. excluding the overseas departments, territories or enclaves; (2) County councils and county boroughs; (3) Excluding 
Gotland where county council duties are performed by the municipality; (4) UK, all types, excluding London.  
Sources: Council of Europe reports various years. 
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Table 3.2 : Employment and Taxation Characteristics of Sub-national Governmental Units 
    
Employees as % of population 
 
Taxes 
as % of total taxes 
 
Autonomous taxes 
as % of income 
  
Country Population (000s) 
All Government 
Employment 
% of population 
Local + 
Regional 
Employment 
as % of Total 
Government 
Employment 
Central 
Government 
Regional 
Government 
Local 
Government 
Regional 
Government 
Local 
Government 
Regional 
Government 
Local  
Government 
Mayoral 
Strength 
Belgium 10193 21 70.1 2.7 2.7 3.5 23 5 57 73 8 
England (1) 58868 17 56.3 3.7  4.7  4  13 5/8.5 
Finland 5176 25 76.3 2.9  9.4  22  60  
France 59187 25 45.7 5.9 1.8 3.2  10  49 12 
Greece 10975 18 10.2 7.1  0.8  1  12 10 
Ireland 3804 17 11.0 7.0  0.9  2  26 5 
Italy 57692 17 45.5 3.7 2.2 0.9 11 5 28 35 10 
Netherlands 15924 13 72.2 1.8  4.6  4  12 5 
Spain 40229 12 58.8 2.3 2.0 1.2 18 9 33 46 11 
Sweden 8868 26 80.7 2.6 8.5 2.5  32  74 3 
            
 
Local unit average 
population      Local + Regional     
Southern (Franco) 8400 17 46 4.3   16.4 6  43  
            
Northern 56000 20 59 3.6    13  37  
Anglo-Saxon 100000 17 34 5.3    3  20  
Scandinavian 22000 26 79 2.8    27  67  
            
  
Note (1) data for UK. Northern: England, Finland; Ireland; Netherlands; Sweden; Southern (Franco): Belgium; France; Greece; Italy; Spain. Anglo-
Saxon: England, Ireland; Nordic: Finland; Sweden (John 2001).   Sources: (OECD 1997; Heinelt and Hlepas 2006; OECD 2007; EUROSTAT 2009b; ILO 
2009)
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Some broad North-South differences are apparent in Table 3.2. However, the ‘Northern’ 
category contains two quite distinct sub-groups: countries with an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ 
tradition of government (the UK and Ireland (sic) – see Loughlin (2001: 5); and the Nordic 
countries of Finland and Sweden33. When these are examined separately (Table 3.3), a 
more distinct pattern emerges: The Southern (Franco) group countries have, on average, 
low local unit populations, moderate sub-national public sector employment, moderate 
sub-national taxation and tax autonomy. The Anglo-Saxon group countries have, on 
average, large local unit size, low sub-national public employment, low sub-national 
taxation and tax autonomy. The Nordic group countries have, on average, moderate 
local unit size, high sub-national public employment, and high local taxation and tax 
autonomy.  
 
Table 3.3 : A Typology of Sub-national Government 
 
Group 
Local unit 
population 
Sub-national 
Public 
Employment 
Sub-national 
Taxation 
Sub-national Tax 
Autonomy 
     
Southern (Franco) LOW MODERATE MODERATE MODERATE 
     
Northern HIGH MODERATE MODERATE LOW 
   Anglo-Saxon HIGH LOW LOW LOW 
   Nordic MODERATE HIGH HIGH HIGH 
   Central-European MODERATE HIGH LOW LOW 
  
                                                             
33 Note that when we assign Northern group countries to Anglo-Saxon or Nordic groups, we are 
left with the Netherlands. Indeed, it has been suggested that the Netherlands should actually be 
considered as part of a Middle European variant group, along with Germany and Austria (see John 
2001:Ch 2). 
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Variations within countries 
It should be noted that these measures of the relative importance and autonomy of sub-
national elected bodies are ascribed to the country under consideration, and, as such, do 
not take account of differences between, say, all of the local councils within a country.  
More generally, various sub-national governments have taken advantage of the 
opportunities presented by changes at the European level to increase their involvement 
in, and their influence on, policy-making at the national and supra-national levels (see 
Loughlin (2001c); Hooghe and Marks (1996)). Developing measurements of every 
individual elected body within each country is beyond the scope of the current research. 
However, we are able to take account of some differences between regions within 
countries by adapting the work of Keating (1998), who distinguished the regions of 
European countries in terms of culture, identity, government institutions, civil society, 
and economic regionalism. Drawing on Keating’s approach, and converting his 
descriptors into numerical values, Table 3.4 characterises the individual regions of 
European countries. The total score is thus a measure of the varying strength of 
regionalism in different geographical locations within a country. In Chapter 6, we will 
examine whether this regionalism score is associated with turnout, and whether any 
such association differs, depending on the type of election under consideration. 
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Table 3.4 : Regionalism Indicators 
Source: adapted from Keating (1998) 
 
Country Region Culture Identity 
Government  
institutions 
Civil society 
Economic  
regionalism 
Total 
        
Belgium Flanders 4 4 4 4 4 20 
Belgium Wallonia 4 2 2 2 4 14 
        
Finland All 1 1 1 1 1 5 
        
France Alsace 2 2 1 1 1 7 
France Brittany 4 3 1 2 4 14 
France Corsica 4 3 1 2 4 14 
France Languedoc 2 2 1 1 1 7 
France Nord-Pas de Calais 1 1 2 1 1 6 
France Other regions 1 1 1 1 1 5 
France Rhone Alpes 1 1 2 1 1 6 
        
Greece All 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
Ireland All 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
Italy Aosta Valley 4 4 2 2 2 14 
Italy Emilia Romagna 1 1 2 1 1 6 
Italy Friuli-Venezia Giulia 4 4 2 2 2 14 
Italy Other regions 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Italy Sardinia 4 4 2 2 2 14 
Italy Sicily 4 4 2 2 2 14 
Italy Trentino Alto Adige-Sudtirol 4 4 2 2 2 14 
        
Netherlands All 1 1 1 1 1 5 
        
Spain Andalucia 3 3 3 2.5 2.5 14 
Spain Aragon 2 2 3 2.5 2.5 12 
Spain Basque Country 4 4 4 2.5 2.5 17 
Spain Galicia 4 4 4 2.5 2.5 17 
Spain Navarre 3 3 3 2.5 2.5 14 
Spain Valencia 2 2 3 2.5 2.5 12 
Spain Other ACs 1.5 1.5 2 1 1 7 
        
Sweden All 1 1 1 1 1 5 
        
England All 0 1 0 0 1 2 
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Election Systems and Rules 
The previous sections in this chapter have provided some historical background of the 
various levels of government in each country, and characterised each country in terms of 
the size of sub-national governmental units, the number of employees, and the taxation 
arrangements. This section addresses selected aspects of the systems and rules by which 
national and sub-national governments are elected, with a particular emphasis on the 
institutional determinants of voting which we identified in Chapter 2, and which will be 
included in subsequent analyses. 
National Legislatures 
Table 3.5 summarises selected characteristics of the electoral systems for national 
legislatures, along with the legal threshold, where applicable, and the size of the 
assembly. Also included are measures of disproportionality and the Effective Number of 
Parliamentary Parties (ENPP), both based on averages of the three most recent elections 
for each country. As can be seen, and as suggested by previous research, there is a 
substantial difference between the degree of disproportionality between PR and non-PR 
electoral systems, reinforcing the point that, what matters most is whether the system is 
PR or non-PR; and that variations on the PR theme have relatively minor influence on the 
degree of disproportionality. The effect of the electoral system on the number of 
political parties is perhaps less marked, though there is a tendency for PR systems to be 
associated with a larger number of political parties in the legislature.  
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Table 3.5 : Electoral Systems for National Legislatures 
Country 
Compulsory 
Voting 
Weekend Voting 
Proportional 
Representation 
Legal Threshold % 
Disproportionality 
Index (1) 
ENPP (1) Seats 
        
Belgium Yes Yes Yes 5 3.8 8.0 150 
England (6) No No No - 17.3 2.3 646 
Finland No Yes Yes 0 3.2 5.1 200 
France No Yes No - 17.8 2.8 577 
Greece No (2) Yes Yes 3 7.0 2.3 300 
Ireland No No (4) Yes (5) - 6.2 6.2 165 
Italy No (3) Yes Yes 4 6.5 6.5 617 
Netherlands No No Yes 0 1.0 5.4 150 
Spain No Yes Yes 0 4.9 2.5 350 
Sweden No Yes Yes 4 2.3 4.2 349 
 (1) Calculated from Gallagher (2009) (2) Previously compulsory until age of 70; but no one ever prosecuted. 
Administrative sanctions officially lifted in 2000  (Malkopoulou ; IDEA 2004; IDEA 2009; Inter-Parliamentary 
Union 2009b) (3) Since 1993 (IDEA 2009) (4) EP elections held on weekend (5) STV (6) Disproportionality, 
ENPP and number of seats refer to the whole UK 
Sources: (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2009b); (Gallagher 2009); National Government websites 
 
Other elections 
Although up-to-date and accurate information on various countries’ arrangements for 
local elections have often been hard to come by, the Council of Europe (CDLR and 
Nohlen 1998) provided a useful summary of local election procedures, the number and 
average size of constituencies, eligibility to vote, and so forth. More recent work, by van 
der Kolk (2007), provides more extensive and up-to-date details of the relevant systems. 
Table 3.6 summarises features of the electoral systems used in each country for 
elections other than the national legislature; that is, for the upper house, regional, and 
local elections. Table 3.7 presents information for the European Parliament elections 
(although all member states of the EU now use a PR system for elections to the 
European Parliament, substantial variation exists within this general theme. For details, 
see Farrell and Scully, (2005)).  
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Two of our countries also have directly elected presidents with substantive powers: 
France and Finland (Although changes to the Finnish constitution in 2000 reduced the 
formal powers of the President, but the head of state retains the authority of a popular 
mandate and a high level of legitimacy among the population (Arter 2008)). In both 
countries, these elections take place on the weekend; and in neither country is voting in 
presidential elections compulsory. Naturally, since only a single candidate can be 
elected, proportional representation cannot be used. 
As can be seen from Tables 3.4 and 3.5, where a country uses Proportional 
Representation for elections to the national legislature, it is usual for this system to be 
used for other elections. Likewise, where a majoritarian or plurality system is used, the 
tendency is for this to be used across other elections. There are, however, exceptions. 
For example, in England and France, elections to the national legislature are not 
conducted using Proportional Representation, whereas in both countries, elections to 
the European Parliament do use PR.  
It should also be noted that certain electoral systems, such as those which have been 
used in municipal elections in France, Greece, and Italy, are specifically designed to 
provide the party winning the largest share of votes with a ‘winner’s bonus’ of seats (for 
example, by first awarding 50 per cent of the available seats to the party with a majority 
or plurality of the votes; then by proportionally distributing the remaining seats to all 
parties, including the party with the plurality or majority). Because these systems 
combine both majoritarian (or plurality) and PR systems in the same constituency, 
Massicotte and Blais (1999) termed such systems ‘fusion’. 
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Table 3.6 : Characteristics of Electoral Systems for National and Sub-National Elections 
Country 
Compulsory 
Voting 
Weekend 
Voting 
Upper 
House/Directly 
Elected 
Regional Electoral 
System 
Local/Municipal 
Electoral System 
      
Belgium Yes Yes Yes/Partial (1) PR PR 
England No No Yes/No - Plurality 
Finland No Yes No - PR 
France No Yes Yes/No 
PR (2 Round post 
1998) 
Fusion 
Greece No Yes No - Fusion 
Ireland No No Yes/No - STV 
Italy No Yes Yes/Yes (1) Fusion Fusion 
Netherlands No No Yes/No - PR 
Spain No Yes Yes/Yes (1) PR PR 
Sweden No Yes No PR PR 
  
(1) Upper House elections in Belgium, Italy, and Spain held simultaneously with Lower House 
elections using Proportional Representation 
Sources: 
Country reports from Council of Europe (LOREG-CoE Various);  
(Inter-Parliamentary Union 2009a; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2009b);   
(van der Kolk 2007); (CDLR and Nohlen 1998) 
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Table 3.7 : Characteristics of Electoral Systems for European Parliament Elections 
Country Compulsory Voting Weekend Voting Legal Threshold Constituencies 
     
Belgium Yes Yes 0 3 
England No No 0 9 
Finland No Yes 0 1 
France No Yes 5 8 (since 2003) 
Greece No Yes 0 1 
Ireland No No - 4 
Italy No Yes 4 5 
Netherlands No No 0 1 
Spain No Yes 0 1 
Sweden No Yes 4 1 
 Note: Since 1999, all countries use Proportional Representation for EP elections (see Farrell and 
Scully (2005)) 
Sources: European Parliament (2004);  European Parliament (2002) 
 
Conclusions 
As we have seen in this chapter, national histories differ, and so does the organisation of 
territorial politics within countries. Often, the existence and shape of different national, 
local, and intermediate level governments have deep seated historical and cultural roots 
(Prodi 2002). Sub-national governments are often caught in a dilemma: whilst they may 
have specific powers of their own, it is usually the case that they are also responsible for 
the implementation of policies and programmes which are actually defined at the 
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national level (Thoenig 2006). Thus, it has often been the case that each apparent 
settlement has merely served as the starting point for the next round of negotiations 
(Tilly 2006). These processes of change are likely to continue, in response to further 
societal changes from within, as well as a result of external influences, be they European 
or international.  
However, for the period covered in the current study, we have been able to summarise 
important aspects of each level of government in each country, and the means by which 
they are elected. These characteristics include those institutional determinants of voting 
which we identified in Chapter 2. In addition, we have provided information about the 
levels of public employment, tax raising powers, the powers of local mayors for each 
country, and the degree of regionalism within each country. This will enable us to 
investigate whether these factors are associated with different levels of turnout. 
In the next chapter, we will turn our attention to turnout data and our socio-
demographic variables, and the construction of the dataset which will be used in our 
subsequent regression analyses. 
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Chapter 4 : Data and methods 
Introduction 
The aim of the current study is to investigate the effects of selected institutional and 
socio-demographic characteristics on turnout in elections. Previous comparative studies 
into turnout in elections which have used aggregate data have predominantly been 
limited to the country level of analysis. Although such research has provided valuable 
insights, especially into the institutional factors which influence electoral participation, 
country level data is naturally of limited use when we seek to understand the variations 
in turnout within countries. To enable us to delve into these regional variations in 
turnout, the current study will use an original dataset based on sub-national 
geographical units. This increases substantially the number of cases available for 
analysis, and, as will be shown, also increases the amount of variation in the values of 
each of the variables. This increase in variation is, of course, a double-edged sword: 
without variance, there would be little to be explained; but by increasing the range of 
values we may also expose the limitations in the predictive powers of the very variables 
we have selected. Further, we include several different types of elections, allowing us to 
systematically investigate any differences in the influence that each of our variables may 
have from one type of election to another, whilst maintaining the same geographical 
basis for each election, and the same set of measures for each of our independent 
variables. 
 
This chapter first considers the time period we will using, along with the countries and 
the types of elections which will be included in the subsequent analyses. Previous 
comparative research into election turnout has often included both developed and less-
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developed countries; and it was appropriate for those studies to include variables which 
were closely related to a country’s level of development. However, we show that 
variables such as the Human Development Index (or its component measures) would be 
of limited use when seeking to differentiate among our group of Western European 
countries. 
 
Next, we provide some background to the territorial units we will be using, and the 
process we used in the matching of turnout data to these units. We then define each of 
our variables, and, based on our literature review in Chapter 2, state our hypotheses. We 
then present summaries of turnout for the different elections which are held in each 
country, and show that turnout aggregated to the national level often conceals 
considerable regional variations. Summary statistics for the socio-demographic variables 
are then provided; and these too indicate substantial regional variation within countries. 
The chapter concludes with a description of the methods we will use to analyse the data 
and test our hypotheses. 
Case selection 
Time frame 
Our study will focus on elections between 1995 and 2008. Although country-level 
turnout data for many countries have long been used in comparative studies of electoral 
behaviour, it is only in the last decade or so that various European countries have begun 
making available official turnout data in greater geographical detail. The start point is 
also influenced by the nature of the socio-demographic data, which is predominantly 
drawn from the census data compiled by Eurostat. In the member-states of the 
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European Union, full censuses are carried out decennially, and the most recent round of 
censuses for which data are currently available was conducted in 2000-2001.  
A mid-1990s start point also has two other advantages. Firstly, the relatively recent start-
point means, compared to many previous studies, that we are dealing with a fairly short 
period of time, which serves to minimise the effects of possible long-term or inter-
generational changes in turnout (Blais 2000; Franklin 2004). Secondly, as described in 
Chapter 3, several European countries conducted major reorganisations of sub-national 
government structures in the 1980s. Sometimes this involved the substantial re-drawing 
of  boundaries, often accompanied by amalgamation of pre-existing geographical units.  
Such changes always present challenges for those trying to compile a coherent dataset; 
and, even when the arithmetic is technically possible, questions often remain as to the 
changed nature of what it is that voters are voting for (although see Morlan 1984 who 
reported no significant changes between turnout before and after amalgamation in a 
number of countries). Further, in some countries, a whole new level of elected 
government was created, leading not simply to a new stream of election results, but also 
raising questions as to the possible effects that the existence of a new level of 
government may have on the electorate’s view of the relative importance of other 
elected bodies in the country. Such major boundary changes or the creation of new 
levels of government were generally completed before the period covered by the 
present study.  
Countries and Elections 
Comparative studies which have sought to explain differences in aggregate levels of 
turnout across a broad range of countries have occasionally included dummy variables 
for continental regions; however, as Siaroff and Merer pointed out, providing we have 
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sufficient cases, there is no reason that we cannot seek to investigate variations within a 
particular continent (Siaroff and Merer 2002:916). Indeed, in an investigation into the 
factors which may influence voter behaviour, there are good reasons to limit ourselves 
to a group of countries which share a number of similarities: as was shown in Chapter 2, 
several of the suggested socio-demographic determinants of voting are (often explicitly) 
linked to notions of how ‘developed’ a country is. By focusing on a set of Western 
European countries which all share a similar level of development, we can ascertain 
whether such determinants retain their applicability in explaining variations in turnout. 
Further, as all are Western European countries and, indeed, all are members of the 
European Union, we effectively control for wider geographical variations which may 
exist; thus, we are better able to isolate the effects of the independent variables. For 
example, it has previously been shown (Blais 2000) that, even when controlling for 
various socioeconomic factors, there are substantial and significant differences in 
turnout between continents, which are perhaps due to differences in political culture.  
Although ‘most of Europe’s outline is determined by its extensive sea coasts’ (Davies 
1997:8), what constitutes Western Europe remains open to debate, and depends on 
whether we use a cultural, political, or geographic basis for our definition (for example, 
see Budge and Newton 1997; Heywood, Jones et al. 2002). Western Europe here is 
meant in contrast to those countries previously part of the Eastern Bloc, comprising the 
Soviet Union and its satellites in Central and Eastern Europe.  
Even by this restricted definition, not all Western European countries are included in the 
current study. This is largely due to issues of data availability. Thus, at the time of data 
collection, data were not available for certain countries or, in the case of Germany, not 
for the entire country: responsibility for conducting elections, and for collating and 
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publishing electoral data, rests with the individual Länder in Germany. Unfortunately, 
not all Länder exhibited the same level of enthusiasm for making data available. For 
similar reasons of data-availability, it was not possible to obtain geographically complete 
data for municipal elections in Italy. Thus, Italian municipal turnout is not included in the 
dataset. 
For most countries, the electoral boundaries for lower levels of governments (for 
example, municipal councils) ‘nest’ perfectly within those of higher levels (for example, 
Lower and/or Upper Intermediate level governments), and correspond exactly with the 
NUTS classification. However, such a neat correspondence does not always exist. For 
example, in Ireland, the electoral boundaries differ from one election type to another, 
and do not always coincide with the boundaries of the NUTS units. Consequently, it was 
not possible to include meaningful turnout data for Irish elections to the European 
Parliament. 
Clearly, it would have been preferable to have had complete data for all types of 
elections in each of the then EU15 member states. However, our aim is not to draw 
general conclusions about voting behaviour across the EU15 as a whole. Rather, we wish 
to investigate whether and how turnout varies from place to place, and between 
different types of elections. As we shall see in later chapters, the current dataset covers 
sufficient countries and elections to allow us to detect the differences, as well as the 
similarities, which exist.  
The ten countries which are included in this study are: Belgium, England, Finland, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. We should note that two of 
the countries included here, France and Spain, each possess territories which lie outside 
of our definition of ‘Europe’, but which are nonetheless considered part of the 
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metropolitan country for various administrative purposes, and which do participate in 
elections34. In the case of Spain, the territories of Melilla and Ceuta lie on the 
Mediterranean coast of Morocco. Registered voters in both of these enclaves participate 
in national elections and elections for the European Parliament, as well as for their own 
municipalities. In the case of France, the list is more extensive, and comprises several 
collectivités d'outre-mer scattered across the surface of the globe – more familiarly 
known by the now unofficial designation of DOM-TOMs (Département d’Outre-Mer – 
Territoire d’Outre Mer). The specific legal arrangements vary, but most of these overseas 
territories not only hold elections for their own municipalities and cantons, but also 
participate in those for the French National Assembly and the Presidency.  
Further, the French overseas départements (Guadeloupe, Guyana, Reunion, and 
Martinique) also take part in elections for the European Parliament (Ministère de 
l'Intérieur 2006; Préfet de La Réunion 2009; Ministère de l'Intérieur nd). Although 
election results are generally available, these overseas territories of France and Spain are 
not included in the dataset used in the present analysis. In part this is due to rather a 
large number of gaps in the socio-demographic data; but, more importantly, these 
territories clearly lie beyond what is normally considered as ‘Europe’, and have their own 
very distinctive local cultures, traditions, and patterns of turnout in elections35. 
Overseas territories aside, there would be little debate as to whether these countries are 
all ‘European’, but there may be questions (as noted in Chapter 3), historically at least, as 
to how long they may have been considered as belonging to ‘Western’ Europe, 
                                                             
34 We also note that Gibraltar has, since 2004, been included as part of SW England for the sake 
of EP elections (though not for UK municipal or parliamentary elections). We do not disaggregate 
Gibraltar from the turnout for SW England; in part because the electorate (around 20,000) 
represents less than one per cent of the total for SW England (around four million).  
35 See (Johns and Brockington 2011) 
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particularly in the case of Finland, and perhaps of Greece. However, at least since the 
late 1970s, all of these countries share important similarities, as will be discussed in the 
next section.  
Democracy and Development  
Since 1972, Freedom House has produced an annual survey of Freedom in the World; 
described as ‘the Michelin Guide to democracy’s development’ by the Wall Street 
Journal. All of the countries in the current study have been designated ‘Free’ in the 
Freedom House classification since at least as early as 1978. This classification is based 
on a combination of scores for ‘Political Rights’ and ‘Civil Liberties’. ‘Political Rights’ 
comprises various measures concerning the electoral process, political pluralism and 
participation, and the functioning of government. All of countries examined here have 
scored ‘1’ (the highest level on a scale of 1 to 7) for Political Rights since at least as early 
as 198936 (Freedom House 2009). Clearly, although the countries may have very different 
histories, by the period covered by the present study, all could be considered as 
‘democratic’.  
The countries also share similar levels of development: Table 4.1 provides details of the 
composite Human Development Index (HDI) score for each country, along with the 
values for contributory measures of Life Expectancy, Adult Literacy, and GDP.  
 
 
 
                                                             
36
 For Civil Liberties, the picture is not quite as rosy: although Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, and Sweden 
have consistently scored ‘1’ from 1989 onwards, we have to wait until 2002 for the remaining countries, 
with the exception of Greece, to achieve this status. Greece, at the time of writing, is still rated ‘2’ for civil 
liberties; a score it shares with Italy, which dropped from ‘1’ to ‘2’ in 2003 and has since remained at that 
level (Freedom House 2009). 
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Table 4.1 : UNDP Development Indicators as at 2000 
Country 
HDI 
(0 – 1 scale) 
Life Expectancy 
at Birth 
(years) 
Adult Literacy 
(%) 
GDP Per Capita 
(PPP US$ 000s) 
     
Belgium .863 77.8 99.0
2
 32 
England
1
 .823 77.8 99.0
2
 31 
Finland .825 77.6 99.0
2
 30 
France .834 78.9 99.0
2
 31 
Greece .784 77.5 96.0 22 
Ireland .855 76.8 99.0
2
 34 
Italy .825 79.5 98.4 31 
Netherlands .868 78.2 99.0
2
 36 
Spain .828 79.2 96.5 28 
Sweden .889 79.7 99.0
2
 32 
     
  
Notes:  
(1) Data for United Kingdom;  
(2) Estimated figure used by UNDP for calculation of HDI. 
             Source : UN Development Programme (UNDP 2011) 
 
As can be seen from Table 4.1, with the possible exception of Greece, all of the countries 
have very similar scores on both the composite Human Development Index, and on the 
individual measures of Life Expectancy, Adult Literacy, and GDP. Indeed, all are classed 
as countries with ‘Very High Human Development’ by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP 2011). However, as will be shown later in this chapter, differences 
appear between countries when we use alternative measures; or when we look below 
the country level of measurement and examine the characteristics of regions within 
countries. 
Although all of the countries can be categorised as highly developed and as being 
established democracies, as was shown in Chapter 3, their historical paths to this status 
have differed markedly, as do their contemporary structures of sub-national 
government. Our set of countries includes examples from each of the various categories 
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which have been used in typologies of local government types. For example, we have 
both ‘northern’ (Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and England) and ‘southern’ 
(Belgium, France, Greece, Italy and Spain) types of local government structures as 
identified by Page and Goldsmith (1987; supplemented by John 2001). In addition, we 
have examples of the more nuanced categories developed by some authors: such as 
‘Anglo-American’ (Ireland and England); ‘Nordic’ (Finland and Sweden); or ‘Middle 
European’ (the Netherlands) (see John 2001; Denters and Rose 2005a). 
Although all of these countries hold elections for local and national governments, and for 
the European Parliament, some also have direct elections for a President, for an Upper 
House, or for one or two intermediate levels of sub-national government. In most cases, 
we have been able to include at least one set of results from each country for each of 
these types of election. This will allow us to investigate whether the variables have 
consistent effects on different types of elections, and to ascertain whether there are 
country to country differences in other factors which influence turnout.  
As noted, all of the countries in our dataset members of the European Union during the 
period covered in the study: Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands were among the 
founding members; Ireland, and England (as part of the UK membership) were part of 
the first enlargement in 1973; Greece and Spain were part of the Mediterranean 
enlargement of the 1980s; and Finland and Sweden were part of the fourth enlargement 
in 1995 (Bache and George 2006). That all of these countries are member states of the 
EU is an important consideration for three reasons: Firstly, it enables the inclusion of 
turnout data for EP elections and the comparison of differences in turnout between 
these and other elections in a country’s election calendar. Secondly, all of the countries 
have been affected by the European Union’s Regional Policy, which has contributed, at 
the least, to the creation of broadly comparable administrative and statistical regions in 
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most of the countries, and in some cases to the creation of a regional tier of elected 
government. Thirdly, all of the countries contribute to and are included in the Eurostat 
database. As will be discussed in the following section, this has the important 
consequence that data are not only available, but share commonality in the way they are 
measured. 
EUROSTAT and Territorial Units 
With its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community of the 1950s, the Statistical 
Office of the European Community (SOEC) became a Directorate General of the 
European Commission when the European Community was founded in 1958. An early 
task for the SOEC was to compile statistics in order to compare the standards of living of 
coal and steel workers in the member countries. In order to do this, it was necessary to 
shift from the previous reliance on statistics supplied by the respective national 
governments, which were piecemeal and compiled using different methodologies. The 
name was changed to Eurostat in 1973 to avoid the difficulties of using different versions 
of the abbreviation in the various official languages of the Community. At around the 
same time, work began on achieving convergence in the definitions and questions used 
by each member country in their ten-yearly census; and, in response to the Community’s 
then recently created Regional Policy, a Division for Regional Statistics and Accounts was 
established (de Michelis and Chantraine 2003).  
 
Since the 1970s, Eurostat has used a common classification of territorial units for 
regional statistics (NUTS: Nomenclature d'Unités Territoriales Statistiques) which has 
three levels, each with recommended minimum and maximum populations as shown in 
Table 4.2 (EUROSTAT 2009a). 
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Table 4.2 : Recommended Population Size for NUTS Levels 
NUTS level Minimum 
Population 
Maximum 
Population 
   
1 3 000 000 7 000 000 
2 800 000 3 000 000 
3 150 000 800 000 
  
 
Each country typically applies the NUTS classification to existing institutional regions, 
which themselves are the result of historical and administrative factors particular to that 
country. However, because it is often the case that a country does not have three, pre-
existing, institutional levels corresponding to the NUTS population thresholds, countries 
have sometimes created an additional level for statistical purposes, but which has no 
real administrative function (nor an elected body). 
 
For example, in the case of France, shown in Figure 4.1, the NUTS3 units typically 
coincide with the historically pre-existing boundaries of the départements, which have 
their own, directly elected councils. The NUTS2 units correspond to the French regions 
created in the decentralisation reforms of the 1980s, and which have had their own 
elected councils since 1986 (Le Galès 2008). The French NUTS1 territorial units did not 
correspond to any pre-existing administrative units, and there are no elected 
governments for this level (Maps of NUTS units for all countries are provided in the 
Appendix). In England, too, the NUTS1 units are mere statistical entities, and do not 
correspond to any directly elected body. In contrast to France, in England, this is also the 
case for the NUTS2 units (there being no intermediate level of government between the 
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national and the municipal). Further, the NUTS1 units in England do not usually 
correspond either to the electoral constituencies for the national government, nor to the 
local government units. This means that, aside from requiring some manipulation of the 
turnout data (see the following section), NUTS2 and NUTS3 units in England are 
functionally different to those in France: in France, the NUTS2 and NUTS3 levels 
correspond exactly to the levels of regional and departmental elections, respectively; 
whereas in England this is not the case.    
 
This raises a potential question when comparing turnout between countries: in France, 
for example, when the NUTS unit corresponds exactly with the geographical area from 
which an elected body draws its support, it may be expected that turnout would be 
higher than where a region is simply an administrative construct that has no direct 
geographical correspondence with an elected body. We could seek to control for this 
potential effect by means of a variable which captured any such functional-geographical 
relationship. However, as we shall see in Chapter 6, we will investigate the effects of a 
variable that does comprise regional aspects of, among other things, government 
institutions. Further, because, in Chapter 8, we examine each election type within 
individual countries, we do not consider that including a specific variable to account for 
any potential effects of geographical and governmental correspondence to be necessary. 
 
Clearly, using data based on the NUTS classification provides the opportunity to 
investigate patterns of turnout below the country level of analysis. Nonetheless, the 
nature of the Eurostat data also imposes some limitations. Although significant progress 
has been made in bringing a degree of uniformity to the data supplied to Eurostat, some 
differences remain in which questions and measures that individual countries employ 
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when conducting their censuses. For example, although both Ireland and the UK collect 
official statistics on ethnicity and religion, this practice is not the norm in Western 
Europe; thus, no such data are collected in Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden (Simon 2007). Given that one of our stated aims is to 
maintain the same set of variables for all countries, it follows that we cannot include 
variables which take account of ethnicity or religion. This, of course, is a limitation which 
would apply even if we restricted our investigation to the country level of analysis.  
 
However, even with those socio-demographic data that are collected by all countries, 
these data were not always available at the NUTS3 level. Thus, for Belgium, variables are 
measured at the NUTS2 level, rather than the NUTS3 level. Whilst this means that we are 
able to use data for sub-national units, these units are not always of comparable size in 
terms of their population. Although NUTS regions are clearly smaller than countries, it 
may be argued that these regions are not small enough to provide the detail necessary 
to investigate associations between turnout in elections and the socio-demographic 
charactersitics of the electorate. This may be true, but, if so, then surely the problem is 
even more pronounced when using country level data. Indeed, as we have seen, 
although NUTS level data may not be perfect for our needs, in many cases, country-level 
data suffers similar limitations, often more seriously so.  
 
Clearly, using data based on the NUTS classification has some limitations. However, we 
consider that these are outweighed by the advantages such data offer; notably that they 
allow a comparison between countries and the opportunity to investigate turnout 
differences within countries.   
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In this section, we have seen that our socio-demographic data is based on the Eurostat 
NUTS classification.  
 
The following section describes how turnout data for different elections are compiled for 
each of the NUTS units.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 : NUTS Level 3 Units of Mainland France 
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Turnout data and NUTS units 
For all countries, turnout data are drawn from official sources; such as the websites 
maintained by the country’s Ministry of the Interior, or the Electoral Commission (full 
details of sources are provided in the Appendix). However, it should be noted here that 
such resources were not designed with the needs of psephologists in mind; rather, they 
made it easier for the interested citizen to look up recent or historical election results in 
their own electoral district or voting area. Thus, data were not generally available in a 
form whereby turnout measured at the NUTS2 or NUTS3 level could be downloaded in a 
form ready for analysis37. More usually, data had to be collected, district by district, or 
ward by ward, and then aggregated to the chosen unit of analysis. For our dataset to be 
of use in investigating the role of various determinants of voting, we need a common 
unit of measurement for both turnout and our independent variables. Socio-
demographic data are drawn from the Eurostat database, and correspond to the NUTS 
units described in the previous section. For many of the countries under consideration 
here, there is a certain convergence between the NUTS units and the organisation of 
elections and reporting of election results. Staying for a moment with our example of 
France, results for Regional Council and European Parliament elections are available at 
the level of the département, that is, the NUTS3 level. Where this is the case, the 
creation of a common dataset of socio-demographic statistics (Eurostat data) and 
election turnout can proceed with little technical difficulty.  
                                                             
37 Since the data gathering phase of this thesis, part of the European Sixth Framework Research 
Programme has resulted in the construction of a European Elections Database (EED 
http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/about/). This database provides election 
results for all European countries, aggregated according to the NUTS definitions. This would have 
considerably shortened the data gathering and manipulation which the current project required. 
However, the EED is limited to first-order (parliamentary or presidential) and EP elections. It is 
noteworthy that no data have been compiled for the second-order (municipal, provincial, 
regional) elections in European countries. Thus, the focus on EP and first-order elections looks set 
to continue.   
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However, for other elections in France, and indeed, many elections in the other 
countries, this neat correspondence between NUTS units and the boundaries of official 
election reporting units does not exist; instead, election results are reported for 
geographical units below the NUTS3 level. This situation requires a deal of data 
manipulation. For example, turnout data for elections to the French lower house are 
reported at the level of the commune, of which there are over 35,000. In order to arrive 
at a useable turnout figure, individual communes were assigned to their respective 
département,  and then commune level numbers for registered voters and votes cast 
were used to calculate a turnout figure for each département. Similarly, in the case of 
Belgian municipal elections, results are reported for each of around 600 individual 
communes. Because Eurostat data for Belgium are typically available for the NUTS2 
level, communes first have to be assigned to their respective NUTS2 geographical unit. 
Figures for those registered and those voting in each commune are then totalled in order 
to calculate a per cent turnout figure for each NUTS2 unit; this NUTS2 turnout figure is 
then matched to the corresponding Eurostat socio-demographic data38. Thus, although 
somewhat time consuming, in most cases, it was technically relatively straightforward to 
arrive at turnout data aggregated to a level which corresponded with NUTS units. 
However, the vagaries of English local elections necessitated a slightly more involved 
process. 
 
English local election results are reported at the constituency level (or below) and thus, 
as in the cases of France and Belgium described above, these data required aggregation 
                                                             
38
 In the case of Ireland, although turnout results were matched to NUTS units for local elections and 
national (lower house) elections, there were insurmountable difficulties in matching NUTS units to turnout 
data for (perhaps ironically) elections to the European Parliament.  
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to the relevant NUTS3 geographical units.  However, in contrast to most of the cases 
included in this analysis, in which any particular election takes place at more or less the 
same time across the whole country, the arrangements for English local elections vary 
from place to place in a rather complex manner 39, 40 :  although all local councillors in 
England are elected for a four year period, both the frequency and timing of elections 
vary from council to council. For some councils, all members are elected at an election 
held every four years, but these elections do not all follow the same four year cycle; that 
is, different councils of this type can hold their full elections in different years41. For the 
remaining councils, elections are held such that only a third of the members are elected 
at any one time, with elections being held in three out of every four years; the fourth 
year being a ‘fallow’ year in which no election is held. Again, these cycles are not uniform 
across the country.  
 
One approach to this problem is to compute an average turnout for each local 
government unit for any and all local elections held there in a given four year period, and 
then to aggregate these results to the relevant NUTS3 units. However, we are then faced 
with two further difficulties. Firstly, local elections may be held simultaneously with 
other elections, be they national or European. In the period under study, three elections 
for the national parliament were held: in 1997, 2001 and 2005. For those local councils 
due to hold full or partial elections that year, their elections took place on the same day 
                                                             
39
 By-elections are not included in our data. 
40
 English local councils take different forms (discussed in more detail in Chapter 3), with differing functions, 
populations, and geographical extents. In the process of aggregation to NUTS3 level, there is an unavoidable 
loss of information as councils of different types are grouped together to achieve a single turnout figure for 
a geographical area - which may well contain local councils of different types. 
41 Although the London boroughs do all hold their elections in the same year 
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as the parliamentary election, and thus turnout in the local elections was boosted42. A 
smaller, though still noticeable effect, was noted in 2004 and 2009 when the local 
elections were held on the same day as elections for the European Parliament43. 
 
There is no entirely satisfactory solution to this problem. The approach used here is to 
calculate the average turnout in local elections across the three year periods 1998-2000 
and 2006-2008 for each council. Thus, councils which elect by thirds will have results for 
at least two years (and possibly all three). Most of the councils which hold full elections 
every four years are also included. However, we are forced to omit results from those 
councils which held full elections in 1997, 2001, 2005, or 2009. We then proceed to 
aggregate these turnout figures for each council to generate a turnout figure for the 
relevant NUTS3 units. In terms of the NUTS3 units ‘lost’ in this process, their number is 
not great; eight for the period 1998-2000, and five for the period 2006-2008, leaving 85 
and 88 NUTS3 units, respectively (the number of NUTS3 units lost from the dataset is 
fewer than the number of councils affected, as in some cases more than one council may 
be missing from a single NUTS3 unit). 
 
For English elections to the Lower House, individual Westminster constituencies were 
matched to the relevant NUTS3 unit, and turnout was calculated from constituency level 
registered voters and votes cast. A similar process was used for calculating NUTS3 
turnout figures in elections for the European Parliament. In a few cases, for instance 
                                                             
42
 Note that voters in London have, since 2000, been able to vote for a London mayor. These mayoral 
elections are not included in the present dataset; but it can be noted that the mayoral elections  do not 
coincide with London’s local elections. 
43
 A further complication is that since 2000, local councils have been encouraged to experiment with 
changes to the electoral arrangements to encourage higher turnout. These modifications included the use of 
all postal voting, which resulted in large and significant increases in turnout (Rallings and Thrasher 2007). 
However, such experiments have been used only by some councils, and thus present a further problem 
when considering the aggregation of these results with others in a NUTS3 region. 
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where polling area or district boundaries had been re-drawn, or where there was a 
serious lack of correspondence between these and the NUTS3 boundaries, cases (NUTS3 
units) were discarded.  
 
Although somewhat laborious, the result of our efforts is that we have a dataset for all 
ten countries, for which turnout is matched to the NUTS units for which Eurostat data is 
available for a range of socio-demographic variables. These Eurostat statistics have the 
advantage of being compiled at similar times, and on the basis of similar geographical 
units. However, these statistics are generally available only from 1990 onwards. 
Although some information is available for non-member countries, the inclusion of 
Finland and Sweden means that information on all variables of interest is not available 
until their accession in 1995 (nor, obviously, are the results of EP elections). The 
beginning of the period under study, then, is defined as 1995, and the most recent 
elections included were those conducted in 2008 (when data were compiled). The 
thirteen-year period means that all countries would have held a minimum of one 
election of each type44. In some cases, more than two elections of a particular type were 
held; and where data are available, these have been included. There are, however, some 
unavoidable gaps, as can be seen in Table 4.3.  
Note that in a few cases, Eurostat data for a particular country lacked sub-national 
figures for one or two of our variables. For example, occupation and educational 
attainment were not available for NUTS regions below the country level in Sweden. In 
this case, recourse to the Swedish national statistics database (Statistika Centralbyrån 
2010) provided raw data for all occupational categories in each sub-national territorial 
                                                             
44
 The relatively short period also has the advantage of minimising the effects of any long term decline in 
turnout which has been suggested as occurring in many established democracies. 
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unit. These, along with population data, were then used to calculate the percentages of 
the population in each occupational category for each Swedish NUTS region. 
Having described the compilation of the core dataset, we now turn to descriptions of the 
dependent and independent variables, and the related hypotheses. These hypotheses 
are divided into three groups: firstly, those which relate to institutional characteristics (1 
a, 1b, etc.); secondly those which refer to the core socio-demographic variables ‘2a, 2b, 
etc.); and, thirdly, those which relate to the supplementary variables which will provide 
the main focus of Chapter 6 (3a, 3b, etc.). 
Variables 
Dependent Variable - Turnout 
Turnout for all countries and elections is taken to be the percentage of the registered 
voters who cast a vote in a given election, as reported in official documents or databases 
of each country’s responsible Ministry or statistical bureau (details of all sources are 
provided in the Appendix). Other measures do exist, notably that based on the total 
eligible population rather than the number of registered voters; however, there are 
difficulties in estimating just what that eligible population is. Such an approach has been 
necessary in some previous research which has attempted to take account of the 
unusual registration procedures in the United States, but is not considered necessary for 
the countries under consideration here. In the case of two-round elections, such as in 
France, standard practice is followed, such that the turnout in the first round is used. For 
each country, a single, sub-national level of aggregation (i.e. NUTS unit) is used for all 
turnout data (for example, provinces in the Netherlands, French departments, etc.). In 
this way, comparisons of turnout can be made across all of the different types of 
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elections in a country, whilst maintaining the same basis for the selected demographic 
and socio-economic measures. 
Independent variables - Institutional 
The institutional characteristics (that is, compulsory voting, weekend voting, and 
electoral system) for each individual election are drawn from the tables presented in 
Chapter 3. Based on the literature review in Chapter 2, we derive the following 
hypotheses which relate to the costs and benefits of voting: 
Compulsory voting has been shown in previous research to be associated with turnout 
between 10 and 20 percentage points higher than where compulsory voting is not used 
(for example, Crewe 1981; Jackman 1987; Colomer 1991; Jackman and Miller 1995; Blais 
and Dobrzynska 1998; Blais 2000; Perez-Linan 2001; Siaroff and Merer 2002). The 
measure we use here is a three point ordinal scale whereby strictly enforced compulsory 
voting is coded 2, weakly enforced compulsory voting is coded 1, and an absence of 
compulsory voting is coded zero. 
Hypothesis 1a : Turnout will be higher where voting is compulsory 
 
Although the effects are generally less marked than for compulsory voting, weekend 
voting has been associated with turnout up to ten per cent higher than in countries 
where elections are held on weekdays (Oppenhuis 1995; Mattila 2003). The measure for 
weekend voting is dichotomous, whereby weekday voting is coded 0, and voting on a 
weekend day is coded 1. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Turnout will be higher where voting takes place on the 
weekend 
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Proportional Representation tends to provide more choice and leads to fewer wasted 
votes, and is usually associated with higher levels of turnout (Franklin 1996; Blais and 
Dobrzynska 1998; Brockington 2004). We use a dichotomous variable, whereby non-PR 
systems are coded 0, and PR systems (included those designated ‘fusion’ systems, but 
which have a substantial proportional component) are coded 1. 
 
Hypothesis 1c: Turnout will be higher where Proportional Representation 
is used  
 
The occurrence of simultaneous elections is calculated from the election calendar for 
each country (full election calendar provided in the Appendix). When two (or more) 
elections are held at the same time, the costs of voting (at least in terms of turning up at 
the polling booth) in two or more elections are no different than voting in one election. 
Previous research has confirmed that turnout in lower-order elections tends to be 
higher when these elections are held simultaneously with national, first-order elections, 
turnout (Franklin 1996; Blondel, Sinnott et al. 1997; Mattila 2003). We take account of 
this effect by means of a dichotomous variable, whereby lower-order elections are 
coded 0 when they are not held simultaneously with another election, and 1 when they 
are held simultaneously with any other election. 
 
Hypothesis 1d: Turnout will be higher when elections are held 
simultaneously 
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Our final institutional variable takes account of the salience of different types of election. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, since Reif and Schmitt (1980) made the distinction between 
(first-order) elections to the national legislature and (second-order) elections for sub-
national levels of government or the European Parliament. However, the very low 
turnout in many elections to the European Parliament supports the idea that these 
elections be considered as third-order (Marsh 1998; Heath, McLean et al. 1999; Rallings 
and Thrasher 2005). We use the first-, second-, third-order categories to construct a 
variable for the salience of an election, whereby: national elections (Lower House, Upper 
House, President) are considered the most salient (coded 2); elections for the European 
Parliament are considered the least salient (coded 0); and the other elections within a 
country (municipal, lower intermediate, upper intermediate) occupy the middle ground 
between these two extremes (coded 1).  
Hypothesis 1e : Turnout will be higher in elections of higher salience 
 
Independent Variables - Socio-demographic 
The data for the socio-demographic variables are predominantly drawn from the 
Eurostat database (details of data series consulted are provided in the Appendix). For 
each variable, we present below a brief description and associated hypotheses based on 
the literature review conducted in Chapter 2.  
Population Density: As we saw in Chapter 2, there are competing views as to the effect 
of population density on turnout in elections. Some expect people living in areas of 
higher population density to feel closer to their fellow citizens, and to be more exposed 
to group pressures and the mobilising activities of political parties, and there is some 
empirical evidence to support this (for example, Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Blais 2000; 
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Siaroff and Merer 2002). Others suggest, on the contrary, that interpersonal bonds and 
social structures are weaker when population density is higher, and that turnout would 
thus be lower. This view is also supported by previous research, particularly in the case 
of European countries (for example, Morlan 1984; Oppenhuis 1995). The measure used 
here is the population density of the NUTS unit, being the ratio between the total 
population and surface (land) area in square kilometres. Note, in all analyses, we use a 
logarithmically transformed population density figure in order to improve the normality 
of the distribution of this variable. 
Hypothesis 2a : Turnout will be lower in areas of higher population density 
 
Percentage of young people: For potential first-time voters, the costs of voting are 
relatively high (Plutzer 2002; Franklin 2004); but as people get older, they not only 
acquire the skills necessary to make an informed choice, but also feel more directly the 
effects of government policy decisions (Rose 2007). Not surprisingly, then, young people 
have consistently be shown to be less likely to vote than older age groups (Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1986; Blais 2000; Norris 2004). Here, we measure the 
percentage of the total population in each NUTS unit which is between 15 and 29 years 
old. This figure is calculated from the Eurostat data provided for standard age categories 
15-19, 20-24, 25-29, and for the total population. 
Hypothesis 2b : Turnout will be lower in areas with a greater percentage 
of  young people 
 
Death Rate: Although a higher death rate in a region may in part reflect a more elderly 
population (and thus higher turnout), it is known that higher death rates are often 
associated with the poorer and more marginalised groups in society who are less likely 
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to have the resources and interest necessary to vote in elections, (Kennedy, Kawachi et 
al. 1996; Hwang, Wilkins et al. 2009). On balance, then, we would expect that regions 
with a higher death rate would be associated with lower turnout in elections. The 
measure we use here is the Crude Death Rate (deaths per year per 1000 inhabitants) for 
each NUTS unit. 
Hypothesis 2c: Turnout will be lower in areas with a higher death rate. 
 
Immigration: High population turnover can undermine the sense of community 
(Ashworth, Heyndels et al. 2002); and empirical research has shown that turnout is 
higher when the population is more stable (for example, Hoffmann-Martinot, Rallings et 
al. 1996; Geys 2006a). More specifically, the longer someone has lived in a particular 
community, the more likely they are to vote (Sharp 1955). Here, we measure the 
percentage of the total population coming from outside of that NUTS unit; comprising 
both ‘external’ and ‘internal’ migration. External migrants are defined as those living 
outside the parent country one year prior to the census. Internal migrants are defined as 
those living in a different NUTS region of the same parent country one year prior to the 
census. 
Hypothesis 2d: Turnout will be lower in areas of higher immigration 
 
GDP: As we saw in Chapter 2, there are competing views as to whether we should expect 
higher GDP to be associated with increased, or decreased turnout (Crewe 1981; 
Bengtsson 2004). On balance, though, most empirical evidence suggests that higher GDP 
is associated with increased turnout; and that, conversely, that lower GDP is associated 
with lower turnout because, when times are tough, the day to day struggle to make ends 
meet takes precedence over voting in elections. The association between GDP and 
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turnout has been reported in studies which have focused on single countries 
(Rosenstone 1982), as well as comparative studies of developed countries (Siaroff and 
Merer 2002), or which have included both developed and less developed countries 
(Powell 1980; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998). Here we use the Gross Domestic Product for 
the NUTS region at current market prices, reported on a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
basis per inhabitant, as a percentage of the EU average. It has also been suggested that it 
may not only be the economic situation at the time of the election that has an effect on 
turnout, but also whether that situation has worsened or improved over previous years 
(Blais 2000). In order to investigate the possible effects of the changing economic 
situation, we also include the variable, GDP 10 year change, which is calculated from 
annual GDP data for each NUTS region for the ten year period centred on 2000. 
Hypothesis 2e : Turnout will be higher in those areas which have higher 
GDP 
Hypothesis 2f: Turnout will be higher in areas which have enjoyed higher 
GDP growth 
 
Occupation: It has long been known that people with higher socio-economic status are 
more likely to participate in politics, and to vote in elections (Verba and Nie 1972). Socio-
economic status is often linked to the occupation of the voter (Evans 1999); with some 
types of occupation being seen, not only as providing opportunities for social 
interactions and exposure to behavioural norms, but also as encouraging the 
development of skills and likely to expose individuals to particular political issues, 
policies, and actors (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Here, we measure, for each NUTS 
unit, the percentage of people in each of the ISCO88 Standard Occupational Categories. 
These categories group various occupations according to the tasks and duties 
undertaken (ILO nd). The highest category (Category 1) comprises Legislators, Senior 
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officials and Managers, who often determine and direct major policies within the 
governmental or private sector.  Category 2 includes various Professionals, who, for 
example, contribute to or apply existing scientific or artistic knowledge. At the other end 
of the scale, Category 8 includes Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers, 
occupations, whose work is usually controlled by strict specifications or procedures, and 
who do not generally require a wider understanding of the work organisation, nor of the 
final uses of the products which they provide. The lowest category, Category 9, includes 
simple and routine tasks which often require the use of hand tools and physical effort.  
Hypothesis 2g: Turnout will be higher in areas which have a greater 
percentage of people in the higher occupational categories 
 
Unemployment: Unemployment has been associated with reduced turnout in elections, 
not only because the unemployed have fewer resources, but also because they have less 
desire to participate in politics (Rosenstone 1982; Brady, Verba et al. 1995). The measure 
used here is the number of unemployed persons as a percentage of the active 
population (that is, the total of all employed and unemployed persons) in each NUTS 
unit. This is predominantly based on registered unemployed people, but Eurostat 
supplements these data by reference to regular labour force surveys. 
Hypothesis 2h: Turnout will be lower in areas with higher unemployment 
 
Educational attainment: People with a higher level of education are more likely to vote 
in elections, because they are more likely to have the required resources, a higher level 
of interest, and to have been socialised into the norms of electoral participation 
(Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Lijphart 1997; Franklin 2004; Johnston and Pattie 
2006). Here, we measure, for each NUTS unit, the percentage of the population with 
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qualifications at ISCED97 Standard educational attainment levels (UNESCO 1997). These 
levels broadly categorise educational attainment according to the knowledge, skills, and 
capabilities required to achieve a given qualification. The lowest level (Level 0) is that of 
pre-primary education; Levels 1 and 2 represent the first and second stages of basic 
education, which are usually compulsory. Level 3 represents upper-secondary education, 
and typically represents about 9 years of full time schooling.  Level 4 comprises 
education that, although post-secondary, cannot be considered as tertiary. Levels 5 and 
6 include all tertiary-level (that is, degree or higher) qualifications, with Level 6 (the 
highest level on the ISCED scale) being reserved for qualifications gained through 
advanced research. 
Hypothesis 2i: Turnout will be higher in areas where a greater percentage 
of people have a higher educational attainment 
 
The institutional and socio-demographic variables discussed above will provide the core 
set of variables that will be examined in the following chapters. However, in Chapter 6, 
we will supplement our analyses with the additional variables described below. 
Regionality: as noted in Chapter 3, we have constructed a Regionality Index, based 
largely on Keating’s (1998) work. The index is a composite of scores ranging from zero to 
a maximum of 20 (full list of Regionality scores for individual regions is provided in the 
Appendix), and is based on individual measures of Culture, Identity, Government 
Institutions, Civil Society, and Economic Regionalism. It has been previously suggested 
(Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Siaroff and Merer 2002) that the national legislature enjoys 
a reduced monopoly of power where it competes with other elected bodies, such as a 
strong regional government. Although this might not be exactly a zero-sum game, it is 
considered likely that those regions with a high Regionality index will not only exhibit 
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higher turnout in their regional elections, but will also display different patterns of 
turnout in other types of elections. 
Hypothesis 3a: Regions with a higher Regionality Index will have higher 
turnout in regional elections. 
 
EU Office: As was noted in Chapter 3, the member states of the European Union have 
been exposed to similar external influences known collectively as ‘Europeanisation’. As 
was also noted, different countries have reacted to these influences in different ways. 
However, even where the powers of central government remain strong, they do not 
enjoy a monopoly over all EU communications and decision making processes. Many 
sub-national regions maintain representative offices in Brussels, which actively engage in 
lobbying for regional interests, and maintain direct contact between the regions and 
various EU officials and decision makers (Nugent 1999). The existence of regional 
representative office in Brussels may be expected to thus reflect, or enhance, the 
visibility of the European Union within the region itself. If this were the case, we may 
further expect that interest in elections for the European Parliament would be higher in 
those regions having such an office – and that turnout in EP elections would thus be 
higher. We use the Regional Offices Contact Directory (Committee of the Regions 2008) 
to identify these regions (which are coded 1; regions without such an office are coded 0) 
. 
Hypothesis 3b: Regions with Representative Offices in Brussels will exhibit 
higher turnout in elections to the European Parliament. 
 
Union and Party Membership: Whether because it is the cause or the result of increased 
political interest, the membership either of a political party or a trade union has also 
been associated with increased levels of turnout (Blais 2000; Siaroff and Merer 2002). 
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There are difficulties with the availability of reliable data for party membership, even at 
a national level; and insufficient data are available for party membership at sub-national 
levels. What is clear, though, is that although party membership has been declining, and 
is below ten percent for all countries under consideration here, the levels do still differ 
from country to country (Mair and Biezen 2001). Trade union membership data are also 
only available at national level, but, again, vary considerably between countries. Data for 
political party and trade union membership45 at a national level are provided in Table 
4.4.  
Table 4.3 : Political Party and Trade Union Membership 
Country 
 
Membership of a 
Political Party  
(% of electorate) 
 
Membership of a 
Trade Union  
(% of all employees) 
   
Belgium 6.6 39.7 
England (1) 1.9 26.6 
Finland 9.7 68.9 
France 1.6 15.6 
Greece 6.8 12.4 
Ireland 3.1 37.6 
Italy 4.1 18.2 
Netherlands 2.5 28.6 
Spain 3.4 11.3 
Sweden 5.5 76.8 
 
 
              Note (1) figures for UK.  
Sources: Mair and Biezen (2001; Schnabel and Wagner (2005) 
 
Hypothesis 3c: Turnout will be higher in countries with higher membership 
of a political party. 
                                                             
45 Note that those countries with particularly high union membership (Finland and Sweden) have 
unemployment benefit systems which are administered by the unions (Schnabel and Wagner 
2005).   
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Hypothesis 3d: Turnout will be higher in countries with a higher 
membership of trade unions. 
 
The territorial coverage of political parties : Caramani (2005) used historical data to 
trace the changes in territorial coverage by political parties contesting national, first-
order elections in Western European countries. Nineteenth century processes of 
industrialisation and urbanisation, state formation and nation building, and the 
development of communications technologies led to the de-territorialisation of 
cleavages and party systems. Caramani suggested that de-territorialisation was in large 
part due to the homogenising effects of class politics. The associated strengthening of 
the left-right functional cleavage often served to suppress pre-existing territorially based 
cleavages. Often, this process was contemporaneous with increased territorial coverage 
by political parties as they sought to identify and mobilise wider bases of support.  
However, these processes were not uniform throughout all Western European countries. 
Caramani calculated the territorial coverage of parties46 in lower house elections by 
expressing the actual constituencies contested as a percentage of the total 
constituencies in a country. Table 4.4 provides the average territorial coverage of 
political parties in the 1990s. As can be seen, there are substantial differences between 
countries, with, for example, political parties in Spain contesting, on average, only 27 per 
cent of all constituencies; whereas in Sweden, political parties contest all of the 
constituencies in the country. We propose that, in countries where political parties 
contest a higher percentage of all constituencies, mobilisation of the electorate will be 
                                                             
46 In Caramani’s calculations, only those parties gaining at least five per cent of the vote were 
included. Caramani’s study was confined to parties contesting elections to the national 
legislature. 
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correspondingly higher and this will be reflected in increased turnout in lower house 
elections. 
Hypothesis 3f: Turnout in lower house elections will be higher in countries 
where political parties contest a greater percentage of constituencies.  
 
 
Table 4.4 : Territorial Coverage by Political Parties 
           Note (1) UK Figures                 Source: Caramani (2005) 
 
Government employment and taxation: In Chapter 3 we presented selected 
characteristics of national and sub-national levels of government, including public 
employment by level of government, and the taxation arrangements for sub-national 
government. Public employees may feel there is more at stake in the outcome of an 
election because the nature, conditions, or indeed the very existence of their jobs may 
hinge on the result (and see Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Further, although the 
politicisation effects of the workplace have tended to decline, in part because of 
Country 
 
Average Territorial 
Coverage by Parties  
(% Constituencies) 
 
  
Belgium 51.1 
England (1) 65.3 
Finland 85.3 
France 98.0 
Greece 98.9 
Ireland 65.2 
Italy 77.0 
Netherlands 99.4 
Spain 27.4 
Sweden 100.0 
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processes of de-industrialisation, and the increase in the numbers of people employed in 
part-time or non-permanent jobs, this decline has been more marked in the private, 
than in the public sector (Braconnier and Dormagen 2007). Consequently, we consider 
that an election may appear more salient to people employed in the public sector than 
to other members of the electorate. We measure the total public sector employment as 
a percentage of all employment in a country.  
Hypothesis 3g: Turnout will be higher in countries where a higher 
proportion of workers is employed in the public sector. 
 
Because it is often difficult to assign the number of public employees to each 
government level, we also investigate the association that taxation has on turnout. For 
this we concentrate on the municipal level. Local taxes are directly and obviously felt by 
the residents of a municipality, and because they are also spent locally, the results of 
that expenditure may be quite visible. Where local taxes contribute a higher share of 
local revenue, then, municipal elections should appear as more important to the voter. 
We will test for this using two tax variables. The first measures the proportion that local 
taxes contribute to the total revenue of the municipality. However, because taxes may 
be raised locally, but set centrally, our second measure is the share of total local 
government revenue contributed by autonomous local taxes.  
Hypothesis 3h: Turnout in municipal elections will be higher in countries 
where municipal government local taxation contributes a greater share of 
municipal government revenue 
Hypothesis 3i: Turnout in municipal elections will be higher in countries 
where autonomous taxation contributes a greater share to municipal 
government revenue 
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Mayoral Strength: Finally, we also presented in Chapter 3 a composite measure of 
Mayoral strength, measured on a scale from 0 to 14, based on the work of Heinelt and 
Hlepas (2006). Where mayors enjoy greater powers, the differential benefits at stake in 
the election are increased; thus, would expect greater mayoral strength to be associated 
with higher turnout in local elections: 
Hypothesis 3j: Turnout in municipal elections will be higher in countries 
with a higher Mayoral Strength Index. 
 
 
In this section, we have discussed the dependent and independent variables, and stated 
our hypotheses. In the following section, we present descriptive statistics for turnout in 
different types of elections, and for the socio-demographic variables.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.5 presents turnout by election type and country, aggregated to the national 
level.  
It is of course tempting to make some preliminary observations on the election results 
presented in Table 4.5: it appears that strictly enforced compulsory voting has a marked 
effect on turnout, with turnout in Belgium being above 90% for all election types, 
including those for the European Parliament. The less stringent form of compulsory 
voting (Greece and Italy) does not result in turnout as high as in Belgium. However, 
turnout in all election types is still generally high when compared to countries with no 
compulsion to vote. This is especially the case for elections other than for the Lower 
House. Similarly, there is evidence that the holding of elections simultaneously results in 
higher turnout, notably of the less important election. For example, in Sweden the 
municipal, county and lower house elections are all held on the same day, and the 
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turnout for in all these types of elections is very similar, at around 80%. The effects of, 
for example, proportional representation and weekend voting are perhaps less obvious, 
and indeed the nature of the data is that we cannot, by simple observation, determine 
the independent effects of these or other variables. This is an analysis we focus on in 
Chapters 5 to 7. 
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Table 4.5 : National turnout and regional variations, by country and election type 
Country Election Type National Turnout % 
Regional Turnout 
Range 
    
Belgium EP* 91.0 7.8 
Belgium Municipal 91.3 12.4 
Belgium Provincial 92.1 5.8 
Belgium Regional 90.7 11.4 
Belgium LH 91.6 7.3 
Belgium UH 91.6 6.8 
    
England EP* 30.4 19.9 
England Municipal* 34.5 23.2 
England LH* 63.8 28.8 
    
Finland EP 39.4 12.6 
Finland Municipal 58.3 10.3 
Finland LH 68.1 7.8 
Finland Presidential 76.9 5.7 
    
France EP 42.8 24.2 
France Municipal 57.3 25.9 
France Cantonal 56.1 32.1 
France Regional 58.0 20.0 
France LH 59.3 18.8 
France Presidential 83.8 13.6 
    
Greece EP* 66.9 31.4 
Greece Municipal* 70.6 39.1 
Greece LH* 74.9 30.1 
    
Ireland EP* 54.6 - 
Ireland Municipal* 51.9 17.2 
Ireland LH* 64.3 12.7 
    
Italy EP 71.7 26.0 
Italy Regional 71.8 22.0 
Italy LH 83.6 21.9 
    
Netherlands EP* 34.8 7.6 
Netherlands Municipal 58.0 9.3 
Netherlands Provincial* 46.6 14.3 
Netherlands LH* 78.2 8.0 
    
Spain EP* 54.1 26.9 
Spain Municipal* 66.2 24.5 
Spain LH* 71.6 18.7 
Spain UH 75.8 24.2 
    
Sweden EP* 38.5 9.1 
Sweden Municipal* 78.6 4.3 
Sweden County* 78.1 4.3 
Sweden LH* 81.2 5.1 
  
* Average figures for multiple elections of this type. Sources: See Appendix 
 
However, one observation which can be made at this stage is particularly relevant to the 
current study: as can be seen from the final column of Table 4.5, individual regions 
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within a country exhibit substantial variations in turnout. This variation is even apparent 
in Belgium, with its strictly enforced compulsory voting. Indeed, in all countries, the 
range in turnout across the regions in a country is of a similar size to the variation in 
turnout between the different types of elections. Whatever the combination of 
institutional arrangements which are in place for a particular election in a particular 
country, these arrangements are generally consistent across all of the regions in that 
country. Clearly, then, not all voters respond in the same way to the electoral rules of 
the game. 
As previously discussed, several socio-demographic variables have been suggested as 
explaining, at least in part, the differences in turnout which remain once we have taken 
into account the effects of the institutional determinants of voting. As also previously 
noted, comparative studies of turnout which have relied on aggregate data have usually 
been confined to the country level of measurement. Table 4.6(a) provides values of 
these variables when measured at the country level (corresponding tables for each 
individual country are provided in the Appendix). In contrast to the Human Development 
Indices presented earlier in this chapter, there is substantial variation between countries 
for most of these measures.   
Although the country-to-country variation is of interest in itself, our dataset allow us to 
go further, and to examine the variation among individual NUTS units within countries. 
Table 4.6(b), in addition to summarising the mean, minimum and maximum values for 
each variable when measured at the country level, also provides the corresponding 
values when we use the individual NUTS regions as our unit of analysis. As can be seen, 
in all cases the range of values for each variable increases substantially, when compared 
to data measured at the country level.  
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Table 4.6 : Characteristics of Socio-demographic variables  
 
       (a) - measured at the national level 
 Belgium England Finland France Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Spain Sweden 
           
Population density  338.0 241.0 17.0 96.0 83.5 55.4 193.0 470.2 81.6 21.6 
Population 10 yr % change 4.4 3.2 2.9 6.3 3.9 17.5 4.4 4.9 11.7 3.5 
Total migration  1.2 4.2 2.3 1.7 2.6 3.8 1.6 2.8 1.2 2.5 
GDP PPP per capita of EU 
average 
126.0 119.0 117.2 115.3 84.1 131.0 117.8 134.3 97.3 126.7 
GDP Ten year change -7.2 4.9 5.3 -5.3 10.4 44.7 -16.8 3.9 12.0 3.5 
Unemployment % 7.0 5.6 9.8 10.2 11.4 4.3 10.6 2.9 13.9 5.4 
Age:  15-29 % 18.9 18.8 18.6 20.3 22.0 24.3 18.7 18.8 22.5 18.2 
Death rate (per 1000) 10.2 10.2 9.5 9.0 9.6 8.2 9.7 8.8 8.9 10.5 
Occupation ISCO 1 & 2 % NA 26.9 18.2 18.1 21.8 29.6 20.7 28.8 19.5 21.5 
Educational Degree Plus % 20.6 25.9 33.7 25.3 22.7 33.4 13.4 23.9 11.2 13.3 
  
 
         (b) - measured at country level and NUTS unit level 
 
 10 Countries  432 Regions 
 Mean Min Max Range  Min Max Range 
 
    
    
Population density  159.7 17.0 470.2 453.2  2.1 20246 20244 
Population 10 yr % change 6.3 2.9 17.5 14.6  -7.6 37.7 45.3 
Total migration  2.4 1.2 4.2 3.1  .47 11.2 10.8 
GDP PPP per capita of EU average 116.9 84.1 134.3 50.2  47.9 602 554 
GDP Ten year change 5.5 -16.8 44.7 61.5  -42.1 77.1 119.2 
Unemployment % 8.1 2.9 13.9 11.0  1.7 30.5 28.8 
Age:  15-29 % 20.1 18.2 24.3 6.1  13.9 28.0 14.1 
Death rate (per 1000) 9.5 8.2 10.5 2.3  5.4 16.4 11 
Occupation ISCO 1 & 2 % 22.8 18.1 29.6 11.5  10.8 47.5 36.7 
Educational Degree Plus % 22.3 11.2 33.7 22.5  6.3 58.9 52.6 
  
That the range of values for any of our socio-demographic variables should increase 
when we take our measurements from smaller geographical units should not, of course, 
come as a surprise. However, this sub-national variation cannot be taken into account in 
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studies which only use data aggregated to the national level. It is usual for such studies 
to conclude that certain variables are, or are not, to be considered as ‘determinants of 
voting’. In subsequent chapters, we will see how reliable these determinants of voting 
are when we use sub-national units; and whether their effects are consistent from 
country to country. In this chapter, we conclude with a brief discussion of the methods 
will we use in those analyses. 
Methods 
We are interested here in assessing the effects that each of our independent variables 
has on turnout in elections, and in how different models compare in terms of the 
amount of variance that each explains. In order to analyse the respective impact of each 
of the independent variables on turnout, we will rely predominantly on the technique of 
multiple regression analysis. This technique will also allow us to assess the statistical 
significance of each of the variables, and to ascertain how much of the total variance is 
explained in each of the models (Powell 1980). 
The use of regression analysis has become widespread across the social sciences, and 
has found particular use in investigating electoral behaviour (Schroeder, Sjoquist et al. 
1986), as a glance at the relevant journals would quickly show. However, there are 
various important conditions which should, ideally, be satisfied if linear regression is to 
be used (see Saint-Germain 2002). Among these is that each variable should be normally 
distributed. On checking the characteristics of the data, it was found that the population 
density measure, in particular, was far from normally distributed. The distribution was 
markedly improved by applying a logarithmic transformation. In all of the regression 
analyses presented in Chapters 5 to 7, we use logarithmically transformed population 
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density. All other variables remain in their natural state, making the interpretation of 
their effects as straightforward as possible.  
Cases (that is, NUTS regions) are only included when we have complete information for 
all variables. The only exception to this is for Belgium, where data for occupational 
category were not available for NUTS2 (or indeed, for NUTS3) units. Because Belgium is 
the only country in our dataset which uses strictly enforced compulsory voting, we 
decided to keep Belgium in the set, at least until we had investigated the effects of 
compulsory voting. 
For most of the regression models, we use the highest categories of the education and 
occupation variables; that is, ISCED categories 5 and 6, and ISCO categories 1 and 2, 
respectively. This was largely determined by simple data availability considerations – 
with the exception of occupational information for Belgium, these categories were the 
only ones where data were complete and comparable across all countries in the dataset. 
However, data on other educational attainment and occupational categories are 
available for a slightly reduced set of countries: these countries are investigated 
collectively and individually in Chapter 7 . 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have described the compilation of an original dataset based on sub-
national territorial units, which will enable us to investigate the associations between 
turnout and our socio-demographic variables. By including several different types of 
elections, whilst maintaining the same set of variables and territorial basis, we will be 
able to investigate whether these associations are consistent, or whether the effects 
change according to the type of election. Such analyses will be the focus of Chapter 5. 
We have also described supplementary variables, which are unfortunately only available 
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at the country-level. We investigate the effects of these variables separately in Chapter 
6. In Chapter 7, we look in more detail at five of the countries in our dataset (England, 
France, Greece, Italy, and Spain) and see whether our variables behave in a similar way 
within each of these countries, or whether there are differences which are not apparent 
at the country level of analysis.  
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Chapter 5 – Institutional and Socio-Demographic Variables 
Introduction 
This chapter will present a series of multiple regression models which use the dataset 
described in Chapter 4. We begin with the institutional variables, and firstly show that 
the results obtained using country-level and regional-level aggregate data are 
comparable. We then note that all of the institutional variables are statistically 
significant, and have effects broadly in line with previous research. We then add selected 
socio-demographic variables to the model for all elections and examine their effects on 
turnout. All of the  socio-demographic variables are strongly significant when tested on a 
model which includes all countries and all election types. The coefficients for the 
institutional variables are generally larger than those for the socio-demographic 
variables. However, when we take into account the continuous nature of the socio-
demographic variables, and the range of possible values that they may take, we note 
that the sizes of the potential effects are substantial. 
Because elections to the European Parliament are often considered to be quite different, 
even from other lower-order elections in a country, we then test the model with results 
from European Parliament elections excluded. Although the effects of a number of 
variables remain relatively unchanged when EP elections are excluded, several 
differences do become apparent, which prompts a closer look at how these variables 
behave when we consider European Parliament elections, Municipal elections, and 
national Lower House elections individually. Although most variables seem to behave in 
line with the balance of opinion of previous research, the results for educational 
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attainment appear problematic, being consistently, and significantly, associated with 
lower turnout. 
Institutional Variables 
It will be recalled that certain characteristics of an election can be viewed, from a 
rational choice perspective, as influencing the costs and benefits of voting, and thus the 
level of turnout in an election. In this section we examine five such variables. 
Compulsory voting and weekend voting would be expected to increase turnout; the first 
because it increases the costs of not voting, the second because for many people, it may 
be easier to vote on the weekend than on a weekday. The use of a proportional 
representation system is expected to increase turnout because the voter is likely to have 
a greater choice of candidates to choose from, and there is less chance that their vote 
will be wasted. Sometimes, more than one election is held at the same time; so, the 
transaction costs - of going to the polling station and casting a vote - are the same as for 
a single election. We would expect, then, that turnout would be higher when elections 
are held simultaneously. Finally, not all elections are of equal importance in the eyes of 
the electorate. Because we are including several different types of elections here, we 
introduce a variable for election salience. Elections to the European Parliament are 
classed as the least salient (or third-order), elections for the national parliament or 
president are the most salient (first-order), and elections for sub-national levels of 
government lie between these two extremes (second order).  
The analysis includes results of up to 71 elections across the ten countries. For all of the 
countries except Ireland, our data include examples from all three election order 
categories. For Ireland, we have examples of first- and second-order elections, but were 
not able to include EP elections.  We take the opportunity here to compare the effects of 
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each variable using both country-level and regional-level data. There are two reasons for 
this: as seen in Chapter 1, changing the spatial units used in an analysis can also lead to 
changes in the results we obtain. Secondly, we have seen that, even under the same set 
of electoral rules, there are often considerable regional turnout differences within 
countries. Thus, we will be able to see whether the results for each variable remain 
consistent when this increased variance is introduced.  
The results of four regression models which examine the effects of our institutional 
variables are presented in Table 5.1. There are two pairs of models: Models 1A and 1B 
use data aggregated to the country-level, as has been used in much previous 
comparative research into turnout in elections. Model 1A includes all ten countries in 
the analysis, whereas in Model 1B we exclude Belgium (the only country with strictly 
enforced compulsory voting). Models 2A and 2B use data aggregated to our smaller 
regional units. Model 2A includes regional level data from all ten countries, and Model 
2B includes all countries except Belgium. We will firstly consider the results from Models 
1A and 1B.  
Compulsory Voting 
Model 1A includes all election types in all ten countries, and uses turnout aggregated to 
the country level. In line with previous research, compulsory voting is associated with 
significantly higher turnout. The measure used here includes two types of compulsory 
voting: strictly enforced compulsory voting (Belgium) is coded ‘2’; whereas those 
countries where voting has been officially compulsory, but where the penalties have 
been somewhat vaguely defined (Italy and Greece) are coded ‘1’. Although the official 
rules have been relaxed in both Italy and Greece, it is thought that most voters would 
have been habituated to vote under the previously prevailing conditions. Thus, there 
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could be vestigial effects of the former rules on compulsory voting. All other countries, 
that is those with no current or recent compulsory voting, are coded ‘0’.  
 
Table 5.1 : Results of Regression Analyses : Institutional Variables 
Model 1A 1B 2A 2B 
Variable 10 Countries 9 Countries 423 Regions 412 Regions 
     
Compulsory Voting (0,1,2) 11.181*** 
(1.723) 
11.085*** 
(3.315) 
11.045*** 
(.392) 
10.623*** 
(.516) 
     
Weekend Voting (0,1) 9.841*** 
(2.392) 
9.847*** 
(2.445) 
13.640*** 
(.465) 
13.743*** 
(.477) 
     
Proportional Representation 
(0,1) 
5.506*** 
(1.572) 
5.887*** 
(1.609) 
3.345*** 
(.249) 
3.446*** 
(.251) 
     
Simultaneous Election (0,1) 8.817*** 
(2.481) 
7.890** 
(2.816) 
8.196*** 
(.216) 
7.766*** 
(.482) 
     
Salience (0,1,2) 14.838*** 
(1.504) 
15.869*** 
(1.586) 
14.701*** 
(.272) 
14.965*** 
(.278) 
     
Constant 27.002*** 
(3.697) 
25.451*** 
(4.148} 
27.763*** 
(.593) 
27.423*** 
(.603) 
Adj R-square .734 .678 .690 .673 
N 71 64 2752 2676 
  
* significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level; *** significant at the .001 level 
 
The results in Model 1A suggest that, even when the effects of the variables are taken 
into account, each unit change in the compulsory voting variable is associated with 
around 11 per cent higher turnout. In other words, for strictly enforced compulsory 
voting (as in Belgium) we would predict about 22 per cent higher turnout, and for the 
‘civic duty’ encouragement to vote (Greece and Italy) around 11 per cent higher turnout, 
all other things being equal. Previous research has typically found compulsory voting to 
be associated with between ten and fourteen per cent higher turnout, depending on the 
countries included in the analysis (Jackman 1987; Blais and Carty 1990; Jackman and 
Miller 1995; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Perea 2002; Siaroff and Merer 2002), so our 
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results appear to be on the high side. However, that research was conducted using 
turnout in first-order (that is Lower House or Presidential) elections. We are including 
lower-order elections in our analysis, and it has previously been shown that compulsory 
voting can have a much larger effect on EP elections, for example, than on first-order 
elections (Mattila 2003). We return to this point later in this Chapter when we examine 
individual election types. 
 
Of course, in a model including all countries, it is possible that the inclusion of Belgium - 
the only country which has strictly enforced compulsory voting - is actually ‘doing all the 
work’. Thus, there may be no real effect associated with the weaker form of compulsory 
voting employed in Italy and Greece. In order to check this, Model 1B excludes Belgium 
from the analysis. As reference to Model 1B shows, compulsory voting is still significant, 
and still has an effect of around 11 per cent. We can conclude from the results that strict 
enforcement of compulsory voting does indeed have substantially larger effects than 
where voting is not strictly enforced.  
However, even in the absence of strict enforcement backed with monetary sanctions, 
the legal expectation that one should vote does appear to have a substantial effect. 
Further, this appears to be the case even after legislation is amended to reflect the 
removal of previous sanctions for the failure to vote; at least in Italy and Greece where 
such amendments were fairly recent. So, contrary to the expectations of pure rational 
choice approaches, where the removal of sanctions would lead us to expect an 
immediate drop in participation rates, it appears that participation remains quite high.   
The results here would seem to confirm (or at least do not contradict) Franklin’s (2004) 
investigation into the rather slow changes in participation rates when we consider the 
electorate as a whole. Thus, in instances where compulsory voting had been in force for 
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many years, most of the electorate would have been habituated to vote in at least a few 
elections prior to the legislation being revoked. For these voters, voting has become the 
norm, and they continue to participate even when the formal rules are relaxed. 
However, we should note that our time-frame is relatively short, and as such we are not 
able to detect any longer term decline in turnout which may take place after the legal 
compulsion to vote is removed. 
Hypothesis 1a: Turnout will be higher where voting is compulsory - Confirmed 
Weekend voting 
As can be seen in Models 1A and 1B, weekend voting is associated with significantly 
higher turnout. Moreover, at around ten per cent, this increase is quite substantial when 
compared to some previous research, which has suggested weekend voting to be 
associated with about six per cent higher turnout (Franklin 1996), or even to have no 
measurable effect at all (Siaroff and Merer 2002). It is possible that we are seeing a 
particularly large effect for weekend voting for two reasons. Firstly, we are only 
considering a rather small set of countries, with weekday voting only being the norm in 
England, Ireland and the Netherlands. Secondly, the models here include all types of 
elections – and, as for compulsory voting, weekend voting has been shown to have 
larger effects on EP elections than on first-order elections; for instance, Matilla reported 
weekend voting to be associated with around 12 per cent higher turnout in EP elections 
(Mattila 2003).  
Hypothesis 1b: Turnout will be higher where voting takes place on the weekend - 
Confirmed 
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Proportional Representation 
Here we are comparing all PR systems to all non-PR systems. We include ‘fusion’ systems 
in the PR category because, although there is a built-in winner’s bonus, there is still a 
substantial PR component, and hence the expectation on the part of the voter that a 
vote for a minor party may not necessarily be a wasted vote. As we can see in Models 1A 
and 1B, the use of Proportional Representation is statistically significant, and is 
associated with around six per cent higher turnout compared to non-PR systems, even 
when the effects of the other variables are taken into account. This finding is broadly in 
line with previous research, which has suggested that turnout is between three and 
twelve per cent higher under a proportional system (Blais and Carty 1990; Franklin 1996; 
Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Blais 2000). 
Hypothesis 1c: Turnout will be higher where proportional representation is used - 
Confirmed 
Simultaneous Elections47 
If, once the voter is at the polling station, there is the chance to vote in more than one 
election, we would expect most of them to make use of this opportunity (Cox and 
Munger 1989). So, simultaneous elections would be associated with higher turnout. But, 
we would expect this to be more noticeable for the less important election out of the 
two (or more) elections held at the same time.  Accordingly, the results in Table 5.1 
reflect the effect of simultaneous elections on second- and third-order election turnout.  
As can be seen, this variable is statistically significant, and associated with turnout 
around eight per cent higher than when elections are not held at the same time. When 
we ran a similar model (not reported here) which measured the effects of simultaneous 
                                                             
47
 We should note that, in overcoming the peculiarities of the electoral calendar in England (see Chapter 4), 
we have specifically excluded the effects of simultaneous elections in that country.  
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elections on all types of elections (that is, including first-order elections), the size of the 
coefficient drops from around eight per cent to about five per cent. This finding is in line 
with the seven to 12 per cent higher turnout in simultaneous elections reported by 
Mattila (2003). 
Hypothesis 1d: Turnout will be higher when elections are held simultaneously - 
Confirmed 
Salience 
Finally, we include a variable which accounts for the relative importance of the different 
types of elections in the analysis. We code national elections (Lower House; directly 
elected upper house; directly elected president) as 2, sub-national elections (Municipal, 
Lower-Intermediate, Upper-Intermediate) as 1, and the elections for the European 
Parliament as 0. Although there is a somewhat arbitrary element to such a classification, 
the results do provide some support for this approach; with more salient elections being 
associated with significantly higher turnout than less salient elections. Indeed, the 
coefficients for the salience variable are substantial, with each step up in the order of 
election being associated with around fifteen per cent higher turnout. The coefficients 
for the salience variable are, in fact, larger than for any of the other institutional 
variables except for strictly enforced compulsory voting. In more important elections, 
more people do indeed vote, and there are correspondingly fewer reluctant voters who 
remain to be potentially influenced by the various institutional arrangements which may 
be in place.  
Hypothesis 1e: Turnout will be higher in elections of higher salience - Confirmed 
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As we have seen in this section, the results of regression analyses which have examined 
the independent effects of each of the institutional variables would provide initial 
support for the hypotheses. However, these analyses used data aggregated to the 
national level. Next, we consider the results of regression analyses which measure 
turnout at the regional level, and compare these results to those obtained in Models 1A 
and 1B. 
Table 5.1 presents the results of two further regression analyses, Models 2A and 2B, 
which correspond with Models 1A and 1B, but use data aggregated to the sub-national 
regional level. Belgium is included in the first model in each pair, and excluded in the 
second. All of the variables are statistically significant, and in terms of the sign on the 
coefficients, there are no differences between the models. When we examine the size of 
the coefficients, we see that the effects of compulsory voting, simultaneous elections, 
and the salience of elections are very similar, whether we use country-level or regional-
level data.  
The coefficients for weekend voting and for the type of electoral system do differ in 
magnitude between those models based on country-level data and regional level data. 
However, for both variables, the effects remain statistically significant in both models, 
and certainly are not trivial. It is possible that these changes are due to the differing 
number of regions in each country; with larger countries effectively being given more 
weight in the analysis. For example, France, with 96 regions, uses weekend voting for all 
elections; but does not use PR for its first-order elections.  
The R-square value for all models is quite high, with the five variables accounting for at 
least two-thirds of the variation in turnout. The R-square values for the models based on 
regions rather than countries are slightly lower than those based on country level data, 
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which is perhaps to be expected given that there is substantially greater variance when 
the measures are taken at the regional rather than the country level. All variables are 
consistently significant at the .001 level in all models, with the sole exception of 
simultaneous elections in Model 1B, where it is significant at the .01 level.  
We have confirmed that the effects of institutional variables used with country level 
data do not seriously contradict either the expectations of rational choice approaches to 
voting behaviour, or to most previous research into institutional determinants of voting. 
The effects associated with the institutional variables are in some cases larger than those 
reported in previous research, but it should be noted that we are dealing with up to 
seven different types of elections, broadly categorised into three levels of salience. As 
was noted in Chapter 2, it has previously been found that the effects of some 
institutional variables are much greater for European Parliament elections than for 
Lower House elections (Mattila 2003); thus, we would reasonably expect that we would 
detect larger effects for these variables when we include lower-order elections in our 
analysis.   
We return to the effects of these institutional variables on different types of election 
later in this chapter; but, having noted the broad consistencies in the effects of 
institutional variables when using either country-level or regional level data, we can 
conclude that we are not encountering any serious effects associated with the 
Modifiable Areal Unit Problem discussed in Chapter 1. We can now introduce our 
selected socio-demographic variables to the regional level turnout model. 
Socio-demographic variables 
As we have previously seen, there are often substantial differences in turnout among 
the regions within countries. The institutional variables that we discussed in the 
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previous section tend to remain constant across the whole country in any given election, 
so are unable to account for these differences. A number of socio-demographic 
variables have been suggested as accounting for differences in turnout, and we now add 
these variables to the model48.   
Belgium is excluded from the analyses which include socio-demographic variables 
because we unfortunately lack sub-national data for the occupational categories. 
However, having investigated the effects of different types of compulsory voting, the 
loss of Belgium should not seriously undermine our subsequent analyses: Belgium does 
not represent a very large proportion of our total dataset; furthermore, the inter-
regional variations in turnout under a system of strictly enforced compulsory voting are 
relatively small.  
Table 5.2 presents the results of regression models which include the selected socio-
demographic variables. To aid comparison, we include the results of Model 2B in the 
first column. Model 3A Int is identical to Model 3A except for the addition of a term for 
the interaction between the percentage of young people and the proportion of the 
population educated to degree level. Our main focus in the next section will be Model 
3A. 
We will first consider Model 3A, and examine whether the introduction of the socio-
demographic variables has altered the effects for the institutional variables. The results 
for compulsory voting, weekend voting, simultaneous elections, and the salience of 
election type are very similar to the results obtained in Model 2B, which included only 
the institutional variables. All of these variables remain highly significant, and retain the 
                                                             
48 We were unable to add all of the socio-demographic variables to the regression models using 
country-level data because of multicollinearity problems. 
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same sign on their coefficients as before. For Proportional Representation, while the 
coefficient is still positive, it is markedly smaller than in Model 2B, and now significant 
only at the .05 level. In other words, the inclusion of the socio-demographic variables is 
reducing the positive effect of proportional representation on turnout; whereas the 
effects of the other institutional determinants remain relatively unchanged. We will now 
consider each of those socio-demographic variables in turn. 
Table 5.2 : Results of Regression Analyses : Institutional and Socio-demographic Variables 
Model 2B 3A 3A Int 
 412 Regions All election types All elections 
    
Compulsory Voting (0,1,2) 
10.623*** 
(.516) 
12.004*** 
(.549) 
11.886*** 
(.563) 
Weekend Voting (0,1) 
13.743*** 
(.477) 
12.552*** 
(.897) 
12.563*** 
(.897) 
Proportional Representation 
(0,1) 
3.446*** 
(.251) 
.540* 
(.302) 
.533 
(.302) 
Simultaneous Election (0,1) 
7.766*** 
(.482) 
8.154*** 
(.455) 
8.110*** 
(.458) 
Salience (0,1,2) 
14.965*** 
(.278) 
13.678*** 
(.274) 
13.669*** 
(.274) 
    
Population Density (ln)  
-1.866*** 
(.274) 
-1.850*** 
(.180) 
Migration %  
-1.182*** 
(.206) 
-1.188*** 
(.180) 
GDP (PPP)  
.031*** 
(.007) 
.027*** 
(.008) 
Unemployment  
-.187*** 
(.044) 
-.185*** 
(.044) 
Young %  
-.332*** 
(.103) 
-.517** 
(.222) 
Death Rate %  
-.622*** 
(.151) 
-.670*** 
(.159) 
Occupation (ISCO1&2 %)  
.566*** 
(.058) 
.557*** 
(.058) 
Education (% Degree)  
-.352*** 
(.034) 
-.537** 
(.199) 
Young*Education   
.009 
(.010) 
    
Constant 
27.423*** 
(.603) 
51.415*** 
(3.405) 
56.007*** 
(5.961) 
Adj R-square .673 .716 .716 
N 2676 2676 2676 
    
* significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level; *** significant at the .001 level 
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In Model 3A, the addition of the eight socio-demographic variables has led to a modest 
increase in the adjusted R-square value (0.716 compared to 0.673 for Model 2B, which 
included only the institutional variables). All of the socio-demographic variables in Model 
3A are highly significant (that is, significant at the .001 level).  
Population Density 
Increased population density is associated with a statistically significant decrease in 
turnout; that is, more densely populated regions (for example, those with large cities or 
towns) are associated with lower turnout, even when we control for the effects of the 
other variables. This finding appears to contradict some previous comparative research, 
albeit based on country level data, which has suggested that more densely populated 
countries have, on average, higher turnout than those which are less densely populated. 
Further, it has also been suggested that people who live in urban, rather than rural areas 
would be more likely to vote because there would be less distance to travel to the 
polling booth. Indeed, the evidence here seems to support the hypothesis that people in 
large towns and cities are less likely to vote, perhaps because they have a weaker sense 
of community, and are not enmeshed in social structures as strongly as those living in 
less densely populated, more rural areas.  
Hypothesis 2a: Turnout will be lower in areas of higher population density - Confirmed 
Migration 
The coefficient for migration into a region is negative and statistically significant. The 
explanation seems rather straightforward: as was discussed in Chapter 2, new arrivals to 
a region will be less likely to participate in elections. A one per cent higher migration to a 
region is associated with just over one per cent decrease in turnout. Before we run away 
with the conclusion that all new arrivals lack the motivation to vote in elections, we need 
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to recall that the measure of migration here is based on the previous year. Thus, for 
elections which take place every four or five years, a one per cent annual migration rate 
could represent a total of 4 or 5 per cent new arrivals in that period. So, all other things 
being equal, many new arrivals do vote, though at a lower rate than the established 
residents.  
 Hypothesis 2d: Turnout will be higher in areas of higher immigration - Confirmed 
Regional GDP 
It was noted in Chapter 2 that measures of GDP have often been used in previous 
research which included both developed and lesser developed countries. In these 
studies, countries with higher GDP tended to have higher turnout in elections (Blais and 
Dobrzynska 1998). As we see in Model 3A, the coefficient for GDP is statistically 
significant (.001 level); and each one unit increase in GDP is associated with around one 
thirtieth of a percentage point increase in turnout. For the countries in our dataset, our 
measure of GDP (see Table 4.6, Chapter 4) ranges from a minimum of 84.1 (Greece) to a 
maximum of 134.3 (Netherlands); suggesting a turnout difference of around one and a 
half per cent. Within our group of Western European countries, then, the result for GDP 
supports previous research which has noted that the effect is rather modest when the 
analysis is restricted to include only developed countries (Blais 2000). 
Hypothesis 2e: Turnout will be higher in those areas which have higher GDP - 
Confirmed  
Unemployment 
In line with previous research (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), our model shows that 
higher unemployment is associated with significantly lower turnout: a one per cent 
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increase in unemployment being associated with a decrease in turnout of just less than a 
fifth of a per cent.  
Hypothesis 2h: Turnout will be lower in areas with higher unemployment – Confirmed. 
Young People 
The percentage of the population in the 15 to 29 years age group is associated with 
significantly lower turnout. Again, this result serves to confirm previous findings that 
younger age groups are, on average, less motivated to vote in elections (Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980; Nevitte, Blais et al. 2009). A one percent increase in the proportion of 
young people is associated with around a third of a percentage point reduction in 
turnout.  
Hypothesis 2b: Turnout will be lower in areas with a greater percentage of young 
people – Confirmed 
 
Death Rate 
It is known that the gap between the incomes of the poorest and wealthiest in a society 
is related to mortality; and that the death rate is higher among the poorer and more 
marginalised groups (Kennedy, Kawachi et al. 1996; Hwang, Wilkins et al. 2009). These 
groups are among those less likely to have the resources necessary to vote in elections. 
We expect then that regions with a higher death rate would be associated with lower 
turnout in elections.  This expectation is confirmed by the results from Model 2A, where 
the death rate is statistically significant when the effects of the remaining variables are 
taken into account: a one unit rise in the number of deaths per thousand people being 
associated with a decrease in turnout of .622 per cent. 
 Hypothesis 2c: Turnout will be lower in areas with a high death rate – Confirmed. 
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Occupational Category 
Previous research has suggested that people in the higher categories of occupations will 
be more likely to vote, because they have had more opportunity to acquire social norms, 
because they have a higher level of skills necessary to participate in elections, or because 
they have a greater stake in the result (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). This is 
confirmed in Model 2A, where a higher percentage of the population in the highest 
employment categories (ISCO categories I and II) is associated with significantly higher 
turnout. Each one per cent increase in the population in those employment categories is 
associated with over a half a per cent increase in turnout.  
Hypothesis 2g: Turnout will be higher in areas which have a greater percentage of 
people in the higher occupational categories – Confirmed. 
Education 
The link between education and voting has been suggested by much previous research: 
more educated people are more likely to vote (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Nevitte, 
Blais et al. 2009).  Our measure here is the percentage of people educated to degree 
level or beyond. As we can see from the results for Model 2A, education is statistically 
significant. However, contrary to our expectations and a wealth of previous research, the 
coefficient is negative: a one per cent increase in the proportion of the population 
educated to degree level or higher is associated with a reduction in turnout of around a 
third of one per cent. Larger effects for education are often found in the USA, with the 
link being less pronounced in some European countries (Milligan, Moretti et al. 2004), 
but what we have here is not a weak positive effect, but a strong negative one.  
For the moment, we note that, in most European countries, the past few decades have 
seen an enormous increase in the numbers of people going to university: thus, it is 
predominantly the younger age cohorts within a particular country which have achieved 
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a degree level of education. However, previous research (confirmed in Model 3A), has 
found that, other things being equal, young people themselves are usually considered to 
be less likely to vote.  
In order to explore the possible interaction between young people and educational 
attainment, Model 3A-Int includes an interaction term, Young*Degree. However, as can 
be seen from the results of this regression model in Table 5.2, this interaction term is not 
significant. Further, when the interactive term is included, the coefficients for both of 
the uninteracted variables remain negative, and significant. At this point, the results 
suggest that the most highly educated groups are less likely to vote. For some of our 
group of countries, we have data on a lower category of education (post-primary) which 
may be a more appropriate measure of the skills necessary to vote in elections; in that 
Chapter we will also be able to examine individual countries and see if the apparent 
association between degree education and lower turnout is confirmed. 
Hypothesis 2i: Turnout will be higher in areas where a greater percentage of people 
have a higher educational attainment – Not Confirmed. 
 
Our main focus in this section has been Model 3A, which included all election types in all 
countries except Belgium. We have found that, while statistically significant, the 
coefficients for the socio-demographic variables are rather modest when compared to 
most of the institutional variables. However, whereas the institutional variables are 
categorical (and can only take two or three values) the continuous socio-demographic 
variables can take values over a much wider range. This being the case, it is worth 
calculating a potential size of effect for each variable by combining the coefficient for 
each variable with the range of values it may take. The results are shown in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3 : Socio-demographic variables: range of values and potential size of effect 
Variable Unit Coefficient Range 
(Country) 
Effect 
(Country) 
Range 
(Regions) 
Effect 
(Regions) 
       
Population 
Density 
Ln -1.866 6.1 11.4 9.9 18.5 
Migration % -1.182 3.1 3.7 10.8 12.8 
GDP % EU 
average 
.031 50 1.6 554 17.2 
Unemployment % -.187 11 2.1 28.8 5.4 
Young % -.332 6.1 2.0 14.1 4.7 
Death Rate Per 1000 per 
year 
-.622 2.3 1.4 11.0 6.8 
Occupation 
(ISCO 1& 2) 
% .566 11.5 6.5 36.7 20.7 
Education 
(ISCED 5 & 6) 
% -.352 22.5 7.9 52.6 18.5 
       
  
 
As can be seen, the difference in turnout predicted by using the minimum and maximum 
values for each variable is usually quite substantial. Of course, no one region actually 
scores the extreme value for all of the variables. However, we can select a couple of 
examples from our data set – one of very low turnout and one of very high turnout - 
which differ markedly in terms of several of the variables. 
Nottingham (England) has above average values for: population density (3606 
inhabitants per square kilometre), immigration (8.03 per cent of the population coming 
from outside the region), unemployment (9.6 per cent), death rate (10.5 deaths per 
1000 inhabitant per year), and the percentage of the population educated to at least 
degree level (23.1). All of these variables are associated with decreased turnout in Model 
3A. Thus, despite having about average numbers of people in the ISCO I and II 
occupational categories (23.1%) and above average GDP (161.4), Nottingham records an 
expectedly low turnout. For example, in the very low salience European Parliament 
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elections of 1999, actual turnout in Nottingham was only 19.5%; compared to 19.7% 
turnout as predicted by Model 3A. 
At the other extreme, Modena (Italy), whilst having a similar Death Rate (10.2) and GDP 
(160), and only slightly lower percentage of people in higher occupational categories 
(19.4), has much lower values than Nottingham on Population Density (239 inhabitants 
per square kilometre), immigration (1.2 per cent coming from outside the region), 
unemployment (1.7%), young people (16.9 per cent of the population), and the 
percentage of people with qualifications at degree level or higher (11.0%). In the high 
salience legislative elections of 2006, Modena recorded actual turnout of 90.0%; 
compared to 91.5% predicted by Model 3A.  
However, as reflected in the R-square value of 0.716, Model 3A is not predicting all 
results with as much success as the two examples given above. Indeed, even for the 
same regions, Model 3A performs less well when we consider different types of 
elections. For example, in the case of the Nottingham and the 2001 legislative election, 
actual turnout was 51.1%, whereas the predicted turnout is 46.0%. The difference is 
much more substantial when we consider Modena and the 2004 European Parliament 
election, where actual turnout was 81.2% and the predicted turnout is only 64%. 
Clearly, the models are doing better at predicting turnout in some cases than in others. 
In Figure 5.1 Predicted Turnout is plotted against Actual Turnout for all cases. Where the 
predicted turnout is exactly the same as the actual turnout, the case would lie on the 
diagonal; and the further from the diagonal, the less well the model is doing. As can be 
seen from Figure 5.1, although many cases do lie close to the diagonal, there are also 
plenty of cases where the turnout as predicted by Model 3A falls markedly above or 
below the actual turnout. 
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Figure 5.1 : Predicted v Actual Turnout (all election types, all countries except Belgium) 
 
 
Figure 5.2 presents similar information as Figure 5.1, but identifies the different types of 
election. For the sake of clarity we have included only European Parliament, municipal, 
and legislative elections.  
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Figure 5.2 : Predicted v Actual Turnout – Municipal, Legislative and EP Elections 
 
 
As the Figure 5.2 shows, the distribution of individual cases in each election type is not 
random about the diagonal; for example, for EP elections, many cases fall below the 
diagonal (that is, the model is predicting turnout lower than was actually the case); 
whereas for elections to the Lower House, the opposite is true, with many cases falling 
above the diagonal (that is, the model is predicting higher turnout than was actually the 
case) . Clearly, Model 3A is being stretched by the inclusion of all election types, and in 
the following section, we examine how well the same model performs when we consider 
different types of elections.  
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Different Election Types 
In this section, we conduct regression analyses on different types of elections. Firstly, we 
compare the effects of excluding European Parliament elections. Table 5.4 includes 
results for Model 3A (all election types) and Model 3B (which excludes elections for the 
European Parliament). The adjusted R-square value is slightly lower for Model 3B; which, 
although having a smaller sample size does not contain the extremely low turnout 
figures which are common for EP elections in some of the countries in our data set.  
When we consider the effects of the institutional variables, the effects of weekend 
voting, simultaneous elections, and the salience of elections remain substantially 
unchanged. However, we see marked changes in the coefficients for compulsory voting 
and for proportional representation.  
For compulsory voting, the coefficient is around 12 per cent in Model 3A, but this effect 
is much more modest when EP elections are excluded, being reduced to just under five 
per cent. This suggests that compulsory voting has a greater effect on the very low order 
elections for the European Parliament than on higher-order elections. This makes sense: 
as an election becomes more important in the eyes of the voters, more people are likely 
to vote anyway, and there is simply less room for compulsory voting to have an effect.   
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Table 5.4 : Results of Regression Analyses (with and without EP elections) 
Model 3A 3B 
 All elections All except EP 
   
Compulsory Voting (0,1,2) 
12.004*** 
(.549) 
4.909*** 
(.603) 
Weekend Voting (0,1) 
12.552*** 
(.897) 
11.964*** 
(.941) 
Proportional Representation 
(0,1) 
.540* 
(.302) 
2.250*** 
(.341) 
Simultaneous Election (0,1) 
8.154*** 
(.455) 
7.052*** 
(.613) 
Salience (0,1,2) 
13.678*** 
(.274) 
15.553*** 
(.449) 
   
Population Density (ln) 
-1.866*** 
(.274) 
-1.805*** 
(.190) 
Migration 
-1.182*** 
(.206) 
-.454* 
(.221) 
GDP (PPP) 
.031*** 
(.007) 
.021** 
(.007) 
Unemployment 
-.187*** 
(.044) 
-.180*** 
(.046) 
Young % 
-.332*** 
(.103) 
-.626*** 
(.108) 
Death Rate % 
-.622*** 
(.151) 
-.602*** 
(.157) 
Occupation (ISCO1&2 %) 
.566*** 
(.058) 
.384*** 
(.085) 
Education (% Degree) 
-.352*** 
(.034) 
-.228*** 
(.039) 
   
Constant 
51.415*** 
(3.405) 
54.048*** 
(3.614) 
Adj R-square .716 .639 
N 2676 2071 
   
* significant at the .05 level 
** significant at the .01 level 
*** significant at the .001 level 
 
 
 
The second change between Models 3A and 3B is the effect of using proportional 
representation: in Model 3A this is only weakly significant, and rather modest at around 
half a per cent turnout. However, when we exclude European Parliament elections 
(Model 3B), the effect of proportional representation is highly significant and over four 
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times the size compared to Model 3A. We can note here that all elections for the 
European Parliament which are included in the data set were held under Proportional 
Representation electoral systems. What appears to be happening is that European 
Parliament elections are giving PR a ‘bad name’: because turnout for European 
Parliament elections in several countries is substantially lower than for all other election 
types, when we include EP elections with all other types of elections, the low turnout for 
EP elections reduces the effect that Proportional Representation has on turnout. 
When we turn our attention to the socio-demographic variables, we can firstly note that 
all are significant in both models. Secondly, the sign of the coefficient for each variable is 
the same in both models. Thus, initial perceptions are that the socio-demographic 
variables are quite consistent in their effects, whether or not we include elections to the 
European Parliament. For many of the variables, the sizes of the coefficients are broadly 
similar in both models. However, for both the Migration and Young variables there are 
marked differences. Migration has a much smaller coefficient in Model 3B; whereas 
Young, alone among the socio-demographic variables, has a larger (negative) coefficient 
in Model 3B – almost double the size of that in Model 3A.   
There do appear to be differences in the effects that some of the variables are having, 
depending on whether or not EP elections are included in the analysis. We consider the 
differences between election types in the following section, where we look at EP, 
Municipal, and Lower House elections in turn49. 
                                                             
49
 These election types are examined here because Presidential and Intermediate level (provincial, regional) 
elections are held only in some of the countries in the data set. 
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European Parliament, Municipal, and Lower House Elections 
As we saw in the previous section, although the effects of some variables seem fairly 
consistent, whether or not we include EP elections in the analysis, there are also some 
differences in the size of the coefficients, and occasionally in the level of statistical 
significance. In this section, we examine EP, Municipal, and Lower House elections 
separately. The results of these three different regression analyses are presented in 
Table 5.5. We will first consider the institutional variables, then the socio-demographic 
variables. 
Table 5.5 : Results of Regression Analyses – EP, Municipal and Lower House Elections 
Model 4A 4B 4C 
 EP Municipal LH 
    
Compulsory Voting (0,1,2) 27.276*** 
(.755) 
11.988*** 
(1.004) 
6.142*** 
(.540) 
Weekend Voting (0,1) 17.574*** 
(1.399) 
15.979*** 
(1.193) 
1.939* 
(.922) 
Proportional Representation (0,1)  8.491*** 
(.589) 
4.952*** 
(.335) 
Simultaneous Election (0,1) 17.122*** 
(.721) 
3.596*** 
(.599) 
 
    
Population Density (ln) -.660* 
(.276) 
-1.720*** 
(.243) 
-.727*** 
(.195) 
Migration -2.098*** 
(.301) 
.590* 
(.273) 
.056 
(.210) 
GDP (PPP) .031*** 
(.009) 
.008 
(.009) 
.014* 
(.007) 
Unemployment -.255*** 
(.064) 
-.063 
(.058) 
-.198*** 
(.046) 
Young % -.058 
(.159) 
-.550*** 
(.144) 
-.914*** 
(.109) 
Death Rate % -.757*** 
(.225) 
-.249 
(.190) 
-.947*** 
(.162) 
Occupation (ISCO1&2 %) .418*** 
(.082) 
.294*** 
(.072) 
.474*** 
(.067) 
Education (% Degree) -.160*** 
(.050) 
-.192*** 
(.042) 
-.370*** 
(.041) 
    
Constant 36.170*** 
(4.983) 
52.734*** 
(4.283) 
91.054*** 
(3.531) 
Adj R-square .881 .880 .678 
N 604 698 876 
* significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level; *** significant at the .001 level 
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Institutional Variables 
We first consider the effects of our institutional variables in the three different models. 
Note that, because we are now dealing with each type of election separately, the 
Salience variable is no longer included in the analyses. In addition, because all elections 
for the European Parliament were held under proportional representation, this variable 
is not included in Model 4A; and, because we do not measure the effect of simultaneous 
elections on first-order elections, this variable drops from Model 4C. 
As can be seen in Table 5.5, where included, all of the institutional variables are 
statistically significant in all three models, and have coefficients agreeing in sign with the 
results in Models 3A and 3B, above. However, we see further evidence of a phenomenon 
noted previously: that the effects of institutional variables generally decrease with 
increasing salience of election; that is, EP -> Municipal -> Lower House.  
Compulsory voting for EP elections is associated with an enormous 27 per cent increase 
in turnout; an effect which is more than halved in the case of Municipal elections; and 
roughly halved again for Lower House elections; where compulsory voting is associated 
with an increase in turnout of ‘only’ six percent. Clearly, compulsion to vote, even if it is 
only the weak form of compulsion in Italy and Greece, has a substantial effect on lower-
order elections; but the effect is much reduced for more important elections where 
more people would presumably vote in the absence of any kind of legally backed, 
normative expectation. 
We see a similar pattern when we examine the coefficients for Weekend Voting. 
Although here there is a much smaller difference between EP and Municipal elections 
(16.6% and 16% respectively) we see a substantial drop in the effects of weekend voting 
when we consider Lower House elections, where the coefficient for weekend voting is 
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rather modest at just under two per cent. Indeed, the coefficient for weekend voting in 
Lower House elections is only weakly significant, and thus rather more in line with 
previous research based on first-order elections, which has occasionally questioned 
whether weekend voting has any independent effect whatsoever (Siaroff and Merer 
2002). 
For Proportional Representation, we are limited to a comparison of the effects in 
Municipal and Lower House elections because all EP elections in this dataset were held 
under Proportional Representation. However, we see again a reduction in the 
coefficients, from over eight per cent in Municipal elections to less than five per cent in 
Lower House elections. We should note, further, that in both cases the coefficients are 
highly significant, and larger than when we included EP elections in the analysis (Model 
3A).  
The effect of holding elections simultaneously is also substantially reduced for Municipal 
elections compared to EP elections (3.6% and 17% respectively). The results here suggest 
that the effects are much greater on the very low salience EP elections than on 
Municipal elections. We should note that in overcoming the vagaries of the election 
calendar in England, we were forced to exclude instances of simultaneous elections in 
England. However, it is likely that a similar pattern does exist in England, and, indeed, 
previous research has shown that holding local elections simultaneously with EP 
elections can lead to measurable increases in turnout for the latter (Rallings and 
Thrasher 2005). 
To summarise the findings for our institutional variables, the effects are consistent, in 
that they have the same sign on the coefficient, and are statistically significant across the 
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three different types of elections. However, in all cases, the effects are markedly 
reduced in elections of higher salience. 
Socio-demographic Variables 
Turning our attention to the socio-demographic variables, we can also examine the 
differences in their effects in different types of elections. Firstly, we consider those 
variables which have effects consistent with Model 3A, at least in terms of the sign of 
their coefficients, across each of the individual election types: population density, GDP, 
unemployment, young people, death rate, occupation, and education. 
Increasing population density is associated with significantly decreased turnout in 
Models 4A, 4B, and 4C. The effect is only weakly significant for EP elections; and is most 
marked for Municipal elections. It has been suggested that mobilisation of voters by 
political parties, or by media coverage, is greater in national elections than in Municipal 
elections (and that it is lower still in EP elections), and that this can overcome to some 
extent the otherwise lower inclination to vote found in large cities (Blais 2000). It is 
possible that we are seeing some effects of this here. However, if this were the case, we 
would expect the effect in EP elections to be at least as high as in Municipal elections: 
mobilisation to vote and media coverage is often even lower in EP elections than in 
Municipal elections.  
The percentage of the population in the highest occupational categories (ISCO I & II) is 
associated with statistically significantly higher turnout in all three election types, 
although the effect is lower in Municipal elections than in EP and Lower House elections. 
On the other hand, an increasing percentage of people with educational qualifications of 
degree level or higher is (as in Model 3A and 3B) associated with statistically significantly 
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lower turnout; and the effects are larger in Lower House elections than in EP or 
Municipal elections. 
The coefficients for GDP are positive in all three election types, though modest. GDP is 
only strongly significant for elections to the European Parliament. In the other two types 
of elections the effects are smaller than in EP elections, and in the case of Municipal 
elections, GDP is not statistically significant. Unemployment is associated with decreased 
participation in all three types of elections, although not significantly so in Municipal 
elections. A one per cent increase in unemployment is associated with a quarter and a 
fifth of a per cent decrease in turnout, respectively, for European Parliament and Lower 
House elections. The percentage of young people is associated with decreased 
participation in elections, although not significantly so in EP elections. In Municipal 
elections, a one per cent increase in young people is associated with about a half of one 
percent decrease in turnout. For Lower House elections, this effect is around double the 
size: almost a one per cent decrease in turnout for each per cent increase in the 
proportion of young people in the population. A higher death rate is associated with 
decreased turnout in all three election types, although this is not significant for 
Municipal elections. However, in elections for the European Parliament and the national 
Lower House, the death rate is strongly significant, and associated with a decrease in 
turnout of about three-quarters and one per cent, respectively.  
As we have seen, although the socio-demographic variables vary in their statistical 
significance, most are consistent in the sign of their effects across all three election types 
(and consistent with the results obtained when all election types are considered 
together (Model 3A). However, the results for Migration are not consistent across all 
three types of election: for European Parliament elections, migration is associated with 
decreased turnout in elections, and is strongly significant; whereas for Municipal 
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elections and Lower House elections, the coefficient for Migration is positive – albeit not 
significantly so for Lower House elections.  
That the effects of Migration should be in different directions, depending on the type of 
election, is rather puzzling. We suggested in Chapter 2 that migration could be taken as a 
general measure of population instability, with higher migration to a region indicating 
that the local population was somewhat less settled, and thus marginally less likely to 
vote in elections. However, we need to recall here that our dependent variable, turnout, 
is itself calculated on the basis of registered voters, not on the basis of the total voting 
age population. Thus, for migration to a region to have a negative impact on turnout, we 
would have to imagine a situation where a newly arrived migrant would bother to 
register on the electoral roll, but not subsequently bother to exercise their vote in an 
election.  
Thus, the registration arrangements for individual countries could be at play here: where 
registration is automatic or at least state-initiated, the chances that a newly arrived 
migrant could be registered, yet chose not to vote, may be marginally higher than in a 
country where registration is initiated by the individual. For example, registration is 
compulsory in France (where it has also become automatic for those reaching the age of 
18) and in Spain; or state initiated (with regular door-to-door inquiries to update the 
voting registers) in Ireland and England. In Chapter 7, where we examine selected 
countries in more detail, we may find evidence of different effects of migration on 
turnout, depending on the country under investigation.  
In the case of Lower House elections, issues are usually more national than local in 
character, and newly arrived citizens from another region of the same country who have 
previously voted in elections will likely be aware of the national-level issues and choices 
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involved, even when they have moved to another location in the same country. It is 
perhaps understandable, then, that migration does not appear to be significantly 
associated with turnout in national elections.  
We should also note that the ‘migration’ variable used here encompasses all migration 
to a region, not just that from another region of the same country.  Those citizens who 
have migrated from another member state of the EU have certain rights of electoral 
participation under EU legislation (European Commission 2010) in that they can register 
for, and vote in, elections for the European Parliament and in the Municipal elections of 
their adopted country (but not, absent becoming a citizen, in national elections). 
Because of this, we can make a proposition (which unfortunately cannot be tested with 
the existing data), that some new arrivals from other EU member states do go to the 
effort of registering, but with the over-riding intention of voting in the Municipal 
elections, not in the European Parliament elections. However, in registering for local 
elections, they are also automatically registered, and entitled to vote in European 
elections. Their abstention in the latter could go some way to explaining the difference 
between the effects of migration in the two election types.  
In fact, there is some evidence from France that immigrants from other EU member-
states are between two and four times more likely to vote in the municipal elections 
than they are to vote in elections for the European Parliament (Collard 2008). However, 
even if this were the case, it would be surprising if such an explanation could account for 
the absolute difference between the coefficients for migration in EP and Municipal 
elections: over two-and-a-half per cent difference in turnout for a one percent change in 
total inward migration. A second factor may also be at play: migration, in a way that is 
different to the other variables included here, can also be an election issue in its own 
right. Indeed, ‘immigration’ has often appeared high on those lists of ‘most important 
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issues’ compiled by opinion pollsters (for example, Van Der Valk 2003; Wells 2006; 
Dahlström and Esaiasson 2009; Muñoz de Bustillo and Antón 2009). It is possible that we 
are seeing the results of a rather complex interaction of different factors; as well as high 
net migration being a (real) measure of local population instability, and hence reduced 
turnout, ‘high immigration’ as a campaign issue results in higher mobilisation and tends 
to increase turnout. Further, it is possible that responding to ‘immigration’ (as an issue) 
is seen as mainly a national responsibility. This could also contribute to the different 
effects of the migration variable across the different election types. In Chapter 7, we will 
further investigate the effects of migration when we consider individual countries. 
  
In summary, the institutional variables maintain the same direction of effect whether we 
analyse all election types together, or examine European Parliament, Municipal, and 
Lower House elections separately. In all cases, the magnitude of the coefficient for each 
variable decreases as the salience of the election increases. Thus, the electoral system 
and rules appear to matter to a greater extent for lower salience elections than for 
higher salience elections. When we examine the additional effects of our selected socio-
demographic variables, the findings are a little less clear-cut. However, with only one 
exception, the sign of the coefficient for each variable is consistent across all three types 
of election, and the coefficients are usually statistically significant. For these variables, 
the results on individual election types confirm, or at least fail to contradict, the results 
from earlier models. The one exception is that of migration, which is significant in both 
EP and Municipal elections, but negative in the former and positive in the latter.  
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Discussion 
This chapter began by testing models using data measured at the country-level and at 
the regional-level in order to check that results were consistent. We established that, in 
terms of our set of institutional variables, the results using the two levels of 
measurement were broadly comparable. Although there were some differences in the 
size of the coefficients for weekend voting and for the electoral system, in both models 
these coefficients were positive and strongly significant. Indeed, all of the institutional 
variables were strongly significant in both models, and the directions of their effects 
were in line with expectations founded on previous research. 
We then showed that compulsory voting has substantial and statistically significant 
effects even when we excluded the only country in our dataset which has strongly 
enforced compulsory voting (Belgium). This provided evidence that even the weaker 
forms of compulsion in Italy and Greece appear to have substantive effects on voter 
behaviour even where recent legal changes had officially removed the requirement to 
vote; probably because most voters would have acquired the habit of voting prior to 
those legislative changes. 
We then added a number of socio-demographic variables to the regression model, and 
when including all types of elections, noted that all of these socio-demographic variables 
were highly significant in their effects. Moreover, with the exception of Proportional 
Representation, all of the institutional variables retained their statistical significance and 
size of effect. In this model, the effects of population density, migration, GDP, 
unemployment, the proportion of young people, death rate and occupation confirmed 
our hypotheses stated in Chapter 4. 
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The effect of education presented us with a puzzle, in that a higher percentage of degree 
educated people was significantly associated with lower levels of turnout. Our suspicion 
that this was related to the higher numbers of degree holders within the younger age 
group (a group itself associated with lower turnout) was not confirmed by the 
introduction of a term which sought to take account of this interaction. Thus, based on 
our model which included all election types, we would be led to the conclusion that a 
higher level of education is associated with lower turnout. However, at this stage we 
regard this finding as provisional. In Chapter 7 we will shed more light on the actual 
effects of education when we examine individual countries. 
We then excluded from our model the elections to the European Parliament and noted 
that the size of the coefficient, and the statistical significance, for Proportional 
Representation increased over that obtained in the model which included EP elections. 
Thus, despite controlling for the importance of elections by including a term for salience, 
the very low turnout elections for the European Parliament (all held under Proportional 
Representation) were giving PR a bad name.  
When we focused in turn on each of three election types, we found further evidence 
that the effects of compulsory voting, weekend voting, the electoral system, and 
simultaneous elections are systematically reduced as the salience of the election 
increases. In terms of RCT and the calculus of voting, this is clear evidence that voters 
are indeed aware of, and take into account, the fact that the potential benefits of voting 
are more substantial in higher order elections. Moreover, as the salience of the election 
increases, the effects of those arrangements which directly influence the costs of voting 
have been shown to have reduced effects. Indeed, this finding may explain why some 
previous research has failed to confirm the effects of PR and of Weekend Voting; much 
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of this research has considered turnout in first-order elections where the effects are 
smaller than in lower-order elections.  
Presidential elections are only held in two of the countries in our dataset, so we have not 
considered this type of election here. But we note in passing that previous research has 
sometimes used presidential, rather than lower house election turnout. Although it is 
understandable that researchers would seek to use turnout in the highest order election 
in each country, this could tend to reduce the observed effects of proportional 
representation: by definition, the presidential election results are used because the 
turnout is higher than for a country’s Lower House election. Yet presidential elections 
can only be won by a single candidate and cannot be conducted using a system of 
proportional representation.  
For our socio-demographic variables, in all but one instance the sign on the coefficient is 
consistent, whether we treat all elections together in the same model, or examine each 
election type individually. The exception is that of migration; and our post hoc 
explanations for this inconsistency are two-fold: one concerns the peculiar rights of EU 
citizens from other countries to participate in elections for the European Parliament and 
in the local elections of their adopted country. The second hinges on the possibility that, 
as well as being a measure of the stability of the population, ‘immigration’ can also be a 
political issue which may serve to increase the mobilisation of voters, particularly in the 
case of elections to the national Lower House. 
We also noted that examining election types separately does not help us to shed any 
light on the unexpectedly negative effect of education on turnout. In Chapter 7, we 
return to this question when we consider turnout variations within countries, and find 
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that there are clear country-to-country differences in how this, and other variables 
behave.  
Before we focus on individual countries, we will examine some variables for which data 
are available only at the country-level. In the next chapter, we investigate the effects of 
these variables when they are added to the core set of institutional and socio-
demographic variables. 
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Chapter 6 – Adding to the core variables 
Introduction 
In this chapter, we begin by examining how well our core set of variables predicts 
turnout for the individual countries. We find that there are substantial country-to-
country differences, and seek to improve the model by testing further variables, most of 
which are measured at the country-level. Each of these additional variables can be 
considered as potentially affecting the salience of one or more types of election; and 
where appropriate, we explore the different effects of each variable on different 
election types. 
We firstly consider three variables which could be expected to increase turnout because 
of their mobilisation effects: the geographical coverage of political parties; political party 
membership; and trade union membership. Next, we examine the level of public 
employment, local taxation arrangements, and the strength of the mayor; each of which 
may influence the voter’s perception of ‘what’s at stake’ in the election.   We then see 
whether those regions with representative offices in Brussels have a higher turnout in 
European elections. Finally, we consider how turnout varies across different election 
types according to a measure of ‘regionality’. 
 
Country-to-Country Differences 
In the previous chapter, we presented graphs of predicted turnout versus actual turnout, 
and found that there were differences, not only in the overall levels of turnout in 
different elections, but also that our model ‘worked’ better for some elections than for 
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others. In Figures 6.1 (a) to (c) we present similar plots of predicted versus actual turnout 
for three individual election types: European Parliament, Municipal, and Lower House. 
Here, we add further information by identifying the country for each data point. The first 
of each pair of graphs presents predicted versus actual turnout at the country-level; that 
is, as an average for all elections of that type in each country. The second graph in each 
pair shows predicted versus actual turnout for the individual regions.  
In Figure 6.1 (a) we see that in the first of the graphs, our model appears to work 
reasonably well for European Parliament elections, with most countries lying quite close 
to the diagonal. However, both Italy and Sweden are more distant from the line; with 
predicted turnout for Sweden being substantially higher than the actual turnout, and 
predicted turnout for Italy being somewhat lower than the actual turnout. Turning to the 
second of the graphs, we see that for several of the countries, individual cases are 
dispersed around the diagonal. However, all of the individual NUTS level results for 
Sweden lie above the diagonal, and most of the results for Italy lie below it. For 
Municipal elections, Figure 6.2 (a), most countries again lie quite close to the diagonal, 
with the exception of England and the Netherlands. Reference to the second of the 
graphs shows that for England, almost all cases lie above the diagonal, and for the 
Netherlands, all lie below. For Lower House elections, Figure 6.3, we again see some 
countries more distant from the diagonal than others; and again the second of the two 
graphs shows that this also applies to the individual cases for each country. This time, it 
is France and Greece where predicted turnout is markedly higher than actual turnout; 
and the Netherlands which lies some way below the diagonal.  
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Although our models in Chapter 5 were explaining a reasonable amount of the variance, 
the evidence from the graphs in Figure 6.1 suggests that there are some substantial 
differences in how well we are predicting turnout for different countries. In particular, 
the graphs show that there are some clear country-to-country differences. Clearly, our 
institutional and regional level variables are not able to fully account for these country-
to-country differences. However, that these differences exist means we have an 
opportunity to test further variables, for which only country-level data are available.  
Additional variables 
In this section, we will investigate the effects of several additional variables. Because 
most of these variables are measured at the country level, we quickly run into 
collinearity problems when we try to include more than one of these in a single model. 
For this reason, we will present results of a series of regression analyses, in which the 
effects of each variable are tested individually.  Some of these variables only relate to a 
particular type of election; so, only that election type is investigated in the model. For 
example, we investigate the possible effects of local government taxation only on 
turnout in municipal elections. Other variables, such as the level of union membership, 
may be expected to have a more general effect, and so more than one election type is 
considered.  
The first group of variables we examine can be seen as potentially affecting the 
mobilisation of voters.  
 
Party Coverage 
In Chapter 4, we noted that, historically, political parties sought to increase their 
territorial coverage in order to mobilise wider bases of support (Caramani 2005); and 
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suggested that countries where major political parties compete in more constituencies 
would show a higher level of turnout, at least in elections to the Lower House. Table 6.1 
shows the results of a series of regression models which include the party coverage 
variable, along with our core set of institutional and socio-demographic variables. 
When we examine all election types together (Model 5A), the coefficient for the party 
coverage variable is indeed significant (.05 level) and positive, although rather modest 
(.023). However, we should recall here that Caramani’s calculations for party coverage 
were based on the number of constituencies contested by political parties in Lower 
House elections, and we should not necessarily expect the party coverage variable to 
behave in the same way for other types of elections.   
 
169 
 
Table 6.1 : Party territorial coverage 
Model Model 5A Model 5B Model 5C Model 5D Model 5E 
 All elections All except EP EP Municipal Lower House 
      
Compulsory Voting (0,1,2) 
11.438*** 
(.603) 
2.553*** 
(.668) 
29.173*** 
(.796) 
6.069*** 
(1.243) 
4.694*** 
(.598) 
Weekend Voting (0,1) 
12.450*** 
(.897) 
11.980*** 
(.927) 
17.412*** 
(1.358) 
16.534*** 
(1.149) 
1.966* 
(.912) 
Proportional Representation 
(0,1) 
.518 
(.302) 
2.155*** 
(.337) 
 
7.937*** 
(.571) 
4.807*** 
(.333) 
Simultaneous Election (0,1) 
7.961*** 
(.463) 
5.428*** 
(.640) 
15.612*** 
(.741) 
.705 
(.691) 
 
Salience (0,1,2) 
13.653*** 
(.274) 
15.102*** 
(.446) 
   
      
Population Density (ln) 
-1.853*** 
(.179) 
-1.784*** 
(.187) 
-.794** 
(.269) 
-2.091*** 
(.239) 
-.705*** 
(.193) 
Migration % 
-1.265*** 
(.209) 
-.758*** 
(.222) 
-1.858*** 
(.295 
.069 
(.271) 
-.092 
(.210) 
GDP (PPP) 
.031*** 
(.007) 
.022** 
(.007) 
.028** 
(.009) 
.003 
(.008) 
.015* 
(.007) 
Unemployment % 
-.176*** 
(.045) 
-.117* 
(.047) 
-.335*** 
(.064) 
-.029 
(.055) 
-.159*** 
(.046) 
Young % 
-.258* 
(.109) 
-.353** 
(.112) 
-.262 
(.158) 
.008 
(.156) 
-.756*** 
(.114) 
Death Rate % 
-.582*** 
(.152) 
-.465** 
(.155) 
-.891*** 
(.220) 
-.068 
(.184) 
-.853*** 
(.161) 
Occupation (ISCO1&2 %) 
.621*** 
(.065) 
.607*** 
(.070) 
.171 
(.089) 
.599*** 
(.080) 
.624*** 
(.074) 
Education (% Degree) 
-.408*** 
(.042) 
-.412*** 
(.045) 
.050 
(.059) 
-.389*** 
(.048) 
-.494*** 
(.050) 
      
Party Geographical 
Coverage 
.023* 
(.010) 
.085*** 
(.011) 
-.100*** 
(.016) 
.115*** 
(.015) 
.047*** 
(.011) 
      
Constant 
47.679*** 
(3.783) 
41.349*** 
(3.923) 
51.395*** 
(5.439) 
34.374*** 
(4.781) 
82.865*** 
(3.958) 
Adj R-square .717 .649 .888 .889 .685 
N 2676 2072 604 698 876 
* significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level; *** significant at the .001 level 
 
 
When we examine Lower House elections (Model 5E), we see that the Party Coverage 
variable is, indeed, significant (.001 level) and positive.  
Hypothesis 3f : Turnout in Lower House elections will be higher in countries where 
political parties contest a greater percentage of constituencies - Confirmed 
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Further, the Party Coverage variable is also significant and positive for Municipal election 
(Model 5D). In seeking to identify the factors which account for the absolute differences 
in turnout between national and local elections, Blais (2000:36-39) considered that, not 
only are national governments perceived as having a greater impact on the day-to-day 
life of the population, and attract commensurately higher media coverage, but also that 
local elections are often less nationally politicised than national elections. On the other 
hand, Morlan has suggested that, in general, local elections in Western European 
countries ‘are partisan, generally involving the same parties as in national elections’ 
(1984:463), and that those parties are usually active in mobilising the electorate. 
Morlan’s view would seem to be borne out by the results here; all things being equal, 
countries with a higher territorial coverage by political parties in Lower House elections 
do also show higher turnout in Municipal elections. Interestingly, although this is the 
case for Municipal elections, a negative effect is found for European Parliament elections 
- perhaps because more nationalised parties make markedly less effort to mobilise the 
electorate compared to either Municipal or Lower House elections. Whatever the 
reasons, it is clear that Party Coverage has a different effect on European Parliament 
elections than on either Municipal or Lower House elections. 
 
Membership of a Political Party or Trade Union 
Crewe (1981) suggested that a possible source for the differences in turnout between 
countries lay with the efforts made by political parties and other organisations to 
mobilise the electorate; and that a crude indicator of these efforts would be the linkage 
between a country’s political parties and its social cleavages, including class and religion. 
Using measures of partisan allegiance and Alford indices of class voting, drawn from 
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previous work by Rose (1974) and Powell (1977), Crewe found strong, positive 
associations between either of these measures and the country’s turnout rate. The 
correlations were stronger when overall post-war turnout was considered, being lower 
when considering only turnout in the 1970s. Powell’s (1980) own work from around the 
same time also showed that strong linkages between cleavage groups and parties were 
powerful predictors of turnout across the 24 countries in his analysis.  
More recently, some researchers have investigated the direct effects of party or union 
membership, rather than seeking to measure the degree of partisanship. Gray and Caul 
(2000) examined the role of party and union membership on turnout in first-order 
elections in 18 countries since 1950. They found that, although the links between unions 
and labour parties have become much weaker, and there has been a corresponding 
decline in the ability of those institutions’ abilities to mobilise their memberships to go 
to the polls, both political parties and trade unions do remain influential in getting their 
members to the polls. These findings attract support from subsequent work by Norris, 
and by Siaroff and Merer, who also considered only first-order elections. Norris (2004) 
used survey data from 37 legislative and presidential elections, and found that 
membership of a trade union was a significant predictor of turnout.  Siaroff and Merer 
(2002) used aggregate data, and found both party and union membership to be 
associated with significantly higher turnout, whether examined by bivariate or 
multivariate methods. 
As was shown in Chapter 4 (Table 4.3), differences remain within our group of countries 
in terms of the membership levels of political parties and, more markedly, trade unions. 
In order to investigate the effects of these two variables on turnout we add each to our 
core-set of variables. In contrast to the previous research discussed above, we do not 
restrict ourselves to first-order elections, but also investigate Municipal and European 
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Parliament elections. The results of these regression analyses are provided in Tables 6.2 
and 6.3. 
Table 6.2 : Membership of a political party 
 Model 6A Model 6B Model 6C Model 6D Model 6E 
 All elections EP only All except EP Municipal Lower House 
      
Compulsory Voting (0,1,2) 
12.537*** 
(.609) 
30.785*** 
(.827) 
5.117*** 
(.650) 
16.992*** 
(1.302) 
6.619*** 
(.627) 
Weekend Voting (0,1) 
12.800*** 
(.905) 
18.256*** 
(1.326) 
12.096*** 
(.953) 
15.926*** 
(1.165) 
2.123** 
(.929) 
Proportional Representation 
(0,1) 
.724* 
(.316) 
 
2.369*** 
(.369) 
11.173*** 
(.736) 
5.209*** 
(.377) 
Simultaneous Election (0,1) 
8.015*** 
(.460) 
17.053*** 
(.681) 
6.926*** 
(.630) 
2.383*** 
(.621) 
 
Salience (0,1,2) 
13.749*** 
(.276) 
 
15.544*** 
(.449) 
  
      
Population Density (ln) 
-1.990*** 
(.189) 
-1.645*** 
(.286) 
-1.849*** 
(.196) 
-1.660*** 
(.238) 
-.793*** 
(.200) 
Migration 
-1.107*** 
(.209) 
-2.034*** 
(.285) 
-.403 
(.229) 
1.150*** 
(.283) 
.134 
(.216) 
GDP (PPP) 
.029*** 
(.007) 
.026** 
(.009) 
.021** 
(.007) 
.009 
(.008) 
.011 
(.007) 
Unemployment 
-.193*** 
(.044) 
-.308*** 
(.061) 
-.182*** 
(.047) 
-.046 
(.056) 
-.202*** 
(.046) 
Young % 
-.301** 
(.015) 
.265 
(.155) 
-.618*** 
(.109) 
-.777*** 
(.145) 
-.898*** 
(.110) 
Death Rate % 
-.558*** 
(.152) 
-.526* 
(.215) 
-.586*** 
(.159) 
-.214 
(.186) 
-.910*** 
(.163) 
Occupation (ISCO1&2 %) 
.563*** 
(.058) 
.476*** 
(.078) 
.383*** 
(.065) 
.221** 
(.071) 
.457*** 
(.068) 
Education (% Degree) 
-.345*** 
(.034) 
-.107* 
(.047) 
-.221*** 
(.040) 
-.149*** 
(.041) 
-.347*** 
(.044) 
      
Party Membership % 
-.278* 
(.138) 
-1.576*** 
(.187) 
-.127 
(.149) 
-1.262*** 
(.216) 
-.264 
(.177) 
      
Constant 
51.115*** 
(3.406) 
35.252*** 
(4.713) 
54.012*** 
(3.614) 
56.639*** 
(4.236) 
91.115*** 
(3.528) 
Adj R-square .717 .893 .639 .886 .679 
N 2676 604 2072 698 876 
* significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level; *** significant at the .001 level 
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Table 6.3 : Membership of a trade union 
 
 Model 7A Model 7B Model 7C Model 7D Model 7E 
 All elections All except EP EP Only Municipal Lower House 
Compulsory Voting (0,1,2) 
12.121*** 
(.572) 
5.580*** 
(.627) 
24.599*** 
(.738) 
11.966*** 
(1.005) 
6.852*** 
(.591) 
Weekend Voting (0,1) 
12.505*** 
(.899) 
11.841*** 
(.938) 
18.721*** 
(1.289) 
16.106*** 
(1.210) 
1.858* 
(.918) 
Proportional Representation 
(0,1) 
.477 
(.315) 
1.761*** 
(.364) 
 
8.297*** 
(.665) 
4.425*** 
(.380) 
Simultaneous Election (0,1) 
8.139*** 
(.456) 
6.871*** 
(.613) 
15.858*** 
(.672) 
3.516*** 
(.613) 
 
Salience (0,1,2) 
13.649*** 
(.277) 
15.409*** 
(.449) 
   
      
Population Density (ln) 
-1.851*** 
(.181) 
-1.756*** 
(.189) 
-.974*** 
(.255) 
-1.736*** 
(.245) 
-.752*** 
(.194) 
Migration 
-1.232*** 
(.217) 
-.781*** 
(.237) 
-1.326*** 
(.286) 
.516 
(.298) 
-.207 
(.228) 
GDP (PPP) 
.030*** 
(.007) 
.020** 
(.007) 
.040*** 
(.009) 
.008 
(.009) 
.013* 
(.007) 
Unemployment 
-.184*** 
(.044) 
-.166*** 
(.046) 
-.274*** 
(.059) 
-.062 
(.058) 
-.192*** 
(.046) 
Young % 
-.315** 
(.106) 
-.522*** 
(.111) 
-.386** 
(.149) 
-.518*** 
(.152) 
-.794*** 
(.116) 
Death Rate % 
-.624*** 
(.151) 
-.621*** 
(.156) 
-.758*** 
(.207) 
-.252 
(.190) 
-.960*** 
(.161) 
Occupation (ISCO1&2 %) 
.557*** 
(.058) 
.408*** 
(.065) 
.435*** 
(.075) 
.300*** 
(.073) 
.531*** 
(.070) 
Education (% Degree) 
-.354*** 
(.034) 
-.239*** 
(.039) 
-.218*** 
(.046) 
-.192*** 
(.042) 
-.405*** 
(.043) 
      
Union Membership % 
.009 
(.012) 
.047*** 
(.012) 
-.176*** 
(.017) 
.010 
(.015) 
.042** 
(.015) 
      
Constant 
51.044*** 
(3.443) 
52.173*** 
(3.637) 
46.358*** 
(4.675) 
52.239*** 
(4.356) 
88.454*** 
(3.628) 
Adj R-square .716 .642 .900 .880 .681 
N 2676 2072 604 698 878 
* significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level; *** significant at the .001 level 
 
 
 
Because the previous research referred to above concentrated on the effects of union or 
party membership on turnout in first-order elections, we first consider the results of 
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those regression analyses. As can be seen in Table 6.2, membership of a political party is 
not significant for Lower House elections (Model 6E), although we should note that the 
coefficient does have an unexpectedly negative sign. In Table 6.3, union membership is 
statistically significant for Lower House elections (Model 7E), although the coefficient is 
rather modest (0.042). This result is, however, broadly in line with the results obtained 
by Siaroff and Merer, given that membership in their models was categorised into five 
per cent bands: they reported coefficients of between .051 and .114 in their multivariate 
models (2002:924-925).  
Union membership is not statistically significant when we treat all types of elections 
together (Model 7A), nor when we consider only Municipal elections (Model 7D); 
although in both cases the coefficients are positive. However, when we exclude EP 
elections from our model (Model 8B), union membership becomes significant at the .001 
level. Correspondingly, in Model 7C, where we consider only elections for the European 
Parliament, union membership is significant and negative. Although party membership 
was not significant for Lower House elections (Model 6E), as we can see in Table 6.2, 
party membership is statistically significant when we consider all elections together, all 
elections apart from those for the EP, and for Municipal elections (Models 6A, 6B, and 
6D, respectively). In all three of these models, party membership has a negative 
coefficient50.  
Hypothesis 3c : Turnout will be higher in countries with higher membership of a 
political party – Not Confirmed 
 
                                                             
50
 Note – not shown here, in a model for Lower House elections only, the inclusion of party membership, 
union membership, and territorial coverage in the same model showed union membership and territorial 
coverage to be significant and positive; whereas party membership was again significant and negative. 
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Hypothesis 3d : Turnout will be higher in countries with higher membership of a trade 
union – Confirmed for Lower House elections. Not confirmed for Municipal or EP 
elections. 
 
The significant and negative coefficients for party and union membership are rather 
puzzling, as it is initially difficult to see why the membership of a political party or of a 
trade union could have the effect of demobilising voters from voting. We could of course 
dismiss the results as spurious, having occurred simply by chance. However, there are 
two possible avenues we can explore in an attempt to make sense of our findings. Firstly, 
we must consider the limitations of our dataset: although we have regional level data for 
turnout and for our core set of socio-demographic variables, figures for union and party 
membership are unfortunately only available at the country-level. Thus, we have had to 
apply the country level values for these two variables to every regional unit within each 
country. This, of course, does not take account of any real differences in union or party 
membership which actually occur within the individual countries, nor their possible 
effects on turnout when measured at a sub-national level. It is possible that the 
relationships within particular countries between membership of a political party or 
trade union and turnout are, indeed, positive. However, we have no way of investigating 
this with the present dataset. 
Secondly, previous research does not always show consistent and robust effects for 
either of these measures. Although Siaroff and Merer reported union and party 
membership as being positively associated with higher turnout, their results were often 
weakly significant at best. Further, some research has shown that there is indeed some 
variation between countries, even when considering only first-order elections. For 
example, using individual-level (CSES) data, Nevitte, Blais et al. (2009) found that union 
membership was only significantly associated with increased turnout in six of the 
176 
 
countries in their dataset; in the other 17 countries, union membership was either not 
significant, or, in the case of one Spanish election, it was associated with decreased 
turnout.  
The picture becomes somewhat more clouded when we consider the effects of union or 
party membership on turnout in lower-order elections. We briefly consider here three 
comparative studies into European Parliament or municipal elections which have 
investigated the effects of union and party membership. Firstly, Oppenhuis (1995) 
examined the effects of both party and union membership on turnout in the 1989 
European Parliament elections. The correlations between union membership and 
turnout were very weak in all countries (below .12). A similar pattern was found for 
party membership, although in some countries, there was evidence of party 
membership having a weak negative effect on turnout. Secondly, in a study of municipal 
elections in Norway, Aars and Ringkjøb (2005) found that, since the end of the 1980s, 
the presence of non-partisan lists is linked to significantly higher turnout, perhaps 
because the candidates campaign on a single interest, and/or specifically local issues 
that are ignored by the major political parties. Thirdly, although they did not consider 
union or party membership directly, Hoffmann-Martinot, Rallings, et al. (1996), in an 
investigation into various determinants of voting in municipal elections in France and 
England, did include data on the percentage of manual workers in the population. 
Interestingly, they found that the effects differed between the two countries – with 
higher levels of manual workers being associated with increased turnout in France, 
whereas in England the relationship was negative. The explanation for the difference 
invoked possible differences in the way that parties and trade unions mobilised their 
memberships. These three studies do provide some evidence that the association 
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between union or party membership and turnout may not apply equally, nor indeed 
operate in the same direction, across different types of election.  
In summary, the three variables which we examined in this section gave rather mixed 
results. Party coverage and union membership were associated with increased turnout 
for Lower House and Municipal elections, providing some support for the idea that both 
serve to increase the mobilisation of the electorate. But, both variables were associated 
with decreased turnout in elections for the European Parliament. Party membership was 
associated with lower turnout in all of the regression models, a finding which is difficult 
to make sense of. It is possible that there is substantial sub-national variation in levels of 
party membership, and that, had we been able to use sub-national data, a positive 
association between turnout and party membership would have been apparent. 
Alternatively, national levels of party membership may be correlated with a variable 
which has not been included in our analysis, and which itself has a negative association 
with turnout. 
The next group of variables that we consider can be seen as relating to what is at stake in 
elections. We consider levels of public employment, local taxation arrangements, and 
mayoral strength. 
Public employment 
According to the calculus of voting, in deciding whether or not to vote, the potential 
voter takes into account the differential benefits represented by the parties contesting 
the election. It has been suggested that higher public expenditure serves to increase the 
differential benefits between one party and another; thus encouraging higher turnout in 
elections (Colomer 1991). In other words, political choices are more important in 
countries with higher public expenditures, and the salience of the election is increased. 
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Indeed, Colomer (1991) found clear differences in first-order electoral turnout between 
countries with high and low levels of public expenditure.  
Rather than using a measure of public expenditure, we focus in this section on the levels 
of public employment and tax raising powers. In part, our choice is influenced by the fact 
we are examining different levels of government, and to separate out public expenditure 
for each of these levels is fraught with difficulty, not least because expenditure at the 
sub-national level often relies heavily on funding from central government, accompanied 
by strict control of how that funding is spent. Although similar difficulties often apply, we 
consider that investigating the role of public employment on turnout is of interest, as 
public employees can be considered as being more likely to vote in an election for two 
reasons. Firstly, people employed in the public sector could be expected to have a higher 
level of awareness and information regarding the competing policies on offer. Secondly, 
public employees may feel they have more at stake in the outcome of an election, since 
the nature, conditions, or indeed the very existence of a voter’s job may hinge on the 
result. In short, an election may appear more salient to public employees than to other 
members of the electorate. 
In Table 6.4, we present the results of a series of regression analyses. Here, we are 
measuring the effects of total public employment for each country; that is, we do not 
seek to take into account the proportion of public employment for each level of 
government in each country. In Model 8A, when we consider all elections together and 
control for the effects of the other variables, increased public employment is actually 
associated with significantly lower turnout. However, when we exclude elections to the 
European Parliament, Model 8B, public employment is associated with statistically 
higher turnout. Examining the different election types in turn (Models 8C, 8D, and 8E) 
sheds further light on this finding: higher public employment is significant and positive 
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for both Municipal and Lower House elections, but significant and negative for European 
Parliament elections.  
Hypothesis 3g : Turnout will be higher in countries where a higher proportion of 
workers is employed in the public sector. Confirmed for Lower House and Municipal 
elections. Not confirmed for European Parliament elections. 
 
Table 6.4 : Total Public Employment 
 
 Model 8A Model 8B Model 8C Model 8D Model 8E 
 All elections All except EP EP only Municipal only LH only 
Compulsory Voting (0,1,2) 
11.568*** 
(.568) 
5.278*** 
(.609) 
24.105*** 
(.737) 
12.144*** 
(.990) 
6.818*** 
(.553) 
Weekend Voting (0,1) 
14.007*** 
(1.020) 
10.137*** 
(1.064) 
24.295*** 
(1.394) 
13.274*** 
(1.313) 
-.476 
(1.047) 
Proportional Representation 
(0,1) 
.402 
(.305) 
2.564*** 
(.351) 
 
9.106*** 
(.595) 
5.309*** 
(.340) 
Simultaneous Election (0,1) 
8.425*** 
(.464) 
6.201*** 
(.655) 
15.531*** 
(.666) 
2.151*** 
(.668) 
 
Salience (0,1,2) 
13.622*** 
(.274) 
15.371*** 
(.450) 
   
      
Population Density (ln) 
-1.780*** 
(.181) 
-1.892*** 
(.190) 
-.140 
(.254) 
-1.910*** 
(.243) 
-.853*** 
(.194) 
Migration 
-.924*** 
(.224) 
-.761*** 
(.237) 
-.786** 
(.296) 
.124 
(.287) 
-.319 
(.222) 
GDP (PPP) 
.031*** 
(.007) 
.020** 
(.007) 
.028*** 
(.008) 
.005 
(.009) 
.012 
(.007) 
Unemployment 
-.198*** 
(.044) 
-.166*** 
(.047) 
-.289*** 
(.058) 
-.045 
(.057) 
-.185*** 
(.046) 
Young % 
-.501*** 
(.118) 
-.420*** 
(.122) 
-.948*** 
(.163) 
-.213 
(.159) 
-.621*** 
(.125) 
Death Rate % 
-.663*** 
(.151) 
-.552*** 
(.157) 
-1.009*** 
(.205) 
-.187 
(.188) 
-.868*** 
(.161) 
Occupation (ISCO1&2 %) 
.459*** 
(.067) 
.468*** 
(.070) 
-.151 
(.089) 
.455*** 
(.079) 
.632*** 
(.074) 
Education (% Degree) 
-.289*** 
(.040) 
-.294*** 
(.043) 
.219*** 
(.056) 
-.290*** 
(.046) 
-.474*** 
(.047) 
      
Public Employment % 
-.198** 
(.066) 
.260*** 
(.072) 
-1.084*** 
(.094) 
.399*** 
(.086) 
.335*** 
(.072) 
      
Constant 
57.824*** 
(4.025) 
46.366*** 
(4.179) 
72.043*** 
(5.483) 
40.541*** 
(4.977) 
79.828*** 
(4.234) 
Adj R-square .717 .642 .902 .884 .686 
N 2676 2072 604 698 876 
* significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level; *** significant at the .001 level 
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How are we to account for the aberrant case of EP elections? One line of reasoning is 
that the European Union is not a public service employer on the same scale as national 
or sub-national governments. In the countries in our dataset, public employment 
represents around 20 per cent of all employment (see Table 3.2, Chapter 3), whereas the 
European Union, with a total of less than 40 000 direct employees (Folketinget 2008), 
actually has very few employees when compared to the total public employment in each 
of the member states. Thus, for most public employees, their employer is one of the 
levels of government within their own country; the EP elections themselves are largely 
irrelevant.  
However, it is difficult to see how higher public employment should have a significant 
negative effect on turnout in EP elections. It is possible that higher public employment 
co-varies with another variable which is not included in our analysis; but were that the 
case, that variable would have to have a different effect on European Parliament 
elections than on other types of elections. We have only been able to find one such 
example in previous research: Abiral, Cautrès et al. (2003) conducted factor analysis of a 
range of socio-demographic variables, then ran regression analyses on the derived 
factors with electoral turnout as the dependent variable. The factor relating to social 
exclusion was found to have a positive effect on turnout in national elections, but a 
negative effect on turnout in European elections. It is possible that social exclusion and 
public employment is related - that is, areas of higher social exclusion also have higher 
than average levels of public employment - but our data does not allow this avenue to 
be pursued.   
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Local Taxation Arrangements 
Local taxation is something that is directly and obviously felt by residents of a 
municipality, and we suggest that the level of taxation directly affects the relative 
importance of an election, because it clearly relates to what is at stake: higher taxation 
increases the differential benefits that the rational voter takes into account. Where local 
taxes represent a larger proportion of total taxation, we would therefore expect that 
local elections would have higher salience.  
Table 6.6 presents two regression models which measure different aspects of taxation 
on turnout in local elections. In Model 9A, we measure local taxation as a percentage of 
the total taxation within a country. As can be seen, the coefficient, although only weakly 
significant, is positive: thus, in countries where local taxes represent a higher proportion 
of total taxation, turnout in Municipal elections is, on average, higher. In Model 9B, we 
measure the contribution that local taxes make to total local government expenditure 
(the balance coming from various grants from central or other levels of government). 
The coefficient for this variable is also positive and significant. The results suggest that a 
ten per cent increase in either the proportion of local taxes of total taxes or of the 
proportion that autonomous taxes represent of local government revenue, is associated 
with an increase in turnout of only about one percentage point. However, both 
coefficients are statistically significant (at the .05 level) even when the effects of the 
other variables are taken into account, and hence support our hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3h : Turnout in municipal elections will be higher in countries where local 
government taxation represents a higher proportion of total taxation – Confirmed 
 
Hypothesis 3i : Turnout in municipal elections will be higher in countries where 
autonomous taxes represent a higher proportion of total local government revenues - 
Confirmed 
 
182 
 
 
Table 6.6 : Local Government Taxation 
 
 Model 9A Model 9B 
 Municipal only Municipal only 
Compulsory Voting (0,1,2) 
12.662*** 
(1.058) 
15.012*** 
(1.606) 
Weekend Voting (0,1) 
15.229*** 
(1.249) 
13.011*** 
(1.712) 
Proportional Representation (0,1) 
8.034*** 
(.632) 
7.776*** 
(.658) 
Simultaneous Election (0,1) 
3.300*** 
(.616) 
2.936*** 
(.657) 
Salience (0,1,2)   
   
Population Density (ln) 
-1.787*** 
(.245) 
-1.755*** 
(.243) 
Migration 
.351 
(.298) 
.323 
(.294) 
GDP (PPP) 
.006 
(.009) 
.007 
(.009) 
Unemployment 
-.059 
(.057) 
-.053 
(.057) 
Young % 
-.448** 
(.152) 
-.457** 
(.148) 
Death Rate % 
-.261 
(.190) 
-.275 
(.190) 
Occupation (ISCO1&2 %) 
.298*** 
(.072) 
.306*** 
(.072) 
Education (% Degree) 
-.176*** 
(.042) 
-.185*** 
(.042) 
   
Local government tax as % of all tax 
.088* 
(.045) 
 
   
Local autonomous tax as % of local 
government income 
 
.094* 
(.039) 
   
Constant 
51.804*** 
(4.300) 
51.100*** 
(4.322) 
Adj R-square .881 .881 
N 698 698 
* significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level; *** significant at the .001 level 
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Mayoral Strength 
Here, we investigate whether the strength of the mayor is associated with differences in 
turnout.  The measure we use is taken from Heinelt and Hlepas (2006), who calculated 
their mayoral strength index based on the responses from a survey of mayors in 
European countries. The composite index for each country51 forms the Mayoral Strength 
variable, which is added to our core set of institutional and socio-demographic variables. 
The results of the regression analysis, using only the results from Municipal elections, are 
presented in Table 6.7.  
As can be seen, the coefficient for Mayoral Strength is negative and significant: thus, 
countries with a higher Mayoral Strength score have significantly lower turnout in 
Municipal elections. This is the opposite to our hypothesised effect, which was that 
higher mayoral strength would be associated with higher turnout in municipal elections, 
as we expected that increased mayoral strength would increase the salience of the 
election for the electorate.  
Hypothesis 3j :  Turnout in Municipal elections will be higher in countries with a higher 
Mayoral strength index -  Not Confirmed 
 
 
This result is, to say the least, puzzling; and prompts a closer look at how the Mayoral 
Strength Index was calculated. The index is a composite measure, with a maximum score 
of 14, based on the scores for nine separate characteristics related to mayors; whether 
or not they: are directly elected by citizens; have a different term of office to council 
election term; usually have control of the council majority; can be recalled by the council 
                                                             
51
 Note that some mayors in England are now directly elected, whereas others are selected by their fellow councillors. 
These different arrangements are reflected in our dataset, where directly elected mayors have a higher Mayoral index 
score.  
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or by referendum; preside over the council; have control over the council agenda; select 
the CEO and administrative heads of the council. 
 
Table 6.7 : Mayoral strength 
 Municipal only 
Compulsory Voting (0,1,2) 
7.716*** 
(.978) 
Weekend Voting (0,1) 
20.040*** 
(1.269) 
Proportional Representation (0,1) 
10.785*** 
(.624) 
  
Population Density (ln) 
-1.935*** 
(.224) 
Migration 
.474 
(.271) 
GDP (PPP) 
-.001 
(.008) 
Unemployment 
.049 
(.053) 
Young % 
-.803*** 
(.138) 
Death Rate % 
-.458** 
(.173) 
Occupation (ISCO1&2 %) 
-.264*** 
(.078) 
Education (% Degree) 
.382*** 
(.059) 
  
Mayoral strength 
-.817*** 
(.122) 
  
Constant 
67.263*** 
(4.048) 
Adj R-square .904 
N 685 
* significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level;  
*** significant at the .001 level 
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As can be seen, these individual measures relate to the independence and power 
enjoyed by the mayor vis a vis the local councillors. Further, the first of the measures 
specifically takes account of the existence of separate mayoral elections. This being the 
case, it perhaps is understandable that a higher score on the Mayoral Strength Index is 
associated with significantly lower turnout in Municipal elections. Indeed, this may be 
somewhat analogous to the findings of some previous research which has reported 
lower turnout in legislative elections in countries which have an elected president with 
substantive powers (for example, see Blais 2000; Siaroff and Merer 2002; Norris 2004). 
One explanation for this phenomenon is that, because the elections for the legislature 
may have little or no effect on executive policy, the salience of those legislative elections 
is effectively reduced. Further, the division of powers between different branches of 
government can lead a reduction in executive responsiveness – ‘the extent to which the 
political complexion of the executive is responsive to the choices made at the time of an 
election’ (Franklin 2004:96). Variations in executive responsiveness have previously been 
invoked to explain differences in turnout for national (first-order) elections; the results 
here suggest that notions of executive responsiveness may also be applicable at the 
municipal level. 
 
To summarise the effects of the variables we have examined in this section, both 
measures of local taxation were positively associated with turnout. Mayoral Strength, 
though, was associated with lower turnout, perhaps because the variable is actually 
reflecting the relationships between the mayor and other councillors, rather than those 
with the electorate. Higher levels of public employment were associated with higher 
turnout in Municipal and Lower House elections. But, as we found in the earlier section 
which examined mobilisation effects, we have evidence that EP elections are in some 
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ways very different to both Municipal or Lower House elections; here we saw that higher 
levels of public employment are associated with lower turnout in EP elections.  
 
EU office 
We have seen previously in this chapter that some variables have an opposite effect in 
EP elections than in Municipal and Lower House elections. Here we focus only on EP 
elections, and see whether those regions with a representative office in Brussels have 
higher turnout in EP elections. The decision to invest money and other resources in such 
an office may be driven by the desire to more directly influence European level policy 
making, or to support an application for EU funds, or indeed, a combination of factors. 
Whatever the motivation, it is possible that, in those regions which maintain a 
representative office in Brussels, the profile of the European Union would be somewhat 
higher than in those regions without such an office. Were this the case, we would expect 
that elections to the European Parliament would have a higher salience, and thus attract 
a higher turnout. To measure this, we introduce a simple dichotomous variable: those 
regions having a representative office in Brussels by 2008 are coded 1, those with no 
such office are coded 0. The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 6.9. As 
can be seen, the coefficient for EU Office is, indeed, positive; however, it is not 
statistically significant. 
Hypothesis 3b : Regions with Representative Offices in Brussels will exhibit higher 
turnout in elections to the European Parliament – Not Confirmed 
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Table 6.9 : Regional Representation in Brussels 
 EP Only 
Compulsory Voting (0,1,2) 
27.498*** 
(.786) 
Weekend Voting (0,1) 
17.534*** 
(1.400) 
Simultaneous Election (0,1) 
17.087*** 
(.721) 
  
Population Density (ln) 
-.706* 
(.280) 
Migration 
-2.094*** 
(.301) 
GDP (PPP) 
.031*** 
(.009) 
Unemployment 
-.255*** 
(.064) 
Young % 
-.023 
(.162) 
Death Rate % 
-.734*** 
(.226) 
Occupation (ISCO1&2 %) 
.412*** 
(.082) 
Education (% Degree) 
-.145** 
(.051) 
  
EU office (0,1) 
.790 
(.771) 
  
Constant 
34.714*** 
(5.181) 
Adj R-square .881 
N 604 
*significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level;  
*** significant at the .001 level 
 
 
 
Regionality 
As was noted in Chapter 3, a number of European countries engaged in significant 
changes to the organisation of territorial government in the 1960s and 1970s. Although 
by the late 1970s this process had slowed, and in some cases reversed, the 1980s saw 
further rounds of territorial reorganisation in many countries. These were prompted, not 
only by changes at both the international and European levels, but also by growing 
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pressures from below the level of the state, with regions in many countries demanding 
greater autonomy.  
Keating (1998) sought to quantify what he described as this ‘new regionalism’ by going 
beyond the purely territorial definition and taking account of functional, social, and 
political aspects of the sub-national regions in European countries. Keating characterised 
these regions in terms of culture, identity, government institutions, civil society, and 
economic regionalism. We have converted his qualitative descriptors – none, weak, 
moderate, fairly strong, strong – for each region into numerical scores (0, 1, 2, 3, 4), then 
combined the individual scores to calculate a composite index of regionalism for each of 
the sub-national units in our dataset. This variable, with a maximum value of 20, is 
added to our core set of institutional and socio-demographic variables; and the results of 
the regression analyses for different types of elections are presented in Table 6.8. 
As can be seen, when we include all election types, Model 10A, the Keating index is 
positive and significant, albeit only weakly so; suggesting that regions with a higher 
regionality score are associated with higher turnout in elections. However, when we 
examine each election type separately, some clear differences emerge. Regionality is 
also associated with higher turnout in elections to the European Parliament (Model 10B); 
with a coefficient and statistical significance similar to the model for all election types. In 
Model 10E, we examine only the Upper Intermediate (that is, regional) elections; and 
note that the coefficient has more than doubled in size and increased in significance 
compared to Models 10A and 10B. Thus, for regional elections, we would predict around 
a half of one per cent increase in turnout for each unit increase in the Keating index.  
Hypothesis 3a :   Regions with a higher Regionality index will have higher turnout in 
regional elections – Confirmed 
 
189 
 
Table 6.8 : Keating regional index 
 Model 10A Model 10B Model 10C Model 10D Model 10E 
 All elections EP only Municipal only LH Only UI only (1) 
Compulsory Voting (0,1,2) 
12.695*** 
(.634) 
28.025*** 
(.848) 
10.869*** 
(1.219) 
5.084*** 
(.647) 
9.448** 
(3.565) 
Weekend Voting (0,1) 
12.038*** 
(.936) 
16.777*** 
(1.462) 
16.802*** 
(1.226) 
2.920** 
(.986) 
11.176** 
(3.822) 
Proportional Representation 
(0,1) 
.439 
(.306) 
 
8.594*** 
(.588) 
5.208*** 
(.347) 
 
Simultaneous Election (0,1) 
8.225*** 
(.457) 
17.098*** 
(.720) 
3.393*** 
(.614) 
  
Salience (0,1,2) 
13.651*** 
(.275) 
    
      
Population Density (ln) 
-1.924*** 
(.275) 
-.735** 
(.279) 
-1.625*** 
(.245) 
-.543** 
(.202) 
-1.424** 
(.482) 
Migration 
-1.057*** 
(.211) 
-1.966*** 
(.305) 
.557* 
(.274) 
.009 
(.209) 
-.525 
(.587) 
GDP (PPP) 
.029*** 
(.007) 
.027** 
(.009) 
.008 
(.009) 
.015* 
(.007) 
.045* 
(.018) 
Unemployment 
-.226*** 
(.046) 
-.302*** 
(.066) 
-.062 
(.059) 
-.178*** 
(.048) 
.063 
(.088) 
Young % 
-.299** 
(.104) 
-.014 
(.159) 
-.502*** 
(.144) 
-.921*** 
(.109) 
-.585* 
(.263) 
Death Rate % 
-.592*** 
(.151) 
-.712** 
(.225) 
-.215 
(.189) 
-.960*** 
(.161) 
-.168 
(.305) 
Occupation (ISCO1&2 %) 
.531*** 
(.059) 
.377*** 
(.084) 
.311*** 
(.073) 
.496*** 
(.067) 
-.106 
(.321) 
Education (% Degree) 
-.333*** 
(.036) 
-.121* 
(.054) 
-.217*** 
(.043) 
-.406*** 
(.042) 
.092 
(.238) 
      
Keating Index 
.172* 
(.067) 
.209* 
(.096) 
-.129 
(.087) 
-.186** 
(.072) 
.497** 
(.162) 
      
Constant 
50.678*** 
(3.410) 
35.240*** 
(4.976) 
51.394*** 
(4.282) 
90.624*** 
(3.512) 
63.865*** 
(9.292) 
Adj R-square .718 .882 .882 .684 .774 
N 2665 602 694 872 199 
*significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level; *** significant at the .001 level 
              (1): due to Collinearity problems, simultaneous elections and PR variables excluded. 
 
 
 
However, when we examine Models 10C and 10D – Municipal and Lower House 
elections respectively – we note that a higher Keating index is associated with lower 
turnout, a finding which is statistically significant for lower house elections. Although the 
index we use here is a composite of several different measures, this finding is in line with 
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previous research which has suggested that the existence of strong regional government 
implies a reduction in the monopoly of power enjoyed by the national legislature; which 
is reflected in lower turnout for elections to the latter (Blais 2000; Siaroff and Merer 
2002). 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, we firstly showed that the predictive power of our core-set of variables 
differed, not only with different types of elections, but also with the individual countries 
in the dataset. We then introduced additional variables, several of which were measured 
at the country level, and tested their effects by means of regression analysis.  
In several cases, our hypotheses were confirmed, at least on the type of elections to 
which we supposed they might apply. The geographical coverage by political parties was 
statistically significant for Lower House elections, as was membership of a trade union, 
and the level of public employment. Our two variables related to local taxes were 
statistically significant predictors of turnout in municipal elections; and the regionality 
index was significantly associated with higher turnout in regional elections.  
Other hypotheses failed to find support: party membership was not significant for Lower 
House elections (and was, indeed, associated with significantly lower turnout in EP and 
Municipal elections); our measure of mayoral strength was associated with lower 
turnout in Municipal elections; and the presence of a representative office in Brussels 
was not significant. In the instances where we were faced with significant results which 
contradicted our expectations, we have revisited the original hypotheses, reviewed the 
findings in the light of previous research, and in some cases speculated on possible 
explanations for otherwise perplexing results. 
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In several models we investigated the effect of a variable on three election types: EP, 
Municipal, and Lower House. For each of four variables - party territorial coverage, union 
membership, public employment, and regionality - it is noteworthy that the coefficients 
for Municipal elections and Lower House elections were the same; and in each case the 
opposite to the corresponding coefficients for EP elections. On this evidence, then, 
European Parliament elections do appear to be quite different, not just to first-order 
elections, but also to second-order elections.  
If variables are found to have different effects from one election type to another, this 
raises the question of whether they may also vary in their effects from country to 
country. Indeed, this may be a reason that the results for two of the variables 
investigated in this chapter – party membership and mayoral strength – contradicted our 
hypotheses. We recall, from Chapter 1, that it is possible for regions within a country to 
have the opposite relationship with a variable to that found when comparing countries. 
Unfortunately, we cannot investigate this possibility using the country level variables we 
have considered here.  
However, this raises an important question: in Chapter 5 we found statistically significant 
effects for all of the core socio-demographic variables. That these effects were generally 
very consistent across different types of elections added to our confidence that these 
findings were reliable. But, do these variables have these same associations with turnout 
in individual countries? For five of the countries in our dataset, we have a sufficient 
number of cases in order to answer this question. These five countries will form the main 
focus of Chapter 7.   
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 Chapter 7 : Individual Countries 
Introduction  
In Chapter 5, we considered how our core-set of institutional and socio-demographic 
variables performed across different types of elections in nine countries (ten countries in 
the case of the institutional variables). We noted that although the direction of effect is 
consistent, the institutional variables tend to have smaller effect on turnout in higher 
order elections than in lower-order elections. Further, we found that most of our socio-
demographic variables are consistent in their direction of effect, whether we consider all 
election types together, or whether we examine EP, Municipal, and Lower House 
elections individually.  
However, in Chapter 6, when we supplemented our core-set with a selection of variables 
measured at the country-level, we were often confronted with results which failed to 
support our hypotheses; or, indeed, contradicted them. In seeking to make sense of 
these results, we speculated that the problems may lay with the nature of our data: 
those variables measured at the country-level could not, of course, take account of 
variations within each of our countries. We were unable, for example, to investigate sub-
national variations in party membership or public employment.  
Nonetheless, in an effort to understand some of the troublesome results, we 
occasionally referred to previous research which had suggested that there were, in fact, 
real country-to-country differences in the effects of some variables. We recall, for 
example, that membership of a political party has been reported as having a weak, 
negative effect on turnout in some countries (Oppenhuis 1995); or that the percentage 
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of manual workers is associated with higher turnout in French municipal elections, but 
with lower turnout in English local elections (Hoffmann-Martinot, Rallings et al. 1996).  
Invoking such country-to-country differences to explain otherwise puzzling results raises 
an important question: do our core variables really behave in the same way within each 
of the individual countries? This is a question seldom explored in comparative research 
into turnout which has used aggregate data: for the rather obvious reason that the data 
were often aggregated to the country-level. Faced with such limitations, a common 
response is to create dummy variables for one or more countries, and to interpret the 
resulting coefficients as evidence that such and such a country is ‘different’ to the rest of 
those included in the analysis (see, for example, Blais and Carty 1990; Blais 2000 ; Siaroff 
and Merer 2002). More detailed investigation into the determinants of voting within 
countries, then, has usually been left to other researchers, using different data, different 
sets of variables, and different methodological approaches.   
However, because we have compiled a dataset in which our dependent and independent 
variables are measured at the sub-national level, we can use these data to investigate 
the effects of the core socio-demographic variables within some of our countries. It is 
important to stress here that, when investigating the effects of our variables in individual 
countries, we are drawing from exactly the same dataset as was used in Chapter 5: 
turnout and each of the independent variables are measured for identical sub-national 
geographical units as before. Because the NUTS classification is broadly based on 
population size, it follows that less populous countries have fewer NUTS units. In the 
cases of Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden, there are too few NUTS units to 
support meaningful regression analyses. Thus, the focus in this chapter is on the 
remaining countries: England, France, Greece, Italy, and Spain. 
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Because we will consider separately the individual election types within individual 
countries, we will necessarily be dealing with far fewer cases than were available for our 
regression models in the previous chapters. In some cases, we have more than one 
instance of a particular type of election in a country, and combining these results would 
lead to a useful increase in sample size. Of course, there are often changes in overall 
turnout between elections of the same type which could be due to factors which are not 
included in our model.  
In order to combine results from elections of the same type within each country, we first 
calculate the average turnout (that is, for all NUTS units) for each instance of that 
election type. We then subtract this average from the raw turnout figure for each 
individual NUTS unit: the resultant turnout figure for each NUTS unit is thus centred on 
the group mean. These centred turnout figures are then used as the dependent variable 
in the regression analyses for each election type. This arithmetical transformation only 
involves changing the zero point of the distribution, and does not alter the distribution 
of values themselves: relative differences among the regions in a particular election are 
maintained52, and the interpretation of the resultant regression coefficients remains 
relatively straightforward.  
The values of two of our institutional variables tend to be constant for all elections in a 
particular country. For instance, in England, all elections are held on a weekday, and in 
France all are held on the weekend; and in Greece and Italy the weak form of 
compulsory voting supposedly applied to all election types. The other institutional 
variables, though, can differ from one election type to another.  For example: all 
                                                             
52
 An alternative approach would be to use a z-standardisation, which would change the shape of the 
distribution. In fact, a series of regression models using z-standardised turnout were run, and the results 
were generally comparable to the models reported in this chapter. Because z-standardisation did not lead to 
any new information, we stay with results using centred turnout as the interpretation of the regression 
coefficients is slightly more transparent. 
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countries use a form of Proportional Representation for elections to the European 
Parliament; but England and France, for example, use plurality or majoritarian systems 
for their Lower House elections. In addition, elections may sometimes be held 
simultaneously, sometimes individually. Each of the institutional variables are often 
associated with marked changes in the overall level of turnout in elections. However, 
because we have centred our turnout variable, the average turnout in each election is, 
by definition, zero; thus, in the models for each country we only include the socio-
demographic variables.  
Concentrating on the socio-demographic variables also serves to reduce the total 
number of variables in each regression model. This is useful because, as previously 
noted, we are often dealing with a small number of observations. There exist various 
recommendations for the minimum number of observations to be used in regression 
analysis; such as ten times the number of variables; 104 + the number of variables; or 50 
+ 8 x the number of variables (see Hox 2010; StatSoft 2011). For some models which 
examine turnout in individual election types, we will be falling short of these guidelines. 
Further, because we are working with smaller numbers of observations, it follows that 
variables may not attain the same level of statistical significance as we saw in Chapter 5. 
In the first half of this chapter, we examine the results of regression analyses for each of 
the five countries in turn. For each country, we compare a model which includes all 
elections to individual models for each type of election in our dataset, and consider the 
findings in the light of our original hypotheses and of the results reported Chapter 5. In 
terms of the usefulness of the socio-demographic variables in differentiating between 
regions of low and high turnout, we will see that there are often differences from one 
type of election to another. These differences often support our initial suspicion that not 
all second-order elections are the same; even when, as is the case in Greece and Italy, 
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the levels of turnout for these various lower-order elections are comparable; and, 
indeed, often approach those of national, first-order elections.  
We then summarise the findings for all five countries, and show that, four of the 
variables behave quite consistently, and provide support for our hypotheses. The 
remaining variables, though, differ in their effects from country to country; sometimes 
supporting our hypotheses, but at other times contradicting them. In seeking to make 
sense of these differences, we offer some initial reflection on the measures we have 
used, but we also venture beyond purely methodological concerns, and consider factors 
related to the countries’ social and political structures. 
In the second section, in an attempt to further explore how aspects of these social and 
political structures may affect turnout in elections, we examine different measures of 
Migration, GDP, Occupation, and Education. For the five countries which we consider in 
this chapter, we have regional-level data which will allow us to consider the effects of: 
external migration to a region (rather than total migration); the change in GDP for each 
region over a ten year period; the proportion of workers engaged in plant and 
elementary industries; and the proportion of the population educated to post-primary 
school level. As with the original versions of these variables, the effects of each differs 
from country to country.   
Individual Country Analyses 
In this section, we first present the results of a series of regression analyses for each 
country in turn. For each country, we focus mainly on those variables which attain 
statistical significance, and discuss the results in relation to the original hypotheses, and 
to the findings of Chapter 5. We then summarise the results for all five countries, and 
find that four variables are consistent in their effects across countries, and support our 
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original hypotheses. For the remaining variables, the effects differ from country to 
country, and we suggest that the reasons for these inconsistencies may be related to 
more general political and social differences between the countries. 
England 
For England, we have results for EP, Municipal, and Lower House elections. The results 
for a series of regression analyses are provided in Table 7.1.  
Table 7.1 : England 
 Model ENG1 Model ENG2 Model ENG3 Model ENG4 Model ENG5 
ENGLAND All Elections All except  EP EP Only Municipal Only LH Only 
      
Population Density (ln) 
-1.051*** 
(.214) 
-1.151*** 
(.237) 
-.803 
(.422) 
-1.227** 
(.420) 
-1.138*** 
(.257) 
Migration % 
1.007*** 
(.185) 
1.336*** 
(.205) 
.209 
(.363) 
1.763*** 
(.369) 
1.097*** 
(.220) 
GDP (PPP) 
-.016*** 
(.004) 
-.019*** 
(.004) 
-.006 
(.007) 
-.027*** 
(.007) 
-.015*** 
(.005) 
Unemployment % 
-.106 
(.093) 
-.042 
(.104) 
-.244 
(.181) 
.341 
(.194) 
-.252* 
(.110) 
Young % 
-.699*** 
(.142) 
-.777*** 
(.158) 
-.510 
(.280) 
-.918*** 
(.281) 
-.672*** 
(.170) 
Death Rate % 
-.175 
(.166) 
-.358 
(.184) 
.276 
(.327) 
-.250 
(.326) 
-.386 
(.199) 
Occupation (ISCO1&2 %) 
.095 
(.106) 
.206 
(.118) 
-.172 
(.208) 
-.007 
(.211) 
.373** 
(.127) 
Education (% Degree) 
.116 
(.078) 
.017 
(.087) 
.354* 
(.154) 
.289 
(.155) 
-.183 
(.094) 
      
Constant 
14.522*** 
(3.996) 
16.651*** 
(4.442) 
9.205 
(7.864) 
14.782 
(7.936) 
16.783*** 
(4.780) 
Adj R-square .519 .612 .315 .542 .718 
N 562 400 162 157 243 
      
* significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level; *** significant at the .001 level 
 
 
 
Referring to the results in the first column of Table 7.1 (Model ENG1), where elections of 
all types are included in the regression analysis, we note that four of the eight variables 
are statistically significant (all at the .001 level): Population Density, Migration, GDP, and 
the percentage of Young people. Further, each of these variables is also statistically 
significant when we consider Municipal and Lower House elections separately (Model 
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ENG4 and Model ENG5, respectively). Population Density and the percentage of Young 
people are both associated with lower turnout; supporting our original hypotheses and 
agreeing with the results presented in Chapter 5. The results for Unemployment, 
Occupation, and Education, when statistically significant, are also in line with 
expectations. However, in both Municipal and Lower House elections, the statistically 
significant coefficients for Migration and GDP contradict both our original hypotheses 
and our earlier analyses (Table 3A, Chapter 5). We will discuss these findings later in this 
chapter, once we have considered and summarised the results for the remaining 
countries. 
The foregoing discussion has focused on Municipal and Lower House elections in 
England; not least because, in these elections, several of the variables were statistically 
significant. However, for elections to the European Parliament (Model ENG3), only one 
variable - Education (being the percentage of people with a degree level qualification or 
higher) - is significant (at the .05 level). Although the number of cases is fewer for EP 
elections than for Lower House elections, it is very similar to that for the Municipal 
elections, for which four variables did attain statistical significance. For the very low 
salience EP elections, then, the only variable which is useful in distinguishing between 
low and high turnout regions is that of the proportion of degree holders in the 
population. It is also noteworthy that this variable was not statistically significant in any 
of the other models. It is, we think, unlikely that it is necessary to have degree level 
education in order to be equipped with skills required to get to the polling station and 
cast a vote. However, it is probable that more educated people will have a higher level of 
interest in, and understanding of, the European Union and hence be marginally more 
likely to be motivated to cast a vote in the low salience elections for the European 
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Parliament – especially where the mobilisation of the electorate by political parties and 
the media is also quite weak. 
 
In terms of the associations between turnout and the socio-demographic characteristics 
of the sub-national units, then, EP elections in England do appear to be different, not just 
to Lower House elections, but also to the (also low turnout) Municipal elections. We also 
note that the amount of variance explained by the regression models is highest for 
Lower House elections (.718), moderate for Municipal elections (.542), and lowest for EP 
elections – where over two thirds of the variance remains unexplained. As we noted in 
the introduction, both EP and Municipal elections have often been considered as 
‘second-order’ elections. For England, at least, it would seem that there are enough 
differences between these elections to justify second- third-order distinction.  
We also note that, in contrast to both Municipal and Lower House elections in England, 
elections for the EP use a proportional electoral system. For the voter, this presents a 
very different environment in which to cast a vote; not least because of the marked 
difference in the district size: rather than casting a vote for an election in one of around 
300 local authorities (Wilson 2005) or in one of the five hundred-odd parliamentary 
constituencies, voters in EP are divided into one of nine English regions; and the 
prospect of voting for a list, rather than an individual, probably serves to reduce even 
further the average voter’s interest in these elections. In such an environment, it is 
possible that other, rather random factors, affect the chances that an individual casts a 
vote  (Matsusaka and Palda 1999). 
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France 
For France, we have results from six different types of elections: EP, Municipal, Lower 
Intermediate (départemental), Upper Intermediate (regional), Lower House, and 
Presidential. The results for a series of regression analyses are provided in Table 7.2.  
 
Table 7.2 : France 
 Model FRA1 Model FRA2 Model FRA3 Model FRA4 Model FRA5 Model FRA6 Model FRA7 Model FRA8 
France All elections All except EP EP Only Municipal Only LI Only UI Only LH Only 
Presidential 
Only 
         
Population Density (ln) 
-1.470*** 
(.210) 
-1.750*** 
(.222) 
.216 
(.456) 
-2.118*** 
(.378) 
-3.514*** 
(.520) 
-1.866*** 
(.449) 
-.963* 
(.397) 
.090 
(.272) 
Migration % 
1.579*** 
(.486) 
1.345** 
(.514) 
3.003** 
(1.053) 
.941 
(.874) 
1.121 
(1.203) 
1.782 
(1.037) 
1.916* 
(.918) 
1.613* 
(.629) 
GDP (PPP) 
.002 
(.009) 
.000 
(.009) 
.014 
(.019) 
-.005 
(.016) 
-.003 
(.023) 
-.006 
(.019) 
-.004 
(.918) 
-.008 
(.011) 
Unemployment % 
-.039 
(.049) 
.043 
(.052) 
-.528*** 
(.107) 
.248** 
(.089) 
.067 
(.122) 
.241* 
(.105) 
-.157 
(.093) 
-.371*** 
(.064) 
Young % 
-.219 
(.134) 
-.320* 
(.142) 
.369 
(.290) 
-.700** 
(.240) 
-.523 
(.336) 
-.185 
(.285) 
.006 
(.253) 
-.041 
(.173) 
Death Rate % 
.864*** 
(.143) 
.730*** 
(.152) 
1.643*** 
(.310) 
.613* 
(.257) 
.682 
(.368) 
.478 
(.305) 
1.194*** 
(.270) 
.394* 
(.185) 
Occupation (ISCO1&2 %) 
-.403* 
(.177) 
-.319 
(.187) 
-.940* 
(.383) 
-.321 
(.317) 
-.622 
(.453) 
-.078 
(.377) 
-.358 
(.334) 
-.683** 
(.229) 
Education (% Degree) 
.529*** 
(.122) 
.491*** 
(.129) 
.779** 
(.264) 
.607** 
(.219) 
.503 
(.309) 
.386 
(.260) 
.495* 
(.231) 
.619*** 
(.158) 
         
Constant 
-5.514 
(3.815) 
-1.630 
(4.039) 
-27.948*** 
(8.245) 
5.092 
(6.839) 
15.488 
(9.896) 
-4.715 
(8.117) 
-14.122 
(7.188) 
-4.620 
(4.927) 
Adj R-square .372 .418 .474 .547 .735 .432 .494 .445 
N 664 569 95 190 94 95 95 95 
         
* significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level; *** significant at the .001 level 
 
 
 
Referring to the results for Model FRA1, where all election types are included, we note 
that five of the eight variables are statistically significant: Population Density, Migration, 
Death Rate, Occupation, and Education. Further, despite the markedly lower number of 
cases, in several instances these variables also attain significance in models for the 
individual election types; when this is the case, the respective direction of effect always 
agrees with that found in Model FRA1. Population Density is associated with lower 
turnout, and Education is associated with higher turnout; and, thus, both provide 
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support for our earlier hypotheses. Further, both of the statistically significant results 
(Models FRA2 and FRA4) for the percentage of Young people are negative, and thus also 
in line with expectations.  
For Unemployment, although some results provide support for our hypothesis (being 
statistically significant and negative for EP and Presidential elections), there are also 
instances of statistically significant contradictory results: for Municipal and Upper 
Intermediate elections, Unemployment is associated with higher turnout. It is difficult to 
see why this variable should have opposite effects from one election type to another. It 
is possible that political parties on the far-left or the far-right are particularly adept at 
mobilising support among the unemployed in these types of elections; where, it should 
be noted, such parties often enjoy more electoral success than in first-order elections, 
perhaps in part because of the continuing importance of the left-right dimension in 
French sub-national elections, and the more proportional nature of the electoral systems 
used in municipal and regional elections. 
Compared to Unemployment, the effects of Migration, Death Rate, and Occupation, 
when statistically significant, are at least consistent across the different models. 
However, the results for all three of the variables contradict the hypothesised effects: as 
can be seen from Table 7.2, Migration and Death Rate are associated with higher 
turnout; and Occupation is associated with lower turnout. We discuss these findings 
further at the end of this section. 
When we examine how our variables behave across the different election types in 
France, we first note that there are no cases where a variable is statistically significant 
for all elections treated together, and then contradicted by a significant coefficient with 
the opposite sign in any of the election types examined individually. In contrast to the 
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results for England, where only one variable was significant for predicting turnout in EP 
elections, in France, five variables are significant; as is also the case for Municipal and 
Presidential elections. Rather, in France, it is the Lower- and Upper-Intermediate level 
elections that have fewest significant associations between turnout and the socio-
demographic variables. However, as was the case in England, the coefficient for 
Education is largest for EP elections. 
Greece 
For Greece, we have results from EP, Municipal, and Lower House elections. The results 
for a series of regression analyses are shown in Table 7.3.  
 
Table 7.3 : Greece 
 Model GRE1 Model GRE2 Model GRE3 Model GRE4 Model GRE5 
Greece All Elections All except EP EP Only Municipal Only LH Only 
      
Population Density (ln) 
-1.943  
(1.009) 
-2.034  
(1.197) 
-1.850  
(1.922) 
-3.359  
(2.165) 
-1.333  
(1.441) 
Migration % 
-1.660***  
(.443) 
-2.245***  
(.537) 
-.443  
(.808) 
-3.413**  
(1.156) 
-1.907**  
(.606) 
GDP (PPP) 
.082**  
(.027) 
.088**  
(.032) 
.070  
(.051) 
.142*  
(.057) 
.051  
(.038) 
Unemployment % 
-.323**  
(.106) 
-.374**  
(.126) 
-.187  
(.203) 
-.231  
(.226) 
-.430**  
(.153) 
Young % 
-.845*  
(.352) 
-.654  
(.419) 
-1.271  
(.667) 
-.079  
(.783) 
-.818  
(.500) 
Death Rate % 
-2.540***  
(.398) 
-2.230***  
(.472) 
-3.254***  
(.762) 
-2.135*  
(.851) 
-2.156***  
(.571) 
Occupation (ISCO1&2 %) 
-1.207***  
(.301) 
-1.194***  
(.357) 
-1.248*  
(.576) 
-1.634*  
(.649) 
-1.014*  
(.432) 
Education (% Degree) 
1.058***  
(.265) 
1.103***  
(.313) 
.954  
(.512) 
1.088*  
(.544) 
1.124**  
(.384) 
      
Constant 
60.460***  
(11.132) 
54.410***  
(13.198) 
74.780***  
(21.282) 
52.634*  
(23.714) 
52.840***  
(15.956) 
Adj R-square .375 .394 .298 .412 .369 
N 263 185 77 68 117 
      
* significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level; *** significant at the .001 level 
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Referring to the results in the first column of Table 7.3 (Model GRE1), where all types of 
elections are included in the model, we note that seven of the eight variables attain 
statistical significance: Migration, GDP, Unemployment, Young, Death Rate, Occupation, 
and Education. Further, with the exception of the percentage of Young people, all of 
these variables are also significant in at least one of the models for individual election 
types. Migration, Unemployment, Young, and Death Rate are all associated with lower 
turnout; and the results here support the original hypotheses for each of these variables. 
GDP and Education are both associated with higher turnout; and these results are also in 
line with expectations. In none of the models does Population Density attain statistical 
significance, suggesting that, in contrast to England and France, this variable is of little 
use in differentiating between high and low turnout regions in Greece, once the effects 
of the other variables are taken into account.  
The Occupation (the percentage of people in the highest two occupational categories) 
variable is negative, and statistically significant, in all of the models for Greece; and thus, 
as was the case for France contradicts the hypothesised result.  
When we examine how the variables behave across different types of elections in 
Greece, the results are very consistent. For all variables, the signs on the coefficients are 
the same across all of the models, irrespective of whether we examine all election types 
together, or whether we examine individual election types. For Lower House and 
Municipal elections, five variables attain statistical significance; however, for elections to 
the European Parliament, only two of the eight variables are significant.  The model for 
EP elections also has the lowest R-square value.  
204 
 
We recall from earlier discussions about individual election types in England that the 
number of variables achieving statistical significance varied across different types of 
elections; and it was the very low salience EP elections in England which had the fewest 
significant variables, even when compared to the model for Municipal elections, which 
had a similar number of cases. We noted that most of the variables, then, were of little 
use in differentiating between regions of high and low turnout in the very low salience, 
European Parliament elections. We have made a similar observation for EP elections in 
Greece. However, as we discussed in previous chapters, Greece has had a recent history 
of compulsory voting, which, as was shown in Chapter 5, tends to have a more marked 
effect on turnout for lower-order elections. Indeed, the average turnout for EP, 
Municipal, and Lower House elections in Greece is 67, 71, and 75 per cent, respectively; 
in terms of turnout, then, the gap between EP and Lower House elections is rather 
modest compared to that observed in England, where the average turnout figures for 
these election types were 30 and 64 per cent, respectively. It is interesting to note, then, 
that even where compulsion to vote results in quite high turnout in all types of elections, 
fewer variables have statistically significant effects in EP elections than in Municipal and 
Lower House elections. We return to this point in the following section, where we 
consider elections in Italy, which has also had a recent history of compulsory voting.  
Italy 
For Italy, we have results from EP, regional and Lower House elections. The results of the 
regression analyses are provided in Table 7.4.  
When we examine how the variables behave for elections in Italy, we note that three 
variables are statistically significant for all elections treated together (Model ITA1): 
Unemployment, Young, and the Death Rate.  In addition, each of these variables attains 
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significance in at least one of the individual election models.  Each of these variables, as 
hypothesised, is associated with lower turnout. Further, when statistically significant in 
the individual models, the results for Migration and Education are also in line with 
expectations, having, respectively, a negative and positive effect on turnout. Neither 
Population Density nor GDP are statistically significant in any of the models. Finally, 
Occupation is significant (.05 level) in Model GRE4 (Regional elections), and, as was the 
case for France and Greece, is associated with lower turnout.  
Table 7.4 : Italy 
 Model ITA1 Model ITA2 Model ITA3 Model ITA4 Model ITA5 
ITALY All Elections All except EP EP Only Regional Only LH Only 
      
Population Density (ln) 
-.220 
(.452) 
-.471 
(.482) 
.111 
(.864) 
-.788 
(.949) 
-.565 
(.424) 
Migration 
-.148 
(.639) 
-1.321* 
(.665) 
1.763 
(1.267) 
-2.514* 
(1.245) 
-.937 
(.600) 
GDP (PPP) 
.010 
(.021) 
.026 
(.021) 
-.022 
(.042) 
.021 
(.036) 
.030 
(.020) 
Unemployment 
-.311*** 
(.087) 
-.196* 
(.091) 
-.490** 
(.172) 
-.019 
(.172) 
-.248** 
(.082) 
Young % 
-1.048* 
(.454) 
-1.148* 
(.468) 
-.974 
(.912) 
-1.496 
(.845) 
-.994* 
(.432) 
Death Rate % 
-1.045* 
(.430) 
-1.174** 
(.447) 
-.919 
(.858) 
-1.657* 
(.833) 
-.875* 
(.407) 
Occupation (ISCO1&2 %) 
-.324 
(.360) 
-.683 
(.366) 
.402 
(.743) 
-1.630* 
(.622) 
.149 
(.351) 
Education (% Degree) 
.066 
(.287) 
.364 
(.292) 
-.550 
(.592) 
1.045* 
(.497) 
-.275 
(.280) 
      
Constant 
38.213* 
(15.196) 
45.139** 
(15.743) 
29.335 
(30.465) 
70.485* 
(28.800) 
29.786* 
(14.450) 
Adj R-square .450 .509 .439 .277 .769 
N 275 177 98 80 97 
      
* significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level; *** significant at the .001 level 
  
 
We also note that for four variables – Population Density, Migration, GDP, and 
Occupation – the coefficients for the European Parliament elections contradict the 
respective coefficients when all elections are treated together. As measured by the R-
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square values, the model is explaining substantially more variance for Lower House 
elections than for EP or Municipal elections.  
Italy, like Greece, has had a recent history of weakly enforced compulsory voting; and 
also exhibits relatively high turnout in lower-order elections: 72 per cent, on average, for 
both the EP and Regional elections in our dataset. Despite these very similar levels of 
turnout in these two types of elections (which, absent a ‘third-order’ category, would 
both be considered ‘second-order’ elections), there are clear differences in terms of the 
applicability of the socio-demographic variables in distinguishing between regions of 
high and low turnout: for Italian Regional elections, Migration, Death Rate, Occupation, 
and Education are statistically significant; whereas for EP elections, the only statistically 
significant variable is that of Unemployment. This, we suggest, is further evidence that 
elections to the EP can differ in important ways from other lower-order elections, and 
thus supports the approach adopted in this and earlier chapters of examining individual 
election types in more detail. 
Taken together, the findings for Greece and Italy also suggest that the weak form of 
compulsory voting does not have the same effect as simply increasing the salience of the 
election or of enhancing the sense of civic duty; at least, not equally so for all voters. 
Were this the case, the same, otherwise reluctant, voters would be encouraged to 
actually vote in, for example, both the Italian EP and Regional elections. Although it 
could have been tempting to make this assumption based on the effectively identical 
average turnout in these two types of elections, the results for the socio-demographic 
variables in these two types of election suggest that, in different types of elections, 
different voters respond to the weak form of compulsory voting.  
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Spain 
For Spain, we have results from EP, Municipal, Lower House, and Upper House elections.  
The results for the regression analyses are provided in Table 7.5.  
In Model SPA1 (all election types), six variables are statistically significant: Population 
Density, GDP, Unemployment, Young, Death Rate, and Occupation. Further, and despite 
the smaller number of cases, each of these variables is also significant in at least two of 
the models which examine individual elections. Population Density, Unemployment, 
Young and Death Rate are all associated with lower turnout; and Education is associated 
with higher turnout (and as was the case in England and France, the coefficient for 
Education is largest for EP elections). The results for all five of these variables, then, 
support our original hypotheses.  
Table 7.5 : Spain 
 Model SPA1 Model SPA2 Model SPA3 Model SPA4 Model SPA5 Model SPA6 
SPAIN All Elections All except EP EP only Municipal Only LH Only UH Only 
       
Population Density (ln) 
-2.277***  
(.246) 
-2.334***  
(.265) 
-2.020**  
(.625) 
-2.592***  
(.385) 
-2.076***  
(.375) 
-2.414**  
(.877) 
Migration % 
-.258  
(.412) 
-.116  
(.445) 
-.890  
(1.048) 
-.938  
(.647) 
.447  
(.630) 
.513  
(1.496) 
GDP (PPP) 
-.180***  
(.017) 
-.175***  
(.018) 
-.201***  
(.043) 
-.169***  
(.026) 
-.163***  
(.026) 
-.249***  
(.059) 
Unemployment % 
-.450***  
(.067) 
-.450***  
(.072) 
-.451**  
(.171) 
-.447***  
(.186) 
-.404***  
(.103) 
-.678**  
(.237) 
Young % 
-.555**  
(.197) 
-.384  
(.212) 
-1.327**  
(.502) 
-.793*  
(.309) 
-.143  
(.302) 
.347  
(.698) 
Death Rate % 
-2.168***  
(.261) 
-2.140***  
(.282) 
-2.308***  
(.662) 
-2.059***  
(.409) 
-2.269***  
(.399) 
-1.851  
(.960) 
Occupation (ISCO1&2 %) 
-.444  
(.227) 
-.303  
(.245) 
-1.069  
(.577) 
-.879*  
(.357) 
.151  
(.347) 
.052 
(.795) 
Education (% Degree) 
.709***  
(.187) 
.590**  
(.202) 
1.237*  
(.475) 
.837**  
(.294) 
.394  
(.286) 
.355  
(.671) 
       
Constant 
67.349***  
(6.099) 
61.425***  
(6.580) 
94.127***  
(15.508) 
79.443***  
(9.554) 
47.312***  
(9.308) 
47.613**  
(22.297) 
Adj R-square .489 .488 .509 .587 .433 .486 
N 514 418 96 185 190 43 
       
* significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level; *** significant at the .001 level 
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Migration is not significant in any of the models, and thus the evidence from Spain does 
not lend support to our hypothesis that Migration, being a measure of population 
instability, would be associated with lower turnout. The Occupation variable is 
statistically significant in only one model (SPA4, Municipal elections); where a larger 
proportion of people in the highest occupational categories is associated with lower 
turnout, which is opposite to the hypothesised effect, and similar to the results for 
France, Greece, and Italy. We discuss the results for GDP, along with the other results 
that contradicted our hypotheses, in the next part of this section.  
Summary& Discussion 
The foregoing regression analyses have shown that, within each of our five countries, 
some of the socio-demographic variables behave consistently across different election 
types. However, these variables do not always have the same direction of effect in all 
five countries. Table 7.6 summarises our findings for each country, and, to aid 
comparison, includes a summary of the results of Models 4A, 4B, and 4C, which included 
all countries and examined European Parliament, Municipal, and Lower House elections, 
respectively (see Chapter 5). 
 As can be seen from Table 7.6; three of the eight variables have entirely consistent 
effects across all five of the countries which have been examined in detail here: 
Population Density, and the percentage of Young people are each associated with lower 
turnout; and Education is associated with higher turnout. In addition, aside from the 
somewhat ambiguous results for France, Unemployment was found to have a 
consistently negative effect on turnout. The results for Population Density53, the 
                                                             
53
 Although we have applied a logarithmic transformation to the raw population density data, in each 
country there are one or a handful of regions which have extremely high population densities – notably the 
regions of the capital city. In order to check whether these regions were having an undue effect on the 
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percentage of Young people, and Unemployment agree with the results in Models 4A, 
4B, and 4C, which included regional level data for a total of nine countries.  
 
Table 7.6 : Effects of Variables in Five Countries 
 
The findings for Education (the proportion of the population educated to at least degree 
level), whilst consistent across the individual countries, differ from those obtained In 
Models 4A, 4B, and 4C, where this variable was associated with lower turnout – a finding 
which was somewhat puzzling given the weight of previous research which had found 
education to have a positive effect on turnout in elections. However, within the 
individual countries considered in this chapter, a higher percentage of degree educated 
people is associated with higher turnout. Thus, whilst the individual country analyses 
contradict our initial findings in Chapter 5, the results do better reflect previous research 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
results, we ran a series of regression models for each country with the extremely high population density 
regions removed. The results were broadly similar; in countries where Population Density had attained 
statistical significance, the effects were still significant when extremely high population density regions were 
excluded from the analysis.  
  
Va riable 
  
  
England 
  France   Greece   Italy   Spain   
Models  
  
4A, 4B, 4C 
  
              Population  
Density 
  
--  --  --  -  --  --  
Migration 
  ++   ++   - -  - -  -  ~  
GDP 
  --  ~  ++   +  --  
++  
Unemployment 
  -  ~  --  --  --  --  
Young 
  --  -  --  --  - -  --  
Death Rate 
  -  ++   --  --  --  --  
Occupation 
  +   --  --  -  -  
++  
Education 
  +   ++   ++   ++   --   
              
++ consistently positive effect; + generally positive effect; 
   ~ inconsistent;  - generally negative effect;  -- consistently negative effect 
  
  
  + 
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into the effects of education on turnout in elections, and also support our original 
hypothesis.  
Thus, the results from analyses on individual countries means that we can be reasonably 
confident that these four variables are, in fact, good predictors of turnout in elections in 
these countries. However, when we consider the remaining variables – Migration, GDP, 
Death Rate, and Occupation - there are often substantial differences in the results, 
depending on the country or the type of election under consideration. We now consider 
these variables in more detail. 
Migration: In Greece, Italy, and Spain, higher levels of migration are generally associated 
with decreased turnout, thus lending support to our initial hypothesis that higher levels 
of migration into a region was a useful indicator of population instability, less integration 
into society, and a resultant reduced propensity to vote. However, in both England and 
France, higher levels of migration are consistently associated with increased turnout. In 
Models 4A, 4B, and 4C, the effects of Migration were also somewhat inconsistent, and in 
seeking to make sense of the different effects of migration from one type of election to 
another, we previously speculated (Chapter 5) that these may be linked either to the 
potential for ‘immigration’ to be a political issue which could be used to mobilise the 
electorate, to aspects of registration procedures, or to different sub-groups of migrants.  
It is possible that political parties in England and France do indeed invoke immigration as 
a campaign issue, and successfully mobilise the electorate to a greater extent than in the 
other countries included in our analyses; but we are unable to directly test this 
proposition with the current dataset. However, the Eurobarometer series of opinion 
polls has sometimes included a question which asks respondents to choose the ‘most 
important problems’ facing their country. In Eurobarometer 60 (European Commission 
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2004), 32 per cent of UK respondents selected immigration as one of the two most 
important problems; and this was certainly higher than the EU average of 14 per cent. 
However, France only scored nine per cent on the same question, which was not 
substantially different to Italy, scoring 14. Further, 22 per cent of Spanish respondents 
rated immigration as one of the most important issues; yet in Spain, migration into a 
region was not significant in any of the regression models. Thus, support for explaining 
the varying effects of Migration by calling on the different mobilising strategies of 
political parties remains patchy, at best54. The idea that ‘immigration’ could be a political 
issue rests largely on a distinction between internal and external migration – that is, 
those new arrivals hailing from within the same country, or those coming from abroad. 
Later in this chapter, we examine the effects of external migration on turnout, but 
mention here that we do not find compelling evidence to support this proposition. 
A second possibility is that there is something about the voter registration procedures in 
France and England, in particular, which make it more likely that a new arrival to a region 
would vote. We suggested in Chapter 5 that citizens from other EU countries are entitled 
to register and vote in both EP and Municipal elections when they move to another 
member state, and that this was perhaps a contributory factor in the different turnout 
rates in these two types of elections. However, such people are not entitled to vote 
(short of becoming a citizen) in the other elections within a country. Differential voting 
rates among this group of migrants, then, cannot be invoked as a factor which would 
explain the apparent positive effects of migration in, for example, the first-order 
elections in England and France.  
                                                             
54 It should also be noted that the ‘most important issue’ question can be interpreted in different 
ways by the respondent; and, more generally, there are doubts as to whether the question is an 
accurate measure of salience effects in elections (see Johns 2010). 
212 
 
As we have seen, it is difficult to explain the association between migration and turnout 
by reference to external migrants; is there, then, something about the voter registration 
procedures for internal migrants which may be at play? 
Registration of voters in England is state initiated, and with local lists regularly updated 
by means of household surveys (Massicotte, Blais et al. 2004). There would appear to be 
rather little effort required on the part of a new arrival (assuming they were eligible) to 
become a registered voter, and thus entitled to vote in all elections. However, this effort 
is not any less for a new arrival than for an existing resident, and it is difficult to see how 
the registration procedures in England could make it more likely, on average, that a new 
arrival would actually vote. In France, registration is compulsory (Massicotte, Blais et al. 
2004), at least in theory, and, as was the case for England, it is difficult to imagine that 
there is something connected with the registration requirements which would somehow 
encourage new arrivals to vote to a greater extent than established inhabitants. 
However, although national registration levels in both France and England are relatively 
high, at around 90 and 95 per cent, respectively, these average figures hide a good deal 
of variation within each country. In England, electoral non-registration varies regionally, 
ranging from a high of 18 per cent in Inner London to a low of four per cent in  the West 
Midlands (Electoral Commission 2005). In France, research which focused on a single 
polling station, has uncovered non-registration levels of around 25 per cent55, and,  
(Braconnier and Dormagen 2007). Further, the very factors which have been linked to 
non-voting have also been shown to affect registration in both England and France (Pak 
Ké Shon 2004; Electoral Commission 2005); so, for example, less educated, younger, and 
                                                             
55 A reminder that ‘the legal prescription as to how things should operate should not always be taken as 
describing how things actually do operate’ (Dearlove 1973:15). 
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more mobile people are markedly less likely to register when compared to other groups 
in society. In effect, then, since these groups would be less likely to vote, even if 
registered, by not registering they effectively increase the (percentage) turnout actually 
exhibited. 
It is also known that, at least in England, population movements within England are far 
from random (Champion 2005): those under the age of 25, and who are single, are likely 
to be drawn to the larger cities; whereas  people over 30, including those with young 
families, or those approaching retirement age and who are often able to ‘cash-in’ on 
relative differences in property prices, are more likely to move in the opposite direction, 
that is, out of the larger cities. Further, people over the age of 45 are also more likely, on 
average, to move out of the larger cities towards less densely populated areas. Thus, 
substantial numbers of those voters who are less likely to vote, migrate to areas of high 
population density, areas which are also shown to be associated with lower turnout. 
Whereas older, more affluent people who are, on average, more likely to vote, tend to 
move towards less densely populated areas, areas which themselves usually exhibit 
higher turnout.  
Further, in England and France, there are substantial numbers of people who live at a 
different address to that under which they appear on the electoral register. Indeed, in 
England, provision is made with the registration rules (Electoral Commission 2007) for 
university students to be registered at, for example, their parents’ address rather than 
where they attend university. Even before the recent increase in the numbers of school-
leavers going to university, these numbers were substantial, being around two million 
university students in 2000 (HESA 2011); being around five per cent of the total eligible 
electorate in England. However, within University towns, the student population can 
represent between ten and fifteen percent of the eligible voters. In France, it has been 
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shown in one study (which focused on a single polling station) that over a quarter of 
voters on the local voting list were no longer actually living within the area (Braconnier 
and Dormagen 2007). Further, these malinscrits were much less likely to vote than were 
those who actually did live in the area. In both France and England, then, there exist 
substantial numbers of people, who may contribute to higher migration figures in one 
part of the country, yet whose (less than average) tendency to vote is actually reflected 
in turnout levels for an entirely different place.  
However, although this explanation may have some appeal to it, we should note that, if 
people are registered in one location, but are recorded as new arrivals in another, they 
are probably more likely to return home to vote in more important elections. And, it 
follows that the marginal effects on turnout would thus be more noticeable in more 
important elections. This expectation is not borne out in the results for different 
elections in either England or France; where the largest effects of migration are found in 
Municipal and EP elections, respectively. Further, although explanations resting on 
differential levels of voter registration and/or particular patterns of internal migration 
may explain the otherwise puzzling results for England and France, we have not been 
able to uncover any evidence to explain why these effects are so different to those in 
Greece or Italy - both of which also have compulsory registration (ACE 2006; Electoral 
Commission 2006).  
Death Rate: We originally hypothesised that the Death Rate could be used as a proxy for 
social disadvantage, as previous research has shown that the socially disadvantaged do 
exhibit a higher death rate. However, this line of reasoning would lead us to the 
conclusion that, in France, the socially disadvantaged (at least those who are on the 
electoral register) are more likely to vote than is the average citizen. Tempting though it 
would be to invoke this as evidence that the French Revolutionary spirit lives on to this 
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day, we will give some thought to two rather more prosaic explanations. It is possible 
that, in France, the Death Rate is related more to the age of the population than to 
measures of social exclusion; and, as older people are, on average, more likely to vote, 
regions with a higher death rate have a higher proportion of older people and thus 
higher turnout. Indeed, when we consider the individual NUTS units of France, we find 
that there is a very strong correlation (.936) between Death Rate and the percentage of 
the population aged over 50. This is certainly higher than is the case for England (.772), 
but actually quite similar to that for Italy (.916) and Spain (.905); and, as we saw, in both 
of those countries, a higher Death Rate is associated with lower turnout. In order to 
explain the apparently aberrant case of France, we would thus still have to show why 
this variable should behave differently in different countries.  
Fortunately, Radcliff (1992) offers us a potential solution to this challenge. Radcliff 
showed that, when considering both developed and less-developed countries, the 
relationship between income and turnout is not linear. In less-developed countries, 
income is negatively associated with turnout; the explanation being that the potential 
benefits are greater because the individual is more sensitive to economic performance. 
In less developed countries, then, poverty is a mobilising factor which serves to increase 
turnout in elections.  
Compared to the less-developed countries, the generally much higher levels of social 
security provision in developed countries serve to lessen the suffering which would 
otherwise be associated with financial hardship, and consequently dulls the mobilising 
effects of poverty. However, Radcliff suggests that the relationship between income and 
turnout is actually curvilinear; and that at very high levels of welfare spending, the 
opportunity costs of voting are lowered to the extent that the relationship between 
income and turnout again becomes negative. Further, because the welfare programmes 
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tend to be more universal in their reach they have a more socially integrative effect, 
rather than being associated with the stigmatisation and resentment that can occur 
when programmes are targeted at particular groups. Indeed, Radcliff presents some 
evidence to support this proposition, finding that income and turnout are negatively 
associated in those developed countries which he considers as having extremely high 
levels of welfare spending. It is noteworthy that, in a dataset which includes the Western 
European democracies, he considers that only France, the Netherlands, and Sweden 
warrant inclusion in this category.  
GDP: When we examine the effects of GDP in each of our five countries, the results offer 
rather less compelling evidence to support our hypothesis. In France and Italy, GDP is 
not significant in any of the regression models; and in England and Spain, higher GDP is 
actually associated with lower turnout. Only in Greece do we find evidence to support 
our hypothesis that higher GDP would be associated with higher turnout.  
Possibly, it is not the actual level of GDP which is important, but rather whether the 
economic situation is improving, or getting worse. In order to investigate this, we 
examine the effects of change in GDP in the second half of this chapter. It is possible that 
the negative association between GDP and turnout is also linked in some way to socio-
demographic patterns which are not discernable with our data. Indeed, those 
movements of people with different individual level characteristics described above may 
be relevant here too.  
However, we should also note that the aggregate measure of GDP does not tell us 
anything about the distribution of wealth among the population, nor their individual 
level of income. Indeed, the wealthiest regions are often those with the highest levels of 
income equality and poverty; for example, Inner London, with a per capita GDP of some 
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600 per cent of the EU average, has the highest income equality (as measured by the 
numbers of people in the top and bottom quintile) of any region in England, as well as 
the highest proportion of people on low incomes (The Poverty Site nd); the very group 
which is least likely to vote (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). As already noted, we do 
not have the necessary data on income equality and poverty to investigate this 
proposition. However, we suggest that, since income is closely related to the type of 
occupation, higher levels of workers in the lowest occupational categories would be 
associated with lower levels of turnout. As will be seen later in this chapter, this is 
indeed the case for England.  
Occupation: In Chapter 5, we saw that, when including all countries in the regression 
analyses, higher GDP was associated with higher turnout; but, among the five countries 
which we have considered in more detail, only in England did we find a similar and 
statistically significant effect (and then, in fact, only for elections to the Lower House). In 
the remaining countries, the Occupation variable was associated with reduced turnout. It 
is, at first sight, difficult to make sense of this in light of previous research which has 
often suggested that people in the higher occupational categories are more likely to 
vote.  
However, people in these categories are often well educated and enjoy high incomes – 
factors which themselves have been shown in studies using individual level data to have 
independent positive effects on turnout. Once the effects of education and income are 
controlled for, there is some evidence to suggest that people in higher status 
occupations are in fact less likely to vote than are those in some other occupational 
categories. It has also been suggested that some lower status occupations may serve to 
provide substitutes for a lack of formal qualifications, thus resulting in higher levels of 
electoral participation than would be suggested by the measure of education alone 
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(Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980:28, 60). But this strikes us as only a partial explanation, 
as it is difficult to see how this mechanism alone could result in those employees being 
even more likely, on average, to vote than those in higher status occupations. We 
suggest two further factors which may result in turnout differences across the various 
occupational categories. 
Firstly, within any particular occupational category, workers may find themselves 
employed in either the private or the public sector; and, as we saw in Chapter 6, there is 
evidence that the proportion of employees in the public sector is significantly associated 
with the level of turnout. It is possible that the differences in the levels of public sector 
employment within our broad occupational category is having an effect; but 
unfortunately we lack the regional level data for public sector employment which would 
be necessary in order to test for this. 
Secondly, different political parties vary in how well they are able to mobilise their 
potential supporters. Although class voting in general has declined in many European 
countries, not least because of the increasingly centrist strategies adopted by the major 
political parties (Evans 1999; Knutsen 2007), the vast majority of people are still able and 
willing to locate both themselves (and the political parties) on a left-right scale of 
political preference (Mair 2007). Further, occupational type continues to be linked to the 
left-right position of political parties, at least in some studies, with manual workers being 
more likely, on average, to identify with parties of the left, and with professionals and 
managers being more likely to identify with parties of the right (Norris 2004). It is 
possible that, for example, left-wing parties may be more successful than right wing 
parties in mobilising their respective potential supporters; and thus, it would be the 
areas with higher concentrations of lower status jobs which would, on average, exhibit 
higher overall turnout. In the second half of this chapter, we investigate this possibility 
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by measuring the effects on turnout of the proportion of workers in the lower 
occupational categories.  
 
In this section, we have examined how each of our variables behaves when we examine 
individual countries, and the individual election types within them. Whereas most of our 
variables had proven to be quite consistent in their effects when we included all 
countries in models which examined different types of elections (see Chapter 5), the 
individual country analyses have uncovered some substantial differences. Indeed, only 
three of our variables can be considered to have consistent effects among all five 
countries and with the findings of the models in Chapter 5: Population Density, 
Unemployment, and the percentage of Young people.  
One further variable, Education, has been shown to have consistent effects for each of 
the individual countries, being associated with higher turnout. This effect is in line with 
previous research, and with our original hypothesis. The results for Education in our 
individual country analyses are interesting when compared to our earlier findings. The 
models in Chapter 5 consistently suggested that Education was associated with 
significantly lower turnout in elections – a finding that flew in the face of most previous 
research in this area (and, indeed, was not explainable when we introduced a term 
which interacted Education with the percentage of Young people). However, when we 
examined the individual countries, we found no evidence of a statistically significant, 
negative effect for Education. Indeed, we find that, within countries, those regions with 
higher levels of degree holders do tend to exhibit higher turnout in elections. That the 
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effects of Education differ in this way suggests that, in the absence of the individual 
country analyses, we could have fallen foul of the ecological fallacy56. 
However, for each of the remaining variables, there is at least one country from our 
group of five where the effects are different to that found in other countries. Thus, 
Migration was found to be associated with higher turnout in England and France; GDP 
was associated with lower turnout in England and Italy; Death Rate was found to be 
associated with higher turnout in France; and Occupation was found to be associated 
with lower turnout in France, Greece, Italy, and Spain.  
In considering the possible reasons for the puzzling effects of some of the variables, we 
have suggested various explanations, some of which lie beyond the reach of our data. 
However, for four variables, we can make use of alternative measures which may shed 
further light on country-to-country differences. These alternative variables will be the 
focus of the following section.  
Alternative Variables 
For the five countries which have been the focus of this chapter, we have regional level 
data which allow us to investigate different aspects of Migration, GDP, Occupation, and 
Education. As the previous section showed, each of these variables was rather 
inconsistent in its effects, either among the five countries, or as compared to the models 
we developed in Chapter 5.  
In this section, these four variables are replaced, respectively, with: External Migration, 
the 10 Year Change in GDP (between 1995 and 2005); the percentage of the workforce 
                                                             
56
 Of course, we have only examined five of our original set of countries in this chapter; so it could be justly 
argued that these countries may differ from those which have not been analysed individually. However, we 
have also run regression models which replicate Models 3A and 3B, but which include only the five countries 
considered in the present chapter. The results of these models also show that Education is statistically 
significant, and associated with lower turnout in elections. 
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employed in Plant and Elementary occupations; and the percentage of the population 
educated to at least the Post-Primary school level. As we saw previously, apart from the 
ambiguous results for Unemployment in French elections, there were no cases where a 
variable was statistically significant for all elections treated together, and then 
contradicted by a significant result in the models for individual election types. So, in 
Table 7.7, we present the results of a single regression model for each country in which 
we include all election types; and for the reasons discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
turnout data for each election event in each country are centred on the mean. 
 
Table 7.7 : Results of Regression Analyses : Individual countries with alternative variables 
 Model ALT1 Model ALT2 Model ALT3 Model ALT4 Model ALT5 
 England France Greece Italy Spain 
      
Population Density (ln) 
-1.663*** 
(.220) 
-.980*** 
(.214) 
-.604 
(.943) 
-1.094** 
(.393) 
-2.141*** 
(.272) 
External Migration % 
.846 
(.580) 
-.125 
(.255) 
-4.402* 
(2.190) 
-1.094*** 
(.198) 
-.788 
(.813) 
GDP 10 Yr Change 
-.035* 
(.015) 
.073* 
(.033) 
-.062 
(.037) 
.107** 
(.040) 
-.055 
(.041) 
Unemployment % 
-.169* 
(.084) 
-.117* 
(.051) 
-.378*** 
(.100) 
-.243*** 
(.069) 
-.048 
(.057) 
Young % 
-.261* 
(.122) 
-.132 
(.122) 
-.855*** 
(.249) 
-2.289*** 
(.433) 
-.848*** 
(.225) 
Death Rate 
-.186 
(.149) 
.641*** 
(.144) 
-2.846*** 
(.3éé) 
-2.072*** 
(.391) 
-1.601*** 
(.244) 
Occupation  
(% Plant & Elementary) 
-.342*** 
(.089) 
-.193** 
(.065) 
.402** 
(.140) 
.488** 
(.159) 
.115 
(.068) 
Education  
(% Post-Primary) 
-.043 
(.088) 
.137* 
(.065) 
.130* 
(.066) 
.078 
(.142) 
-.130** 
(.047) 
      
Constant 
27.991*** 
(8.447) 
4.492 
(6.398) 
44.259*** 
(9.865) 
60.005** 
(19.484) 
51.720*** 
(7.402) 
Adj R-square .486 .361 .354 .530 .375 
N 562 664 263 275 514 
* significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level; *** significant at the .001 level 
 
 
 
We first note that, for the variables which remain unchanged, the results are very similar 
to those reported in the previous section. In England, Population Density and the 
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percentage of Young people are again significant. In addition, Unemployment has now 
attained weak statistical significance while retaining the negative coefficient. For France, 
Population Density and Death Rate are again statistically significant, and as for England, 
Unemployment has become significant and associated with lower turnout. For Greece, 
Unemployment, the percentage of Young people, and the Death Rate remain statistically 
significant. For Italy, Unemployment, the percentage of Young people, and the Death 
Rate remain statistically significant; in addition, Population Density has attained 
statistical significance, whilst retaining its negative coefficient. For Spain, Population 
Density, the percentage of Young people, and the Death Rate are again statistically 
significant; although unemployment, whilst retaining a negative coefficient, has slipped 
into statistical non-significance.  
Thus, although we have changed four of the variables, the effects of the remaining 
variables remain substantively unchanged. On this evidence, the models appear 
reasonably robust, and lend further credence to the findings reported in the previous 
section. 
External Migration 
We now turn to our new variables, beginning with External Migration, where we only 
count new arrivals to a region if they have come from outside of the country in question. 
In England and France, total migration to a region was associated with higher turnout; 
when we consider only external migration, the coefficients become non-significant for 
both countries. That external migration has been found to have a non-significant effect 
in England and France tends to undermine our previous proposition that ‘immigration’ 
could be a political issue which is used to mobilise the electorate; were this the case, we 
would have expected that external migration would have been positive and statistically 
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significant57. This suggests that for these countries, it is the relative level of internal 
migration which is actually associated with higher turnout, and, as discussed in the 
previous section, it may be the different patterns of migration displayed by various 
socio-demographic groups, perhaps combined with registration procedures, which is at 
play in these two countries.  
Change in GDP 
We previously found that the GDP of a region had rather inconsistent effects on turnout, 
being associated with lower turnout in England and Spain, but with higher turnout in 
Greece and Italy. When we substitute GDP with GDP change, we also find inconsistent 
effects. In England, an increase in GDP is associated with lower turnout; and in Italy it is 
associated with higher turnout. In France, GDP was not statistically in any of the models; 
but GDP Change is associated with higher turnout (.05 level). In Greece and Spain, GDP 
Change is not statistically significant. On the evidence presented in this chapter, then, it 
appears that neither GDP, nor the change in GDP can be considered a reliable predictor 
of turnout in elections across our set of five countries. 
Occupation – Plant and Elementary Workers 
In previous chapters, the ‘Occupation’ variable measured the percentage of people in 
the ISCO categories 1 and 2 (that is, legislators, senior officials, and professionals). A 
higher proportion of people within these categories was consistently associated with 
higher turnout in those analyses which included all countries. However, when our 
analyses focused on individual countries, only in England did we find further evidence to 
support this finding. Indeed, in France and Greece there was strong evidence of the 
                                                             
57 We should note that we are unable to disaggregate external migrants in terms of the specific 
countries from which they came; nor whether they come from inside or outside of the European 
Union member-states.   
224 
 
reverse association: that is of higher occupational status being associated with lower 
turnout. Previous research has shown that the levels of manual workers within 
constituencies can be associated with different turnout patterns in different countries; 
and is perhaps due to the different campaign mobilisation strategies used by a country’s 
political parties (Hoffmann-Martinot, Rallings et al. 1996). Here, instead of using a 
measure of people in the very highest occupation categories, we use a variable which 
measures the total numbers in ISCO categories 8 and 9 (Plant, machine operators and 
assemblers; and Elementary occupations, respectively).  
As we can see from Table 7.7, the proportion of Plant and Elementary workers in a 
region is statistically significant in four of our five countries. In England and France, this 
variable is associated with lower turnout. The result for England is in line with that found 
in previous research which found that English constituencies with a higher level of 
manual workers were associated with lower turnout  (Hoffmann-Martinot, Rallings et al. 
1996). However, the authors of that research found that, in France, higher levels of 
manual workers were associated with higher turnout58. In Greece and Italy, though, a 
higher proportion of Plant and Elementary workers is associated with significantly higher 
turnout in elections, which may well be due to parties of the left being more successful 
in mobilising their supporters than are parties of the right.  
Post-Primary Education 
The last variable that we consider in this section is that of Post Primary Education. It will 
be recalled that, in Chapter 5, we were confronted by the apparently puzzling finding 
that a higher proportion of people educated to degree level was associated with lower 
                                                             
58 Hoffmann-Martinot et al. noted that their data for France was from the early 1980s, whereas 
for England it was from the early 1990s, and suggested that, had they used more recent French 
data, they may also have found a negative effect in France; a view supported by the results 
presented herein.  
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turnout in elections. In the previous section of this chapter, we saw that within 
countries, this relationship was reversed, and indeed was in line with most previous 
research.  
However, although we allayed our initial concerns on the contradictory behaviour of this 
variable, we should also note that, in fact, voting is not a particularly demanding activity, 
and only a fairly minimal educational attainment should be required in order for an 
individual to be equipped with the necessary skills. Is there, then, a difference between 
the effects of a high or a low level of education?  
As we can see in Table 7.7, for England and Italy, the coefficients for Post Primary 
education are statistically non-significant – as was the case for both countries when we 
examined the effect of Degree level education on the model which included all types of 
elections. In France and Greece, Post Primary education is associated with higher 
turnout – as was degree level education in both of these countries. Only in Spain do we 
find that the effects of the two measures of education differ: a higher proportion of 
people with Post Primary education is associated with lower turnout; whereas a higher 
proportion of degree holders was associated with higher turnout. However, the effects 
of degree-level education in Spain were greater in the lower-order elections than in 
those for the national legislature, whereas the costs of actually turning up at a polling 
station and casting a vote are effectively the same for any type of election. We consider 
the likely explanation to be that more educated people also have a higher level of 
political interest, and hence are more likely to vote.  
 
In this section, we have investigated the effects of alternative measures of four socio-
demographic variables. The results of the regression analyses showed that the effects of 
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the unchanged variables were generally as before, lending support to our previous 
findings. For External Migration, we found no support for our earlier suggestion that 
higher external migration could be used as a political issue in order to mobilise the 
electorate. Rather, it seems more likely that the association between migration and 
turnout in France and England has to do with the different patterns of internal migration 
for different groups within society. GDP Change was as inconsistent in its effect as was 
the simple measure of GDP. Measures of plant and elementary workers lent support to 
the notion that, at least in the cases of Greece and Italy, political parties differ in the 
success in mobilising their potential supporters. Finally, for four of the countries, our 
alternative measure of education, (the proportion of people being educated to only the 
post-primary level) had effects which were comparable to the results when measuring 
the proportion of degree holders. Only in Spain did we find that the effects differed; 
which, together with the finding that degree level education had a larger, positive, effect 
in lower-order elections, we considered evidence of political interest, rather than of any 
enhanced ability to find the polling station, or of actually casting a ballot.   
Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have taken advantage of the sub-national character of our data, and 
examined how each of the variables behave within five countries. In the first section, we 
saw that four of the variables have consistent effects within and between these 
particular countries: Population Density, Unemployment, Young People, and Education. 
For the other four socio-demographic variables, we have seen that, in each case, there is 
at least one country in which a variable has an effect in the opposite direction to that 
found in Chapter 5.  
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Further, when we considered the effects of Occupation (ISCO categories 1 & 2) and 
Education (ISCED 5 & 6), we saw that in several cases, the results contradicted our earlier 
findings. In passing we noted that, absent our ability to investigate these variables within 
individual countries, it could have been tempting to infer from the initial models that 
Occupation and Education would be associated with higher turnout and lower turnout, 
respectively, in each of the individual countries. As the analyses in the first section of this 
chapter have shown, such an inference would have been fallacious. 
We also saw, when comparing the results of individual election types in each country, 
that the effects of the variables differed, even among the lower-order elections; which 
lent further support to the proposition that not all second-order elections are the same. 
In the second section, we examined different categories of Occupation and Education; in 
both cases shifting from the top categories to the lower categories for each variable. In 
addition, we looked at different aspects of Migration and GDP. We noted that, in most 
models, the unchanged variables retained their significance and direction of effect, 
lending further credence to our findings in the first section. However, none of our four 
new variables displayed consistent effects. As with the previous findings, when the 
results proved contrary to our expectations, we have proposed alternative explanations, 
and these have often been linked to the wider social and political structures in each 
country. Indeed, it would seem that there are often as many differences as there are 
similarities. In the concluding chapter of this thesis, we place these findings in a wider 
context, and consider the implications for past and future comparative research into 
turnout in elections. 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusions 
   
We began this thesis with the aim of investigating how patterns of turnout differ 
between types of elections, and from place to place.  Drawing on official sources for the 
period from 1995 to 2008, we compiled turnout data for 66 elections in ten Western 
European countries: Belgium, England, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. We included instances of sub-national, as well as 
national and supra-national elections. For all of the elections in each country, data were 
aggregated to the same geographical units, enabling a direct comparison of the effects 
on turnout of the selected institutional and socio-demographic variables. 
 
In Chapter 1, we distinguished between the different types of elections in terms of their 
importance, or salience, in the eyes of the electorate. Those elections which result in the 
selection of a national government or president are the most important elections in a 
country, and as such are often termed ‘first-order’ elections. In addition to these first-
order elections, all of the countries in our dataset also hold elections for one or more 
tiers of sub-national government, as well as elections to the European Parliament. These 
other types of elections have often been grouped together in the ‘second-order’ 
category. However, we suggested that elections to the EP often appear to be even less 
important than other second order elections, and should thus be considered as ‘third 
order’ elections. Because most comparative research into second-order elections has 
actually concerned itself with EP elections, we know relatively little about the effects of 
various determinants of voting on, say, municipal elections. One of our aims, then, was 
to contribute to our understanding of the differences in turnout by incorporating more 
types of elections than has been the case with previous comparative studies.  
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We also noted in Chapter 1 that almost all comparative research into turnout which used 
aggregate data had been done using country-level data. Such research has suggested a 
number of institutional and socio-demographic variables as being associated with 
differences in turnout. However, the obvious limitation of using country-level data is that 
it is not possible to investigate whether the variables have the same associations with 
turnout within countries. Indeed, according to Franklin (2004), there are reasons to 
expect that variables will have different associations with turnout in different countries, 
because these associations are themselves conditioned by different historical levels of 
turnout. Our second aim, then, was to go further than most previous comparative 
research which has used aggregate data, by using data aggregated to the regional level 
within countries.  
 
In Chapter 2 we considered in detail the literature pertaining to voting in elections, and 
saw that, as suggested by rational choice theory, people take into account the costs and 
benefits involved when deciding whether or not to vote. This was particularly the case 
with the institutional variables related to characteristics of the election, such as 
compulsory voting. Further, people do appear to vote in greater numbers when there is 
more at stake in the election: more people vote in a national election for the parliament 
or president than, for example, in a sub-national election to choose municipal 
councillors, or in a supranational election for members of the European Parliament.  
 
However, we also saw that the rational choice approach to voting appears to offer but a 
partial explanation – not least because, in imagining voters as taking into account the 
fact that the chances of their vote making a difference to the outcome of an election are 
often vanishingly small, the rational response would be to not bother. Clearly though, 
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people do vote, and various attempts have been made to address this paradox, for 
example by invoking notions of citizen duty, which itself appears to rest on the process 
of socialisation, whereby individuals acquire various attitudes and beliefs regarding the 
political system, and their expected participation within it. Although aspects of 
socialisation theory are disputed, previous research has shown that different groups 
within society do tend to exhibit different levels of turnout in a given election. Drawing 
on the relevant literature, we identified a number of individual- and aggregate-level 
socio-demographic characteristics which have been suggested as being associated with 
different levels of turnout. 
  
In Chapter 3, we considered each of the countries in more detail and placed the 
contemporary characteristics of their territorial governments in historical context. 
Although all of the countries in our study have been subject to similar international and 
European influences, their responses have differed. For instance: some countries have 
introduced or strengthened a regional tier of government; whereas in others this level 
remains weak, or non-existent. Further, these levels of government differ - within and 
between countries - not just in terms of, for example, the number of people they 
employ, or the powers they enjoy in raising taxes, but also in terms of the institutional 
variables we identified in Chapter 2.  
  
In Chapter 4, we described the construction of an original dataset in which we matched 
official election turnout figures and details of the electoral systems to the same 
geographical units used for the socio-demographic data. We were able to include not 
only national, first-order elections, and third-order elections to the European Parliament, 
but for every country in our dataset, at least one type of second-order, sub-national 
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election. This would enable us to examine the associations between turnout and the 
explanatory variables in first-, second-, and third-order elections. Data were aggregated 
to the same NUTS units for every set of election results within a country, thus allowing 
us to examine how the same set of explanatory variables, measured in the same way, 
behaved across different election types. In addition, because the geographical units 
were below the country-level, we would be able to go further than most previous 
comparative research which had used aggregate data, and see whether the associations 
between turnout and the socio-demographic variables remained the same when we 
examined different elections within individual countries. 
 
Main Findings 
Institutional Variables 
In Chapter 5, we presented results for the institutional variables using both country level 
and regional level data, and found the results to be broadly comparable. We included all 
types of elections in the analysis, and considered four variables related to the electoral 
‘rules of the game’. Three of these - compulsory voting, weekend voting, and the holding 
of simultaneous elections - can be viewed from the rational choice perspective as 
affecting the costs of voting. We also considered the use of proportional representation, 
which can be seen as affecting the benefits of voting. The findings for each of these 
variables were broadly in line with previous research.  
 
In addition, we included a salience variable to take account of the differing importance 
of first, second-, and third-order elections. Our expectation, also informed by rational 
choice theory, was that the potential benefits to the voter were greater in higher order 
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elections and that turnout would be higher. The results were also in line with 
expectations. Thus, our preliminary analyses confirmed that the institutional variables 
have substantial and statistically significant effects on turnout. It is noteworthy that 
these five variables were able to explain around seventy per cent of the variance in 
those models which included all types of elections in all countries.   
 
In subsequent analyses, where we examined EP, Municipal, and Lower House elections 
in turn, we found that the effects of the institutional variables are systematically reduced 
with increasing order of election. Thus, compulsory voting, weekend voting, and the 
holding of simultaneous elections had much larger effects on turnout in third-order (EP) 
elections than on first-order (Lower House) elections (and see Mattila 2003). However, 
we also found that the effects of these institutional factors were larger for EP elections 
than for Municipal elections. This finding supports the idea that EP elections deserve the 
third-order label, and are different in important ways from second-order elections. This 
has important implications for comparative research into electoral turnout, which has, as 
noted in the introduction, often focused on comparisons of national and European 
Parliament elections. Such research has identified important differences in the effects of 
institutional variables on turnout in these two types of elections; but, it was only by also 
including municipal elections in our dataset that we able to show that these effects vary 
systematically with the order of the election.  
 
In general, the results of analyses which included the institutional variables lend support 
to the rational choice perspective on voting, and the interpretation of these variables as 
affecting the costs and benefits of voting. However, there is a caveat: we also recall from 
Chapter 5 that the weak form of compulsory voting in Greece and Italy appeared to have 
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substantial effects (around ten per cent higher turnout), even when the legal compulsion 
to vote had been rescinded. Jackman and Miller had reported that voters react to such 
changes in the electoral rules in ‘remarkably short order’ (1995:484); but the evidence 
here is that the rules in place prior to such changes being made can continue to have 
vestigial effects. Because the elections in our dataset have been drawn from a relatively 
short time-frame, we cannot predict how long such effects may last (nor, indeed, have 
we investigated the possible relevance of how long a country has held democratic 
elections); but at face value this finding would seem to support Franklin’s (2004) notion 
that there is a substantial habitual component to voting in elections.  
 
Socio-demographic variables 
Our findings for the socio-demographic variables present a much more complex picture 
than was the case with the institutional variables. In Chapter 5, the addition of eight 
socio-demographic variables to the institutional variables led to an increase in the 
amount of variance explained, but this increase was rather modest, at just over four per 
cent. In fact, this is very similar to the results from Franklin (1996), who reported that, 
when included with a number of institutional variables, individual level characteristics 
only explained about five per cent of the total variance.  In the preliminary model, which 
included all election types, all of the core set of socio-demographic variables were highly 
significant; and, with the exception of education, behaved as hypothesised. However, 
with the socio-demographic variables, it seemed that the closer we looked, the more 
differences appeared.  
 
When we considered EP, Municipal, and Lower House elections separately, most of the 
socio-demographic variables (Population density, GDP, Unemployment, Young, Death 
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rate, Occupation, and Education) maintained the same sign on the coefficient across all 
three election types, but the sizes of the coefficients, and the levels of statistical 
significance, did differ. Further, and in contrast to the effects of the institutional 
variables, the coefficients did not vary in a systematic way with the salience of the 
election. Some variables maintained the same sign, and their coefficients increased in 
size with the order of election (Young, Education), but other variables had larger 
coefficients in EP elections (GDP, Unemployment) or in Municipal elections (Population 
Density). Further, the direction of effect of one variable - Migration – changed from one 
election type to another. That the effects of the socio-demographic variables do not vary 
systematically with the salience of the election type means that we cannot assume that 
findings based on one (or two) types of election will necessary be valid for other types of 
elections. We have previously noted that municipal elections have seldom been the 
focus of systematic comparative research into the factors which affect turnout; our 
findings suggest that, notwithstanding the difficulties in gathering suitable data, 
municipal (and other sub-national) elections should be included along with national and 
supranational elections when studying the effects of socio-demographic variables on 
turnout. 
 
In Chapter 6, we saw that the core socio-demographic and institutional variables were 
not predicting turnout equally well in all countries. We took the opportunity to examine 
a number of country-level variables which could be expected to affect turnout; either 
because of increased mobilising effects on the electorate, or by increasing what was at 
stake in the election. The results of these investigations were rather mixed. Party 
coverage, trade union membership, and the level of public employment each had the 
expected, positive effect on turnout, at least in Lower House elections. The proportion of 
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all taxes represented by local taxes was associated with higher turnout in municipal 
elections, as was the degree of local autonomy in setting those taxes. Both of these 
results provide further evidence that, as according to Rational Choice Theory, people do 
respond to ‘what is at stake’ when deciding whether or not to vote. 
 
Different types of elections 
As we have noted, the salience variable highlighted the substantial differences in the 
effects of the institutional variables on the different types of elections; with the effects 
being systematically reduced as the salience of the election increased.  Although no such 
systematic trend with the salience of election was seen with the core socio-demographic 
variables, we can draw several pieces of evidence together to support the idea that EP 
elections often appear quite different, not just to national, first-order elections, but also 
when compared to second-order, subnational elections. Aside from the lower turnout, 
often substantially so, that the EP elections tend to attract, there appear to be 
differences in how various groups of the electorate respond to the opportunity of voting 
in EP elections. It will be recalled from Chapter 6 that Party Coverage, Trade Union 
membership, and Public employment each had positive effects on turnout in both 
Municipal and Lower House elections. However, for elections to the EP, each of these 
variables had a negative, and statistically significant, effect. 
  
We think it likely that at least some of these differences are due to the low interest such 
elections hold, not just for voters, but also for political parties, other voluntary 
associations, and the media, each of which has the potential to mobilise sections of the 
electorate.  We should note though, that what we see for EP elections is not simply the 
absence of a relationship, but that increases in each of the variables is actually 
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associated with a decrease in turnout for EP elections. This implies that some voters do 
respond to mobilising factors for municipal and LH elections, but are, when these 
mobilising factors are weaker (or absent), actually less likely to vote than the average 
voter. Although at first blush this may seem a little odd, it actually does make sense – 
there would be little reason to invest time and effort into encouraging people to vote if 
they were already likely to do so.  
 
We also saw in Chapter 6 that those areas with a high ‘regionality’ score tended to 
display significantly higher turnout in regional elections. This suggests that one or more 
regional-level factors related to the formal degree of autonomy, or the strength of 
political institutions, economic independence, or identity, is having a positive effect on 
turnout in regional elections. Two further observations are of interest: firstly, that those 
same regions tend to record significantly lower turnout in Lower House elections, 
implying that, whilst this may not be a strictly zero-sum game, the increased salience of 
elections associated with a particular level of government is not necessarily without cost 
to other levels of government within a country.  Secondly, those regions tending to show 
higher turnout in regional elections also display higher turnout in EP elections. Indeed, of 
the variables in Chapter 6 which we investigated across different types of elections, the 
measure of regionality was the only one to have had a significant and positive effect on 
turnout for EP elections. As we noted in Chapter 3, the EU has itself sought to promote a 
Europe of the Regions, and an associated strengthening of the role of the regional level 
of government. It is possible that this has led to an increased profile for the EP elections 
in those same regions.  
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We also saw in Chapter 7 that, in some countries, the socio-demographic factors are of 
limited use in distinguishing between regions of high and low turnout for EP elections. 
Thus, for both England and Italy, only one of the socio-demographic variables attained 
significance for EP elections. On the other hand, in France and Spain, at least five 
variables were statistically significant for EP elections. This lack of consistency in the 
effects of these variables was also apparent when we examined other types of elections. 
Clearly, then, even within a single election type, there are country-to-country differences 
in the relationships that the socio-demographic variables have with turnout.  
 
This would seem to provide at least circumstantial support for Franklin’s suggestion that 
the relationships between turnout and the explanatory variables will differ from country 
to country, depending on the historical patterns of turnout in each. Franklin’s study 
considered national (first-order) elections. How are we to relate his findings to other 
types of elections? Given the differences in turnout, and the differing effects of our 
independent socio- demographic variables, it does not seem that people learn the habit 
of voting (or of not voting) in their first election experience, and then behave 
consistently according to this habit for all types of elections. Indeed, as we saw in 
Chapter 8, in Greece and Italy, although the levels of turnout are similar across different 
types of elections, the results of our regression analyses suggested that different 
sections of the electorate participated in each type of election. Clearly, the extent to 
which voting is habitual, and how this relates to lower-order elections is a topic which 
requires further study. 
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Different countries 
In Chapter 7, we investigated the effects of the independent variables in five individual 
countries: England, France, Greece, Italy, and Spain. For four of these variables - 
Population Density, Unemployment, Young, and Education - the results were reasonably 
consistent across all five countries, and in line with expectations. Interestingly, then, for 
these four variables, there were no obvious differences between countries with longer 
(England, France, Italy) or shorter (Greece, Spain) unbroken runs of democratic elections 
– turnout in the latter being expected by Franklin to be subject to more random factors, 
which may reflect the country’s idiosyncratic history (Franklin 2004:199). To be sure, the 
results for the other socio-demographic variables – Migration, GDP, Death Rate, and 
Occupation - were less consistent, but no more so than among those countries which 
have had longer continuous histories of democratic elections.  
 
In our attempts to explain the inconsistencies, we considered both the suitability of the 
measures we had used, and the wider social and political factors which may be at play. 
Thus, when considering why the level of migration to a region may exhibit a positive 
effect in England and France, we considered the possibility that ‘immigration’, as well as 
measuring the amount of new arrivals in a region, may also be a political issue in its own 
right: thus having the potential to be used by political parties to mobilise support, and 
serving to increase turnout.  
 
However, reference to opinion polls in which respondents were asked to rank the 
importance of immigration among other issues of concern offered but patchy evidence 
to support this idea – and when we examined the effects of external migration (in the 
second part of Chapter 7), the results were no less ambiguous. A more promising 
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explanation hinged on the characteristics of the migrants themselves; and rather than 
being a homogenous group, we saw that, in England at least, single, young migrants 
(with a below average propensity to vote) tend to move towards the larger population 
centres – travelling in the opposite direction to older, more affluent migrants (who are 
more likely to vote).  
 
We also saw that, in England and France, although levels of voter registration are high 
(above 90 per cent) when measured nationally, substantial regional variation exists in 
both countries. Further, substantial numbers of people who are actually registered may, 
in fact, spend all or most of their time at a different address. Thus, their below average 
propensity to vote may be reflected in a different part of the country to that where they 
are registered (and where their socio-demographic characteristics are captured in official 
statistics). Whatever the explanation for the otherwise contradictory effects of 
migration, it would seem that there are difficulties in using ‘migration’ as a simple 
measure of population instability.  
 
Likewise, when we sought reasons for the contradictory results for GDP in England and 
Spain, we considered the limitations of the regional GDP measure, and speculated that 
the apparent negative association between GDP and turnout may be linked to other 
socio-demographic factors that are not discernible with our existing data. In particular, 
we noted that regional level GDP figures do not provide us with the opportunity to 
explore the effects on turnout of income inequality within regions.  As with the 
migration measure discussed above, it is possible that the use of alternative and 
additional measures related to the regional economic performance and the distribution 
of wealth would lead to a better understanding of the effects of such factors on turnout. 
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This need to seek explanations beyond our existing data was even more marked when 
we considered the inconsistent associations between turnout and the occupational 
categories. We suggested that the partisan attachments that voters have for particular 
political parties, and the degree to which parties may be able to (or, indeed, make the 
effort to) mobilise their potential supporters to actually cast a vote, may vary between 
parties, elections, and countries.  
 
More generally, the politicisation of voters appears to have declined in some countries, 
at least in part because of changes in the workplace. Processes of de-industrialisation, 
increases in the number of those in non-permanent, or part-time work, or those 
employed in small and medium enterprises, have reduced the opportunities for the 
workplace to play an important role in the socialisation and politicisation of large 
sections of the electorate, and, more specifically, have contributed to a reduction in the 
influence of trade unions (Braconnier and Dormagen 2007). Indeed, such changes in 
France may well be a contributing factor to the significant and negative association 
between turnout and the proportion of plant and elementary workers in the population 
that we found in Chapter 7 – and could explain why other researchers, using earlier data 
for France, found a positive association between turnout and the proportion of manual 
workers (Hoffmann-Martinot, Rallings et al. 1996). Clearly, given the relatively short time 
period from which we have drawn our turnout data, and the particular set of variables 
which we have selected, the explanations we have proposed to account for the 
differences between countries remain speculative.  
 
We can be rather more confident, though, in the main findings of our research. The 
effects on turnout of the institutional variables decrease systematically as the salience of 
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the election increases. This is the case even when we compare elections for the 
European Parliament to the second-order elections for sub-national governments. 
Although there appears to be no systematic relationship between the salience of the 
election and the effects of the socio-demographic variables, a number of these variables 
were found to have the opposite effect on turnout in EP elections than is the case for 
municipal or lower house elections. On this evidence, then, investigations into the 
determinants of voting in second-order elections should not rely on data relating to 
elections for the European Parliament.  
 
We have also shown that, although the findings concerning the effects of the socio-
demographic determinants of voting may appear robust when a number of countries are 
included in the analysis, inconsistencies appear when we shift the focus to individual 
countries. Thus, for four of these variables, there is at least one country where the effect 
on turnout is the opposite to that found elsewhere; and, indeed, to that which previous 
comparative research had led us to expect. This has important implications for past and 
future research into turnout in elections, and especially to that which aims to investigate 
the role of socio-demographic characteristics in explaining patterns of electoral 
participation. The lack of consensus on the influence that such characteristics have on 
turnout may well have something to do with the variety of approaches that previous 
researchers have used. But, as we have shown, it may also be because their effects do 
actually differ from country to country. As Blais (2000: 25) noted, continental differences 
in aspects of political culture may be responsible for the differing levels of turnout seen 
in multinational studies. However, it strikes us that countries within a single continent 
can also differ markedly from their neighbours on measures of political culture, which 
may in part explain the differing levels of turnout.  
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We have certainly uncovered important country-to-country and election-to-election 
differences in the effects of the institutional and socio-demographic determinants of 
voting. This has been possible because we sought to improve on previous comparative 
research in two ways: Firstly, we included instances of first-, second-, and third-order 
elections in the investigation. Secondly, we constructed a dataset based on sub-national 
geographical units. Although the results would appear to justify both of these 
innovations, our approach has taken us only so far. Important limitations remain; these, 
and suggestions for further research, are discussed in the following section. 
 
Methodological limitations and further research  
We noted in the previous section that a long-term decline in the socialising and 
politicising effects of the workplace may account, at least partially, for changes in the 
levels of turnout. Clearly, an investigation of such long-term changes in turnout is 
beyond the reach of our data, drawn from little more than a single decade. Further, we 
have focused only on turnout; not on the performance of individual political parties. It 
would be possible, drawing on the same sources we have used for our own investigation, 
to gather data for the vote share of individual parties for each election. This would 
enable consideration of two factors identified by previous research, which are both 
related to the party system: the number of political parties, and the closeness of the 
election.  
 
Despite the attention these factors have received, their effects on turnout are not 
entirely clear (Blais 2007): perhaps due, for the former, to an attendant increase in 
information costs as the voter is confronted by a greater number of parties from which 
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to choose, or the increased tendency for the outcome of an election in a multi-party 
system to be the formation of coalition government, the negotiations for which are at 
one remove from the expressed preferences of the electorate (Jackman 1987;  though, 
see Brockington 2009). Further, the number of parties is itself related, as famously 
shown by Duverger, to the type of electoral system – a factor which we have already 
taken into account. However, it would certainly be of interest to test such a variable by 
incorporating it into the models we have presented.  
 
Although the evidence is stronger that people are more likely to vote in a closely fought 
election because their vote is more likely to make a difference, the effect is often only 
marginal (Blais 2007). Further, we should note that the bulk of research into effects of 
election closeness on turnout has been conducted on first-order elections; and even 
then it is open to some debate as to whether it is the closeness of the contest at the 
national, or at the constituency level which should be taken into account. Indeed, 
political parties in UK parliamentary elections often concentrate their campaign 
resources on ‘marginal constituencies’ - defined in terms of the small difference in vote 
shares obtained by the first and second placed candidate. Such constituencies can be 
critical in a competition for power which rests on achieving a majority of seats, and 
highlights the importance of closely fought local contests in a plurality system. Under a 
PR system, with multiple seats at stake, a measure of closeness based on winning 
margins is perhaps less applicable and rather more complex calculations have been 
proposed (Blais and Lago 2009). This represents a difficulty when comparing countries 
using different electoral systems, as at least two different methods of measuring 
closeness would be necessary. When also including different types of elections, the 
picture becomes potentially more complex, as the number of arenas for which closeness 
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can be calculated also increases. Such concerns, though, are not insurmountable, and, 
indeed, testing propositions about closeness across a wider range of election types may 
well add to our understanding of how, and when, closeness matters.  
 
However, we should note that for both multi-partyism and the closeness of the electoral 
contest, information would unavoidably be lost when data are aggregated to the sub-
national units we have used. Although this loss is not as great as when aggregating to the 
national level, it is still potentially problematic – and especially so when we consider 
municipal elections. The geographical area at stake in municipal elections is smaller, 
often markedly so, than the NUTS units we have used in the present study. Thus, 
particular municipalities may have very large or very small numbers of parties; and the 
result may have been a landslide or decided by only a handful of votes. Such extreme 
cases would be averaged-out when aggregated along with the neighbouring 
municipalities in the NUTS unit. 
 
Of course, such concerns over the loss of information when data are aggregated also 
apply to those very variables that we have been able to include; a limitation which brings 
us to a consideration of how generalisable our results may be. Although we have been 
able to use sub-national geographical units, these units are quite large and the aggregate 
values for each variable may still hide substantial, local variation. It is possible, then, that 
further differences in the effects of these variables would emerge, were we to consider 
yet smaller geographical units. We leave such an investigation to future researchers, to 
whom suitable data may become available. 
  
245 
 
In our own research, we have employed an explicitly comparative approach, and have 
studied different countries and different types of elections. In classifying various types of 
elections as first-, second-, or third-order, we have assumed that, not only is each class 
different to the others, but that within each class there is a certain degree of ‘sameness’. 
However, Sartori (1991) has indicated a number of potential problems with systems of 
classification, and we need to consider a possible shortcoming of our present approach: 
do we have too many categories, or, indeed, too few? 
 
We have justified our choice of three categories, both in terms of previous research and 
in terms of our own results. Elections to the European Parliament have long been seen 
as qualitatively and quantitatively different to national first-order elections. However, 
although other scholars have suggested that EP elections may be less salient that other 
second-order elections (such as municipal elections), we believe the results presented 
herein are the first to show a systematic decrease in the effects of institutional variables 
as we move from third- to second- to first order elections. This, then, is evidence of the 
quantitative difference between elections in these three categories. But, we have also 
seen evidence (in terms of the different associations between turnout and some 
variables) of qualitative differences.  
 
Have we, then, fallen foul of what Sartori terms ‘misclassification’, whereby we have 
wrongly collapsed municipal elections, lower-intermediate elections, and upper-
intermediate elections into the single category of second-order elections? We consider 
this a serious enough possibility to suggest that future researchers pay more attention to 
elections within this second-order category. As noted in the introductory chapter, few 
studies have considered these second-order elections in a comparative setting, and, 
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although we consider our own research has contributed to a better understanding of 
their nature (both when treated as a class, and, in Chapter 8, when examined 
individually), we do not consider these findings to be other than preliminary. Further, it 
is quite possible that subsequent investigations, using a larger dataset, would support 
the idea that the second-order category is itself too broad, and that a fourth-, or even 
fifth-order category may be justified.  
 
On the other hand, by introducing the third-order category, we are perhaps already 
guilty of what Sartori termed ‘degreeism’, whereby we have assumed that all of the 
election types that we have included in our analysis differ only by degrees (that is, 
quantitatively), rather than in kind (that is, qualitatively). Were this the case, the 
inclusion of first-, second- and third-order elections in the same regression model would 
clearly be erroneous.   
 
This, too, we consider a possibility which cannot be discounted. Our categories are based 
on the hierarchical and geographical relationships of different types of elections – but is 
it correct to assume that elections higher in this hierarchy are inherently more salient 
than those lower down? As we saw in Chapter 6, a composite measure of regionality was 
shown to be associated with higher turnout in regional (upper-intermediate) elections, 
but with lower turnout in lower house elections. It is possible, then, that to some voters 
– perhaps those who view the regional government as more powerful than the national 
government, or who have strong feelings of regional identity – elections for the regional 
government hold more importance than those for the national government.  
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We have insufficient data to be able to pursue this line of investigation, but regional 
elections, which have seldom been the subject of research into electoral participation, 
are clearly worthy of further study. Such research would also reveal whether regional 
elections in different countries (such as Belgium, France, Italy and Spain) are comparable 
enough to be included in the same category. 
 
 
The results of our own analyses have shown that, although the results obtained when 
including all countries in the analysis are both statistically significant and in line with the 
hypothesised effects, even across three different types of elections (Chapter 5), the 
associations between turnout and some of these variables actually differ from country to 
country (Chapter 7). This point deserves to be stressed: we would have been wrong to 
have assumed that the results of our early analyses applied even to those countries that 
we had included in our own analysis. Understandably, then, we are reluctant to make 
claims as to the effects that the socio-demographic variables may have in other 
countries - particularly so for those variables relating to migration, GDP, death rate, or 
occupational class.  
 
Further, in trying to understand the reasons for the country-to-country differences that 
we have uncovered, we have sometimes made reference to wider social or political 
factors – such as the politicising effects of the workplace, or to the levels of welfare 
assistance provided by the state. Clearly, these and other factors are subject to change, 
and it would be useful to test these propositions by drawing data from a longer time-
period than has been possible here. 
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The results presented herein, although confirming a number of hypotheses, have also 
raised a number of questions. These questions arise because we have been able to 
consider variations in turnout within countries, and across different types of elections. 
This has been possible because of the nature of the dataset we used for our 
investigation. We chose to invest the time necessary in order to gather data for sub-
national units and for different types of elections.   
 
Our approach, then, has been rather different from most previous comparative studies 
of electoral turnout that used aggregate data: as we saw in Chapter 2, in such studies, 
‘aggregate’ has often been synonymous with ‘country-level’. Further, as the number of 
democracies has increased, so too has breadth of multi-national studies which analysts 
have conducted in their efforts to uncover regularities and patterns in human behaviour.  
 
This search for regularities is reasonable enough, but what we have shown is that the 
relationships between turnout and the explanatory variables that are detected when 
analysing a set of countries do not necessarily apply to each of the individual countries. 
Indeed, in some instances, the direction of effect may differ. This is obviously 
problematic, not only for psephologists, but also to policy-makers who wish to better 
understand the reasons for variations in turnout in order that electoral participation and 
democratic legitimacy may be enhanced. 
 
By using the same dataset to examine countries both collectively and individually, we 
have seen that there are, indeed, several country-to-country similarities, but we have 
also uncovered some important differences. Further, we have shown that the factors 
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which may affect turnout in one type of election do not necessarily apply to other types 
of elections. In particular, elections to the European Parliament are qualitatively and 
quantitatively different to municipal elections; thus justifying the ‘third-order’ 
classification. Much previous research has considered both EP and municipal elections as 
being ‘second-order’; with the former receiving much more attention in comparative 
studies of turnout. In part, the lack of comparative research into municipal elections 
(and indeed, into other sub-national elections) has likely been due to the difficulties in 
obtaining suitable data. Similarly, a lack of data for sub-national units has meant that 
much comparative research using aggregate data into turnout has been limited to the 
national level.   
 
We have shown that the difficulties in obtaining appropriate data are not 
insurmountable. Indeed, with the recent advent of the European Electoral Database, 
national (first-order) and European Parliament (third-order) turnout data, complied 
according to the NUTS classification, are now readily available. Obtaining data for 
second-order (municipal, lower intermediate, and upper intermediate) elections is a 
little more involved. However, increasingly, countries are making such data available, 
and often these data are also compiled according to the NUTS classification. There would 
seem little reason, then, for researchers to continue to ignore these types of elections. 
 
We hope that, by compiling an original dataset to investigate how turnout varies 
between different types of elections, and how it varies from place to place, we have 
made a useful contribution to research into electoral participation – not least by 
identifying the differences, as well as the similarities, that exist.  
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Data Sources 
Country Election Turnout Data 
  
Belgium Belgische verkiezingsuitslagen 
http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/result/nl/main.html 
England LGC Elections Centre University of Plymouth and  
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/b/britain/ 
Finland Tilastokeskus - Statistics Finland 
http://www.stat.fi/til/vaa.html 
France Ministère de l’Intérieur 
http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a_votre_service/elections/resultats 
Greece Ministry of the Interior 
http://www.ypes.gr 
Ireland Elections Ireland 
http://www.electionsireland.org/ 
Italy Ministero dell’Interno 
http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php 
Netherlands Nederlandse verkiezingsuitslagen 
http://www.nlverkiezingen.com/index.html 
Spain Ministerio del Interior 
http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/ 
Sweden Statistiska Centralbyrån 
http://www.scb.se/Pages/SubjectArea____12262.aspx 
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National and sub-national governments - All countries  
 Inter-parliamentary Union database: http://www.ipu.org/english/home.htm 
 Council of Europe series: ‘Structure and operation of local and 
regional democracy’ (Spain CoE 1997; Belgium CoE 1998a; France CoE 
1998b; Ireland CoE 1998c; UK CoE 2000b; Italy CoE 2000a; Greece CoE 
2001; Sweden CoE 2007; Netherlands CoE 2008; Finland CoE 2009) 
 
Socio-demographic data: main Eurostat data files consulted:  
 Population demo_r_r3dens 
 Population Change demo_r_pjanaggr3  
 Percentage of young people demo_r_pjanaggr3 
 Death Rate reg_hlth_cdeath series 
 Immigration cens_ramigr  
 GDP nama_r_e3gdp  
 Unemployment lfst_r_lfu3rt  
 Occupation Eurostat cens_reisco  
 Educational Eurostat cens_reisco  
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NUTS Regions 
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Election Turnout and Regional Variations by Country and Election Type 
   National Regional Regional Regional Regional Regions 
Country Election 
Type 
Year Turnout 
% 
Minimum Maximum Range Mean No of 
         
Belgium EP 1999 91.1 86.6 94.4 7.9 91.3 11 
Belgium EP 2004 90.8 86.5 94.3 7.7 90.9 11 
Belgium Municipal 2000 91.3 82.9 95.3 12.4 91.4 11 
Belgium Provincial 2000 92.1 89.5 95.3 5.8 92.2 10 
Belgium Regional 1999 90.7 82.5 93.9 11.4 90.7 11 
Belgium LH 2003 91.6 87.5 94.8 7.3 91.7 11 
Belgium UH 2003 91.6 88.1 94.9 6.8 91.9 11 
         
England EP 1999 23.1 12.3 31.3 19.0 22.4 81 
England EP 2004 37.6 27.4 48.2 20.8 38.5 81 
England Municipal
1
 1998 32.0 18.5 45.5 27.0 32.2 77 
England Municipal
1
 2008 37.0 25.9 36.8 19.3 37.0 80 
England LH 1997 71.2 58.3 82.4 24.1 71.6 81 
England LH 2001 59.0 43.2 68.1 28.9 59.2 81 
England LH 2005 61.3 46.7 71.0 24.3 61.1 81 
         
Finland EP 2004 39.4 31.9 44.5 12.6 36.9 13 
Finland Municipal 2004 58.3 55.0 65.3 10.3 58.4 13 
Finland LH 2003 68.1 64.6 72.5 7.8 67.2 13 
Finland Presidential 2000 76.9 73.4 79.1 5.7 76.3 13 
         
France EP 2004 42.8 27.6 51.7 24.2 43.7 95 
France Municipal 2001 57.3 51.9 77.9 25.9 62.2 95 
France Cantonal 2001 56.1 50.2 82.3 32.1 68.4 95 
France Regional 2004 58.0 53.7 73.7 20.0 63.3 95 
France LH 2007 59.3 51.7 70.4 18.8 61.9 95 
France Presidential 2007 83.8 75.4 89.0 13.6 85.3 95 
         
Greece EP 1999 70.3 45.4 79.0 33.6 67.7 39 
Greece EP 2004 63.4 46.2 75.3 29.1 62.6 39 
Greece Municipal 1998 70.6 45.2 82.2 37.0 71.3 34 
Greece Municipal 2002 70.6 50.8 92.0 41.2 72.4 34 
Greece LH 2000 75.0 53.7 80.0 26.3 72.5 39 
Greece LH 2004 75.6 49.8 82.9 33.1 72.8 39 
Greece LH 2007 74.1 51.5 82.5 31.0 73.0 39 
         
Ireland EP
2
 1999 50.2 NA NA NA NA - 
Ireland EP
2
 2004 59.0 NA NA NA NA - 
Ireland Municipal 1999 48.0 35.5 59.1 23.6 52.3 8 
Ireland Municipal 2004 55.8 51.5 62.2 10.7 58.7 8 
Ireland LH 1997 65.9 61.3 70.7 9.4 67.1 8 
Ireland LH 2002 62.6 56.9 72.8 16.0 64.9 8 
         
Italy EP 2004 71.7 57.8 83.8 26.0 73.9 98 
Italy Regional 2005 71.8 57.9 79.9 22.0 71.1 80 
Italy LH 2006 83.6 68.7 90.6 21.9 84.0 97 
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   National Regional Regional Regional Regional Regions 
Country Election 
Type 
Year Turnout 
% 
Minimum Maximum Range Mean No of 
         
Netherlands EP 1999 30.2 27.2 33.9 6.8 31.1 12 
Netherlands EP 2004 39.3 35.1 43.5 8.4 40.1 12 
Netherlands Municipal 2006 58.0 53.9 63.2 9.3 59.6 12 
Netherlands Provincial 1999 45.6 41.6 54.1 12.5 47.5 12 
Netherlands Provincial 2003 47.6 41.8 57.8 16.1 49.7 12 
Netherlands LH 1998 73.4 68.3 78.3 9.9 74.2 12 
Netherlands LH 2002 79.1 73.7 82.4 8.7 79.4 12 
Netherlands LH 2003 80.0 75.3 83.7 8.3 80.7 12 
Netherlands LH 2006 80.4 77.9 83.1 5.2 80.9 12 
         
Spain EP 1999 63.1 52.6 80.9 28.3 66.3 48 
Spain EP 2004 45.1 32.4 57.9 25.5 47.3 48 
Spain Municipal 1995 69.9 61.7 82.2 20.4 71.9 42 
Spain Municipal 1999 64.0 53.3 81.3 28.0 67.4 48 
Spain Municipal 2003 67.7 59.5 81.3 21.7 70.4 48 
Spain Municipal 2007 63.3 51.3 79.2 28.0 67.1 47 
Spain LH 1996 77.4 69.6 84.2 14.6 77.9 47 
Spain LH 2000 68.7 55.9 78.7 22.8 70.2 47 
Spain LH 2004 75.7 68.0 81.5 13.4 76.3 48 
Spain LH 2008 64.6 57.4 81.5 24.1 74.7 48 
Spain UH 2004 75.8 58.8 83.0 24.2 75.0 43 
         
Sweden EP 1999 38.8 32.9 41.8 8.9 37.3 19 
Sweden EP 2004 38.2 32.5 41.7 9.3 36.6 19 
Sweden Municipal 1998 78.6 77.3 80.9 3.6 79.2 19 
Sweden Municipal 2002 77.9 76.0 81.1 5.1 78.3 19 
Sweden Municipal 2006 79.4 77.3 81.5 4.2 79.6 19 
Sweden County 1998 78.1 76.9 80.5 3.6 78.8 18 
Sweden County 2002 77.5 75.8 80.7 4.9 77.9 18 
Sweden County 2006 78.8 76.7 81.1 4.4 79.1 18 
Sweden LH 1998 81.4 77.3 83.7 6.4 81.4 19 
Sweden LH 2002 80.1 77.6 82.3 4.7 80.2 19 
Sweden LH 2006 82.0 79.3 83.6 4.3 82.0 19 
         
 
Notes: EP = European Parliament; LH = Lower House; UH = Upper House 
1: Results for English municipal elections averaged over three years; see text. 
2: Irish EP constituencies do not correspond to NUTS standardisation.
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Socio-demographic descriptive statistics 
Belgium (11 regions) Mean Minimum Maximum Range Country  
Population density 846 55.8 5974.3 5918.5 338 
Ln Population density  4.02 8.70 4.67 5.82 
Population percentage change 
in ten years 
5.1 1.1 9.2 8.1 4.4 
Total migration corrected 1.51 .58 3.40 2.82 1.24 
PPP per capita of EU average 121.8 83.4 255.5 172.1 126.0 
Ten year change in PPP -7.0 -24.3 7.3 31.6 -7.2 
Unemployment pc 7.4 3.60 13.90 10.30 7.0 
Age: Percent 15-29 19.1 17.92 20.90 2.98 18.9 
Death rate  10.1 7.8 12.0 4.2 10.2 
Occupation . . . . . 
agriculture and fishery workers 
pc 
. . . . . 
plant and elementary workers 
pc 
. . . . . 
Educational Degree Plus % 21.1 16.6 29.9 13.3 20.6 
Post primary education % . . . . . 
 
 
Finland (13 regions) Mean Minimum Maximum Range Country 
Population density 31.1 2.1 152.2 150.1 17.0 
Ln Population density  .74 5.03 4.28 2.83 
Population percentage change 
in ten years 
-.2 -7.6 10.4 18.0 2.9 
Total migration corrected 2.23 1.57 3.66 2.09 2.3 
PPP per capita of EU average 103.5 80.1 162.9 82.8 117.2 
Ten year change in PPP 5.6 -3.9 14.2 18.1 5.3 
Unemployment pc 11.29 6.27 17.70 11.43 9.8 
Age: Percent 15-29 18.09 16.10 20.30 4.20 18.6 
Death rate  10.2 7.8 11.9 4.1 9.5 
Occupation 15.7 12.5 24.6 12.1 18.2 
agriculture and fishery workers 
pc 
5.7 1.0 9.4 8.4 4.5 
plant and elementary workers 
pc 
21.2 16.3 24.6 8.3 19.8 
Educational Degree Plus % 31.6 29.0 39.2 10.2 33.7 
Post primary education % 76.93 74.30 79.20 4.90 76.8 
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France (95 regions) Mean Minimum Maximum Range Country 
Population density 528.0 14.0 20246.0 20232.0 96.0 
Ln Population density 4.57 2.64 9.92 7.28 4.56 
Population percentage change 
in ten years 
5.8 -5.6 18.3 23.9 6.3 
Total migration corrected 1.66 .77 3.07 2.30 1.72 
PPP per capita of EU average 102.5 75.4 330.0 254.6 115.3 
Ten year change in PPP -5.4 -18.3 18.3 36.6 -5.3 
Unemployment pc 10.1 5.20 23.10 17.90 10.2 
Age: Percent 15-29 19.1 14.80 24.40 9.60 20.3 
Death rate  10.0 6.1 16.4 10.3 9.0 
Occupation 15.6 10.8 43.5 32.7 18.1 
agriculture and fishery workers 
pc 
6.6 .2 49.5 49.3 4.2 
plant and elementary workers 
pc 
20.0 10.6 28.3 17.7 19.1 
Educational Degree Plus % 21.9 15.8 54.3 38.5 25.3 
Post primary education % 78.35 71.60 86.50 14.90 79.3 
 
 
Greece (39 regions) Mean Minimum Maximum Range Country 
Population density 58.9 20.8 175.0 154.2 83.5 
Ln Population density  3.03 5.16 2.13 4.92 
Population percentage change 
in ten years 
1.8 -5.5 15.2 20.6 3.9 
Total migration corrected 2.84 1.61 8.43 6.82 2.62 
PPP per capita of EU average 69.7 47.9 113.0 65.1 84.1 
Ten year change in PPP -4.1 -18.3 26.2 44.5 10.4 
Unemployment pc 11.31 4.60 24.40 19.80 11.4 
Age: Percent 15-29 21.0 17.80 25.20 7.40 22.0 
Death rate  10.5 7.0 14.5 7.5 9.6 
Occupation 18.0 11.5 24.2 12.7 21.8 
agriculture and fishery workers 
pc 
25.0 7.0 50.0 43.0 13.6 
plant and elementary workers 
pc 
16.1 9.7 23.3 13.6 16.6 
Educational Degree Plus % 16.9 12.0 24.9 13.0 22.7 
Post primary education % 60.5 37.70 71.60 33.90 71.8 
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Ireland (8 regions) Mean Minimum Maximum Range Country 
Population density 187.4 27.5 1209.4 1181.9 55.4 
Ln Population density  3.31 7.10 3.78 4.01 
Population percentage change 
in ten years 
19.3 12.6 37.7 25.1 17.5 
Total migration corrected 3.82 2.75 5.04 2.29 3.76 
PPP per capita of EU average 115.9 81.6 179.3 97.7 131.0 
Ten year change in PPP 36.6 15.0 77.1 62.1 44.7 
Unemployment pc 4.66 3.50 6.20 2.70 4.3 
Age: Percent 15-29 23.53 22.30 27.60 5.30 24.3 
Death rate  8.4 6.2 9.7 3.5 8.2 
Occupation 27.6 23.7 36.2 12.5 29.6 
agriculture and fishery workers 
pc 
6.8 .6 9.1 8.5 5.4 
plant and elementary workers 
pc 
17.1 11.9 19.7 7.8 15.9 
Educational Degree Plus % 31.0 25.5 40.9 15.4 33.4 
Post primary education % 85.9 82.80 87.80 5.00 86.2 
 
 
Italy (98 regions) Mean Minimum Maximum Range Country 
Population density 254.8 36.7 2638.6 2601.9 193.0 
Ln Population density  3.60 7.88 4.28 5.26 
Population percentage change 
in ten years 
4.1 -5.0 16.9 21.9 4.4 
Total migration corrected 1.89 .79 3.86 3.08 1.63 
PPP per capita of EU average 112.7 60.0 186.6 126.6 117.8 
Ten year change in PPP -18.7 -42.1 3.8 45.9 -16.8 
Unemployment pc 9.72 1.70 30.50 28.80 10.6 
Age: Percent 15-29 18.1 13.90 23.30 9.40 18.7 
Death rate  10.4 7.6 15.2 7.6 9.7 
Occupation 19.9 16.4 24.6 8.3 20.7 
agriculture and fishery workers 
pc 
2.9 .4 8.1 7.7 2.3 
plant and elementary workers 
pc 
21.8 15.6 26.9 11.3 21.4 
Educational Degree Plus % 12.4 8.1 20.2 12.2 13.4 
Post primary education % 87.24 80.70 95.00 14.30  
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Netherlands (12 regions) Mean Minimum Maximum Range Country 
Population density 476.3 178.2 1189.1 1010.9 470.2 
Ln Population density 5.96 5.18 7.08 1.90 6.15 
Population percentage change 
in ten years 
6.6 -1.0 31.0 32.0 4.9 
Total migration corrected 3.07 1.96 5.58 3.62 2.82 
PPP per capita of EU average 127.8 97.1 168.3 71.2 134.3 
Ten year change in PPP 4.0 -5.9 15.9 21.8 3.9 
Unemployment pc 3.15 2.40 4.50 2.10 2.9 
Age: Percent 15-29 19.20 17.00 21.70 4.70 18.8 
Death rate  8.8 5.4 9.9 4.5 8.8 
Occupation 27.6 24.0 34.4 10.4 28.8 
agriculture and fishery workers 
pc 
. . . . 1.3 
plant and elementary workers 
pc 
. . . . 13.1 
Educational Degree Plus % 22.2 17.2 31.7 14.5 23.9 
Post primary education % 91.41 90.40 92.20 1.80  
 
 
Spain (48 regions) Mean Minimum Maximum Range Country 
Population density 109.1 8.8 685.1 676.3 81.6 
Ln Population density  2.17 6.53 4.35 4.4 
Population percentage change 
in ten years 
8.6 -5.8 34.2 40.0 11.7 
Total migration corrected 1.11 .47 2.77 2.30 1.16 
PPP per capita of EU average 90.9 61.6 134.4 72.8 97.3 
Ten year change in PPP 10.4 -1.6 26.6 28.2 12.0 
Unemployment pc 13.80 5.30 29.70 24.40 13.9 
Age: Percent 15-29 21.45 17.80 25.20 7.40 22.5 
Death rate  9.6 7.4 13.3 5.9 8.9 
Occupation 19.3 14.9 25.1 10.2 19.5 
agriculture and fishery workers 
pc 
6.4 .6 21.0 20.4 3.7 
plant and elementary workers 
pc 
23.8 17.7 34.2 16.5 23.0 
Educational Degree Plus % 9.5 6.3 18.5 12.2 11.2 
Post primary education % 75.7 63.50 86.90 23.40 77.4 
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Sweden (19 regions) Mean Minimum Maximum Range Country 
Population density 43.0 2.6 278.1 275.5 21.6 
Ln Population density  .96 5.63 4.67 3.07 
Population percentage change 
in ten years 
.0 -6.0 11.5 17.5 3.5 
Total migration corrected 2.52 2.04 3.19 1.15 2.51 
PPP per capita of EU average 114.3 98.9 176.0 77.1 126.7 
Ten year change in PPP -8.4 -20.0 4.8 24.8 3.5 
Unemployment pc 6.22 3.20 11.40 8.20 5.4 
Age: Percent 15-29 17.64 16.40 19.90 3.50 18.2 
Death rate  11.3 8.7 12.7 4.0 10.5 
Occupation 19.1 15.4 29.0 13.6 21.5 
agriculture and fishery workers 
pc 
. . . . . 
plant and elementary workers 
pc 
. . . . . 
Educational Degree Plus % 11.0 8.5 19.5 11.0 13.3 
Post primary education % 84.36 81.60 90.40 8.80  
 
 
England (81 regions) Mean Minimum Maximum Range Country 
Population density 1465.6 61.2 8660.0 8598.8 241.0 
Ln Population density  4.11 9.07 4.96 .48 
Population percentage change 
in ten years 
3.0 -7.2 13.0 20.2 3.2 
Total migration corrected 4.23 1.96 11.22 9.26 4.23 
PPP per capita of EU average 115.6 70.2 601.6 531.4 119.0 
Ten year change in PPP 2.8 -19.7 70.1 89.8 4.9 
Unemployment pc 5.77 2.40 12.20 9.80 5.6 
Age: Percent 15-29 18.69 14.00 28.00 14.00 18.8 
Death rate  10.3 7.1 13.9 6.8 10.2 
Occupation 25.8 15.7 47.5 31.8 26.9 
agriculture and fishery workers 
pc 
1.2 .2 4.4 4.2  
plant and elementary workers 
pc 
20.2 7.5 30.3 22.8  
Educational Degree Plus % 22.5 12.9 58.9 46.0 25.9 
Post primary education % 73.91 63.00 88.00 25.00  
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10 Countries Mean  Minimum Maximum Range  
Population density 160.8  17.0 470.2 453.2  
Ln Population density 4.57  2.83 6.15 3.32  
Population 10 yr % change 6.5  2.9 17.5 14.6  
Total migration corrected 2.39  1.16 4.23 3.07  
PPP per capita of EU average 116.7  84.1 134.3 50.2  
Ten year change in PPP 6.6  -16.8 44.7 61.5  
Unemployment pc 7.90  2.90 13.90 11.00  
Age: Percent 15-29 20.19  18.20 24.30 6.10  
Death rate  9.5  8.2 10.5 2.3  
Occupation ISCO 1 & 2 % 23.0  18.1 29.6 11.5  
agriculture & fishery workers % 5.0  1.3 13.6 12.3  
plant & elementary workers % 18.2  13.1 23.0 9.9  
Educational Degree Plus % 21.1  11.2 33.7 22.6  
Post primary education % 78.12  71.80 86.20 14.40  
 
 
432 Regions Mean  Minimum Maximum Range  
Population density 517.2  2.1 20246.0 20243.9  
Ln Population density 4.83  .74 9.92 9.17  
Population 10 year % change  4.8  -7.6 37.7 45.3  
Total migration corrected 2.37  .47 11.22 10.75  
PPP per capita of EU average 103.5  47.9 601.6 553.7  
Ten year change in PPP -1.2  -42.1 77.1 119.2  
Unemployment % 9.28  1.70 30.50 28.80  
Age: Percent 15-29 % 19.46  13.90 28.00 14.10  
Death rate  10.1  5.4 16.4 11.0  
Occupation ISCO 1& 2 % 20.0  10.8 47.5 36.7  
agriculture & fishery workers% 6.8  .2 50.0 49.8  
plant & elementary workers % 20.6  7.5 34.2 26.7  
Educational Degree Plus % 17.7  6.3 58.9 52.6  
Post primary education % 77.11  37.70 95.00 57.30  
 
 
273 
 
Bibliography 
 
Aars, J. and H.-E. Ringkjøb (2005). "Party Politicisation Reversed? Non-partisan Alternatives in 
Norwegian Local Politics." Scandinavian Political Studies 28(2): 161-181. 
Abrial, S., B. Cautrès and N. Mandran. (2003, March 2003). "Turnout and abstention at multi-
level elections in France."   Retrieved 14 January 2009, from 
http://www.ucd.ie/dempart/brusselsconference/presentations/grenobletext.pdf. 
ACE. (2006). "Considerations for a new voter registration system for Ukraine."   Retrieved 14 
Jul 2011, from http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/europe/IT/italy-voter-registration-case-
study.pdf. 
Achen, C. and W. P. Shively (1995). Cross-level inference. Chicago & London, University of 
Chicago Press. 
Aja, E. (2001). Spain: nation, nationalities, and regions. Subnational democracy in the European 
Union. J. Loughlin. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Alba, C. and C. Navarro (2003). Twenty-five years of democratic local government in Spain. 
Reforming local government in Europe. N. Kersting and A. Vetter. Germany, Leske + Budrich. 
Arrow, K. J. (1951). Social choice and individual values. New York London, Wiley ; Chapman & 
Hall. 
Arter, D. (2008). Scandinavian politics today, Manchester University Press. 
Ashworth, J., B. Heyndels and C. Smolders (2002). "Redistribution as a local public good: an 
empirical test for Flemish municipalities." Kyklos 55(1): 27-56. 
Assmann, A. (2006). Memory, individual and collective. The Oxford handbook of contextual 
political analysis. R. E. Goodin and C. Tilly. Oxford, Oxford University Press: xii, 869. 
Bache, I. and S. George (2006). Politics in the European Union 2nd edition. Oxford, OUP. 
Bäck, H., H. Heinelt and A. Magnier, Eds. (2006). The European Mayor: political leaders in the 
changing context of local democracy. Wiesbaden, VS Verlag. 
Baldersheim, H. and K. Ståhlberg (2002). "From guided democracy to multi-level governance: 
Trends in central-local relations in the Nordic countries." Local Government Studies 28(3): 74-
+. 
Ball, A. and B. Peters (2000). Modern politics and government 6th edition. Basingstoke, 
Palgrave. 
Barrington, T. J. (1991). Local government in Ireland. Local government in Europe: trends and 
developments. R. Batley and G. Stoker. Basingstoke, Macmillan Education. 
274 
 
BBC. (2004). "North East votes 'no' to assembly."   Retrieved 12 May 2010, 2010, from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3984387.stm. 
Bekke, H. (1991). Experiences and experiments in Dutch local government. Local government 
in Europe: trends and developments. R. Batley and G. Stoker. Basingstoke, Macmillan 
Education. 
Bengtsson, A. (2004). "Economic voting: the effect of political context, volatility and turnout on 
voters' assignment of responsibility." European Journal of Political Research 43: 749-767. 
Benoit, K. (2001). "District magnitude, electoral formula, and the number of parties." European 
Journal of Political Research 39: 203-224. 
Bernstein, R., A. Chadha and R. Montjoy (2001). "Overreporting Voting: Why It Happens and 
Why It Matters." Public Opinion Quarterly 65(1): 22-44. 
Blair, P. (1991). Trends in local government and democracy: reflections from a European 
perspective. Local government in Europe: trends and developments. R. Batley and G. Stoker. 
Basingstoke, Macmillan Education. 
Blais, A. (2000). To vote or not to vote? : the merits and limits of rational choice theory. 
Pittsburgh, Pa., University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Blais, A. (2007). Turnout in elections. The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior. R. Dalton and 
H.-D. Klingemann. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Blais, A., Ed. (2008). To keep or to change first past the post? : the politics of electoral reform. 
Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press. 
Blais, A. and R. K. Carty (1990). "Does proportional representation foster voter turnout?" 
European Journal of Political Research 18(2): 167-181. 
Blais, A. and A. Dobrzynska (1998). "Turnout in electoral democracies." European Journal of 
Political Research 33(2): 239-261. 
Blais, A. and I. Lago (2009). "A general measure of district competitiveness." Electoral Studies 
28: 94-100. 
Blondel, J., R. Sinnott and P. Svensson (1997). "Special issue: Political representation in the 
European Parliament - Representation and voter participation." European Journal of Political 
Research 32(2): 243-272. 
Bobbio, L. (2005). Italy: after the storm. Comparing local governance: trends and 
transformations. B. Denters and L. Rose. Basingstoke, Palgrave. 
Borges, J. L. (2000). The lottery in Babylon. Labyrinths: selected stories and other writings. D. 
Yates and J. Irby. London, Penguin Classics. 
Borraz, O. and P. Le Galès (2005). France: the intermunicipal revolution. Comparing local 
governance: trends and transformations. B. Denters and L. Rose. Basingstoke, Palgrave. 
275 
 
Bowler, S. (2006). Electoral systems. The Oxford handbook of political institutions. R. A. W. 
Rhodes, S. A. Binder and B. A. Rockman. Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press: xvii, 816. 
Braconnier, C. and J.-Y. Dormagen (2007). La démocratie de l'abstention. France, Editions 
Gallimard. 
Brady, H. E., S. Verba and K. L. Schlozman (1995). "Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political 
Participation." The American Political Science Review 89(2): 271-294. 
Brockington, D. (2004). "The paradox of proportional representation: The effect of party 
systems and coalitions on individuals' electoral participation." Political Studies 52(3): 469-490. 
Brockington, D. (2009). "It's About The Benefits: Choice Environments, Ideological Proximity 
and Individual Participation in 28 Democracies." Party Politics 15(4): 435-454. 
Budge, I. and K. Newton (1997). The politics of the new Europe: Atlantic to Urals. London, 
Longman. 
Burden, B. (2000). "Voter turnout and the national election studies." Political Analysis 8(4): 
389-398. 
Burns, N., K. L. Schlozman and S. Verba (2001). The private roots of public action : gender, 
equality, and political participation. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. 
Caramani, D. (2005). "The Formation of National Party Systems in Europe: A Comparative-
Historical Analysis." Scandinavian Political Studies 28(4): 295-322. 
CDLR and D. Nohlen (1998). Electoral systems and voting procedures at the local level. 
Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing. 
Champion, T. (2005). Population movement within the UK. Focus on people and migration. 
ONS. Basingstoke, Office for National Statistics/Macmillan. 
Chisolm, M. (2000). Structural reform of British local government: rhetoric and reality. 
Manchester, Manchester University Press. 
CoE (1997). Structure and operation of local and regional democracy: Spain. Strasbourg, 
Council of Europe Publishing. 
CoE (1998a). Structure and operation of local and regional democracy: Belgium. Strasbourg, 
Council of Europe Publishing. 
CoE (1998b). Structure and operation of local and regional democracy: France. Strasbourg, 
Council of Europe Publishing. 
CoE (1998c). Structure and operation of local and regional democracy: Ireland. Strasbourg, 
Council of Europe Publishing. 
CoE (2000a). Structure and operation of local and regional democracy: Italy. Strasbourg, 
Council of Europe Publishing. 
276 
 
CoE (2000b). Structure and operation of local and regional democracy: United Kingdom. 
Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing. 
CoE (2001). Structure and operation of local and regional democracy: Greece. Strasbourg, 
Council of Europe Publishing. 
CoE (2007). Structure and operation of local and regional democracy: Sweden. Strasbourg, 
Council of Europe Publishing. 
CoE (2008). Structure and operation of local and regional democracy: Netherlands. Strasbourg, 
Council of Europe Publishing. 
CoE (2009). Structure and operation of local and regional democracy: Finland. Strasbourg, 
Council of Europe Publishing. 
Collard, S. (2008). The French municipal elections: cradle of European citizenship? Annual 
Conference of the Political Studies Association. University of Swansea. 
Colomer, J. (1991). "Benefits and costs of voting." Electoral Studies 10(4): 313-325. 
Colomer, J. M. (2005). "It's Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger's Laws Upside 
Down)." Political Studies 53(1): 1-21. 
Committee of the Regions (2008). Regional offices contact directory. Belgium, EU Publications 
Office. 
Cox, G. W. and M. C. Munger (1989). "Closeness, Expenditures, and Turnout in the 1982 U.S. 
House Elections." The American Political Science Review 83(1): 217-231. 
Crewe, I. (1981). Electoral Participation. Democracy at the polls: a comparative study of 
competitive national elections. D. Butler, H. Penniman and A. Ranney. Washington and 
London, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Curtice, J. (2007). Comparative opinion surveys. The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior. R. 
Dalton and H.-D. Klingemann. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Curtice, J. and b. Seyd (2004). Is there a crisis of political participation. British social attitudes 
2003-2004. A. Park, J. Curtice, K. Thomson, L. Jarvis and C. Bromley, Sage. 
Dahlström, C. and P. Esaiasson. (2009). "The Immigration Issue and Anti-Immigrant Party 
Success: Is Sweden the Odd Case Out?"   Retrieved 6 Apr 2011, from 
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/working_papers/2009_30_dahlstrom_esaiasson.pdf. 
Dalton, R. and H.-D. Klingemann (2007). Citizens and political behavior. The Oxford Handbook 
of Political Behavior. R. Dalton and H.-D. Klingemann. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Davies, N. (1997). Europe: a history. London, Pimlico. 
de Michelis, A. and A. Chantraine (2003). Memoirs of Eurostat: fifty years serving Europe. 
Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
277 
 
Dearlove, J. (1973). The politics of policy in local government: the making and maintenance of 
public policy in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
DEMPART. (nd). "Democratic Participation and Political Communication in Systems of Multi-
level Governance."   Retrieved 21 May 2011, from http://www.ucd.ie/dempart/. 
Dente, B. (1991). Italian local services: the difficult road to privatisation. Local government in 
Europe: trends and developments. R. Batley and G. Stoker. Basingstoke, Macmillan Education. 
Denters, B. and O.-J. Klok (2005). The Netherlands: in search of responsiveness. Comparing 
local governance: trends and transformations. B. Denters and L. Rose. Basingstoke, Palgrave. 
Denters, B. and L. Rose, Eds. (2005a). Comparing local governance: trends and 
transformations. Basingstoke, Palgrave. 
Denters, B. and L. Rose (2005b). Towards local governance? Comparing local governance: 
trends and transformations. B. Denters and L. Rose. Basingstoke, Palgrave. 
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York,, Harper. 
Electoral Commission (2005). Understanding electoral registration: The extent and nature of 
non-registration in Britain. 
Electoral Commission. (2006). "Compulsory voting around the world."   Retrieved 10 Jul 2011, 
from 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0020/
16157/ECCompVotingfinal_22225-16484__E__N__S__W__.pdf. 
Electoral Commission. (2007). "Electoral registration in Great Britain."   Retrieved 14 Jul 2011, 
from 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0015/
13263/Electoral-Registration-GB-2007-06_26425-6132__E__N__S__W__.pdfElectoral. 
ESPON (2006). The Modifiable Areas Unit Problem. Luxembourg, ESPON Monitoring 
Committee. 
European Commission. (2004, 2004). "Eurobarometer 60 - Public opinion in the European 
Union."   Retrieved 28 Oct 2009, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb60/eb60_rapport_standard_en.pdf. 
European Commission. (2010). "Electoral rights for EU citizens living in another Member 
State."   Retrieved 6 Apr 2011, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/citizenship/political/policies_citizenship_vote_en.htm. 
European Parliament. (2002, 12 sep 2002). "The European Parliament: fact sheets 1999-2002."   
Retrieved 24 Oct 2009, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/default_en.htm. 
European Parliament. (2004, 22 Sep 2004). "The European Parliament: electoral procedures."   
Retrieved 24 Oct 2009, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/facts_2004/1_3_4_en.htm. 
278 
 
EUROSTAT (2009a). Regions of the European Union - A statistical portrait. Luxembourg, 
European Commission. 
EUROSTAT. (2009b). "Statistics by theme." from 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes. 
Evans, G. (1999). The end of class politics? : class voting in comparative context. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
Evans, J. (2004). Voters and voting: an introduction. London, Sage. 
Farrell, D. and Scully, R. (2005). "Electing the European Parliament; How uniform are 'Uniform 
Electoral Systems?" Journal of Common Market Studies 43 :  969-984 
Folketinget. (2008). "How many people are employed in the EU institutions?"   Retrieved 14 
Apr 2011, from http://www.eu-oplysningen.dk/euo_en/spsv/all/48/. 
Franklin, M. (1996). Electoral participation. Comparing democracies : elections and voting in 
global perspectives. L. LeDuc, R. G. Niemi and P. Norris. Thousand Oaks, Calif., Sage 
Publications: xii, 428 p. 
Franklin, M. (2004). Voter turnout and the dynamics of electoral competition in established 
democracies since 1945. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Freedom House. (2009, 2009). "Freedom in the world: Country ratings."   Retrieved 16 Sept 
2010, from http://www.freedomhouse.org/. 
Freeman, G. (2006). Politics and mass migrations. The Oxford handbook of contextual political 
analysis. R. E. Goodin and C. Tilly. Oxford, Oxford University Press: xii, 869. 
Gallagher, M. (2009, 19 Jun 2009). "Election indices."   Retrieved 20 Oct 2009, from 
http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.
pdf. 
Gallagher, M., M. Laver and P. Mair (2006). Representative government in modern Europe 4th 
edition. NY, McGraw-Hill. 
Garside, P. and M. Hebbert, Eds. (1989). British regionalism 1900-2000. London, Mansell. 
Geys, B. (2006a). "Explaining voter turnout: a review of aggegate-level research." Electoral 
Studies 25: 637-663. 
Geys, B. (2006b). "'Rational' theories of voter turnout: a review." Political Studies Review 4: 16-
35. 
Goerres, A. (2007). "Why are older people more likely to vote? The impact of ageing on 
electoral turnout in Europe." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 9: 90-121. 
Gosnell, H., F. (1930). Why Europe Votes Chicago, Chicago University Press. 
279 
 
Gray, M. and M. Caul (2000). "Declining voter turnout in advanced industrial democracies, 
1950 to 1997 - The effects of declining group mobilization." Comparative Political Studies 
33(9): 1091-1122. 
Green, D. P. and I. Shapiro (1994). Pathologies of rational choice theory : a critique of 
applications in political science. New Haven, Yale University Press. 
Gustafsson, A. (1991). The changing local government and politics of Sweden. Local 
government in Europe: trends and developments. R. Batley and G. Stoker. Basingstoke, 
Macmillan Education. 
Hague, R. and M. Harrop (2004). Comparative government and politics : an introduction. 
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Halvarsson, B. (nd). "Report on local democracy in Belgium". Brussels, Council of Europe 
Hasen, R. (1996). "Voting without law?" University of Pennsylvania Law Review 144(May): 
2135-79. 
Heath, A., I. McLean, B. Taylor and J. Curtice (1999). "Between first and second order: a 
comparison of voting behaviour in European and local elections in Britain." European Journal 
of Political Research(35): 389-414. 
Heinelt, H. and N. Hlepas (2006). Typologies of local government systems. The European 
mayor. H. Bäck, H. Heinelt and A. Magnier. Wiesbaden, VS Verlag. 
Hendriks, F. (2001a). Belgium: federalism and subnational democracy in a divided country. 
Subnational democracy in the European Union. J. Loughlin. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Hendriks, F. (2001b). The Netherlands: reinventing tradition in local and regional democracy. 
Subnational democracy in the European Union. J. Loughlin. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
HESA. (2011). "Statistics - students and qualifiers at UK HE institutions."   Retrieved 13 Jul 2011, 
from 
http://www.hesa.ac.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1897&Itemid=239. 
Hesse, J. and L. Sharpe (1991). Local government in international perspective - some 
comparative observations. Local government and urban affairs in international perspective: 
analyses of 20 Western industrialized countries. J. Hesse. Baden-Baden, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft. 
Heywood, A. (2002). politics (2nd edition). Basingstoke, UK, Palgrave. 
Heywood, P., E. Jones and M. Rhodes, Eds. (2002). Developments in West European politics 2. 
Basingstoke, Palgrave. 
Hoffmann-Martinot, V., C. Rallings and M. Thrasher (1996). "Comparing local electoral turnout 
in Great Britain and France: More similarities than differences?" European Journal of Political 
Research 30: 241-257. 
Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (1996). "Europe with the regions". Publius 26 : 73-91 
280 
 
Howell, D. R. and K. Jusko (2009). Methodological challenges: research opportunities and 
questions for the future. The comparative study of electoral systems. H.-D. Klingemann. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Hox, J. (2010). Multilevel analysis: techniques and applications. New York and Hove, Routledge. 
Hwang, S., R. Wilkins, M. Tjepkema, P. O'Campo and J. Dunn (2009). "Mortality among 
residents of shelters, rooming houses, and hotels in Canada: 11 year follow-up study." British 
Medical Journal 339(b4036). 
IDEA. (2004). "Voter turnout in Western Europe since 1945: a regional report. Compulsory 
voting in Western Europe."   Retrieved 2 Jun 2010, from 
http://www.idea.int/publications/voter_turnout_weurope/. 
IDEA. (2009, 3 Nov 2009). "Compulsory Voting."   Retrieved 2 Jun 2010, from 
http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm. 
ILO. (2009). "Laboursta Internet." 2009, from http://laborsta.ilo.org/. 
ILO. (nd, 24 Sept 2004). "ISCO-08 Structure and preliminary correspondence with ISCO-88."   
Retrieved 14 Jun 2011, from 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco08/index.htm. 
Inter-Parliamentary Union. (2009a). "Parliaments at a glance: electoral systems."   Retrieved 4 
Nov 2009, from 
http://www.ipu.org/parline/ElectoralSystem.asp?REGION=All&typesearch=1&LANG=ENG. 
Inter-Parliamentary Union. (2009b). "Parline database on national parliaments."   Retrieved 4 
Nov 2009, from 
http://www.ipu.org/parline/ElectoralSystem.asp?REGION=All&typesearch=1&LANG=ENG. 
Jackman, R. (1987). "Political institutions and voter turnout in the industrial democracies." 
American Political Science Review 81(2): 405-423. 
Jackman, R. and R. Miller (1995). "Voter turnout in the industrial democracies during the 
1980s." Comparative Political Studies 27(4): 467-492. 
Jackson, R. (1993). "Voter mobilization in the 1986 midterm election." The Journal of Politics 
55(4): 1081-1099. 
Jessop, B. (2006). The state and state-building. The Oxford handbook of political institutions. R. 
A. W. Rhodes, S. A. Binder and B. A. Rockman. Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press: xvii, 
816. 
John, P. (2001). Local governance in Western Europe. London, Sage. 
Johns, J. and D. Brockington (2011). Salience and turnout in second order elections: the role of 
EU regional funding. Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago, Illinois. 
Johns, R. (2010). "Measuring issue salience in British elections." Political Research Quarterly 
63(1): 143-158. 
281 
 
Johnston, R. and C. Pattie (2006). Putting voters in their place: geography and elections in 
Great Britain. Oxford, OUP. 
Karp, J. A. and D. Brockington (2005). "Social desirability and response validity: A comparative 
analysis of overreporting voter turnout in five countries." Journal of Politics 67(3): 825-840. 
Kavanagh, A., G. Mills and R. Sinnott (2004). "The geography of Irish voter turnout: a case 
study of the 2002 general election." Irish Geography 37(2): 177-186. 
Keating, M. (1998). The new regionalism in Western Europe: territorial restructuring and 
political change. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 
Kennedy, B. P., I. Kawachi and D. Prothrow-Stith (1996). "Income distribution and mortality: 
cross sectional ecological study of the Robin Hood index in the United States." BMJ 312(7037): 
1004-1007. 
Kestelman, P. (1999). "Quantifying representativity." Voting Matters  Retrieved 29 Oct 2009, 
from http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/VM/ISSUE10/P6.HTM. 
Kettl, D. (2006). Public bureaucracies. The Oxford handbook of political institutions. R. A. W. 
Rhodes, S. A. Binder and B. A. Rockman. Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press. 
Knutsen, O. (2007). The decline of social class? The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior. R. 
Dalton and H.-D. Klingemann. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Kostadinova, T. (2003). "Voter turnout dynamics in post-communist Europe." European Journal 
of Political Research 42: 741-759. 
Larsson, T., K. Nomden and F. Petiteville, Eds. (1999). Le niveau intermédiaire d'administration 
dans les pays européens: La démocratie au défi de la complexité? Maastricht, Institut Europen 
d'administration publique. 
Le Galès, P. (2008). Territorial politics in France. Developments in French politics 4. A. Cole, P. 
Le Galès and J. D. Levy. Basingstoke & New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 
LeDuc, L., R. G. Niemi and P. Norris (2002). Comparing democracies 2 : new challenges in the 
study of elections and voting. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif., Sage Publications. 
Lidström, A. (2001a). Finland: geo-political changes and Europeanization. Subnational 
democracy in the European Union. J. Loughlin. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Lidström, A. (2001b). Sweden: the end of the 'Swedish Model'? Subnational democracy in the 
European Union. J. Loughlin. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Lijphart, A. (1994). Electoral systems and party systems: a study of twenty-seven democracies, 
1945-1990. Oxford, OUP. 
Lijphart, A. (1997). "Unequal participation: Democracy's unresolved dilemma - Presidential 
Address, American Political Science Association, 1996." American Political Science Review 
91(1): 1-14. 
282 
 
LOREG-CoE. (Various). "National Reports: Structure and operation of local and regional 
democracy."   Retrieved 10 Nov 2009, from http://www.loreg.coe.int/Browse.aspx. 
Lorrain, D. (1991). Public goods and private operators in France. Local government in Europe: 
trends and developments. R. Batley and G. Stoker. Basingstoke, Macmillan Education. 
Loughlin, J. (2001a). Greece: between 'Henosis' and decentralization. Subnational democracy 
in the European Union. J. Loughlin. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Loughlin, J. (2001b). Italy: the crisis of the Second Republic. Subnational democracy in the 
European Union. J. Loughlin. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Loughlin, J. (2001c). Subnational democracy in the European Union. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
Loughlin, J. and D.-L. Seiler (2001). France: between centralization and fragmentation. 
Subnational democracy in the European Union. J. Loughlin. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Louth, J. and L. Hill (2005). "Compulsory voting in Australia: Turnout with and without it." 
Australian Review of Public Affairs 6(1): 25-37. 
Lyons, P. and R. Sinnott. (2003a). "The study of voter turnout: state of the art."   Retrieved 22 
May 2011, from http://www.ucd.ie/dempart/workingpapers/stateoftheart.pdf. 
Lyons, P. and R. Sinnott. (2003b). "Voter turnout in the Republic of Ireland."   Retrieved 21 May 
2011, from http://www.ucd.ie/dempart/workingpapers/ireland.pdf. 
Mair, P. (2007). Left-Right Orientations. The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior. R. Dalton 
and H.-D. Klingemann. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Mair, P. and I. v. Biezen (2001). "Party membership in twenty European democracies, 1980-
2000." PARTY POLITICS 7(1): 5-21. 
Malkopoulou, A. (July 2009). "Compulsory voting in Greece: a history of concepts in motion."   
Retrieved 2 Jun 2010, from 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/helsinki/ws7/malkopoulou.p
df. 
Marsh, M. (1998). "Testing the second-order election model after four European elections." 
British Journal of Political Science 28: 591-607. 
Massicotte, L. and A. Blais (1999). "Mixed electoral systems: a conceptual and empirical 
survey." Electoral Studies 18(3): 341-366. 
Massicotte, L., A. Blais and A. Yoshinaka (2004). Establishing the rules of the game : election 
laws in democracies. Toronto ; Buffalo, University of Toronto Press. 
Mateo, J. F. (1991). Improving access to administration in Spain. Local government in Europe: 
trends and developments. R. Batley and G. Stoker. Basingstoke, Macmillan Education. 
Matsusaka, J. and F. Palda (1999). "Voter turnout: how much can we explain?" Public Choice 
98: 431-446. 
283 
 
Mattila, M. (2003). "Why bother? Determinants of turnout in the European elections." 
Electoral Studies 22(3): 449-468. 
Mény, Y. (2008). Le système politique français 6th edition. Paris, Broché. 
Miller, W. (1988). Irrelevant elections?:the quality of local democracy in britain. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press. 
Milligan, K., E. Moretti and P. Oreopoulos (2004). "Does education improve citizenship? 
Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom." Journal of Public Economics: 1667-
1695. 
Ministère de l'Intérieur. (2006, 14 Apr 2006 ). "Ministère de l'Intérieur: Résultats électoraux en 
France."   Retrieved 12 Dec 2006, from 
http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a_votre_service/elections/resultats/. 
Ministère de l'Intérieur. (nd). "Découvrir l’Outre-Mer."   Retrieved 6 Jan 2011, from 
http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a_votre_service/elections/resultats/. 
Ministry of Justice. (2008). "The governance of Britain - election day - weekend voting."   
Retrieved 26 July 2010. 
Morlan, R. L. (1984). "Municipal vs. National Election Voter Turnout: Europe and the United 
States." Political Science Quarterly 99(3): 457-470. 
Mouritzen, P. and J. Svara (2002). Leadership at the apex: politicians and administratorsin 
Western local governments. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Muñoz de Bustillo, R. and J.-I. Antón. (2009, 1 Mar 2009). "Health Care Utilization and 
Immigration in Spain."   Retrieved 7 Apr 2011, from http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/12382/1/MPRA_paper_12382.pdf. 
Nevitte, N., A. Blais, E. Gidengil and R. Nadeau (2009). Socioeconomic status and nonvoting: a 
cross-national comparative analysis. The comparative study of electoral systems. H.-D. 
Klingemann. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Norris, P. (2004). Electoral engineering: voting rules and political behaviour. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Norton, A. (1991). Western European local government in comparative perspective. Local 
government in Europe: trends and developments. R. Batley and G. Stoker. Basingstoke, 
Macmillan Education. 
Nugent, N. (1999). The government and politics of the European Union. Basingstoke, 
Macmillan. 
OECD. (1997). "Managing across levels of government." 24 Oct 2009, from 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/14/1902308.pdf. 
OECD (2007). ""Towards Better Measurement of Government", OECD Working Papers on 
Public Governance, 2007/1, OECD Publishing. doi:10.1787/301575636734." 
284 
 
Oppenhuis, E. (1995). Voting behavior in Europe. Amsterdam, Het Spinhuis. 
Page, E. C. and M. Goldsmith, Eds. (1987). Central and local government relations - a 
comparative study of West European states. London, Sage. 
Pak Ké Shon, J.-L. (2004). "Determinants of electoral non-registration and sensitive 
neighbourhoods in France." Population 59(1): 143-156. 
Perea, E. A. (2002). "Individual charactersitics, institutional incentives and electoral abstention 
in Western Europe." European Journal of Political Research 41: 643-673. 
Perez-Linan, A. (2001). "Neoinstitutional accounts of voter turnout: moving beyond industrial 
democracies." Electoral Studies 20: 281-297. 
Plees, Y. (2005). Belgium: the changing world of Belgian municipalities. Comparing local 
governance: trends and transformations. B. Denters and L. Rose. Basingstoke, Palgrave. 
Plutzer, E. (2002). "Becoming a habitual voter: inertia, resources, and growth in young 
adulthood." The American Political Science Review 96(1): 41-56. 
Powell, G. B. (1977). Voting turnout in thirty-one democracies: effects of the socio-economic, 
legal and partisan environments, University of Rochester. 
Powell, G. B. (1980). Voting turnout in thirty democracies: partisan, legal, and socio-economic 
differences. Electoral participation: A comparative analysis. R. Rose. Beverly Hills, London, 
Sage. 
Powell, G. B. (1986). "American voter turnout in comparative perspective." American Political 
Science Review 80(1): 17-43. 
Powell, G. B. (2000). Elections as instruments of democracy: majoritarian and proportional 
models. New Haven & London, Yale University Press. 
Préfet de La Réunion. (2009, 12 Jan 2010). "Structure territoriale."   Retrieved 6 Jan 2011, from 
http://www.reunion.pref.gouv.fr/pse/d/index.php?m=presentationreunion.htm-
structureterritoriale.htm. 
Prodi, R. (2002, 15 July 2002). "The role of the regions in building the Europe of tomorrow - 
Governance and the Convention."   Retrieved 17 Feb 2009, from http://europa.eu/ 
 
Radcliff, B. (1992). "The Welfare State, Turnout, and the Economy: A Comparative Analysis." 
The American Political Science Review 86(2): 444-454. 
Rae, D. (1967). The political consequences of electoral laws. New haven, Yale University Press. 
Rallings, C. and M. Thrasher (1997). Local elections in Britain. London, Routledge. 
Rallings, C. and M. Thrasher. (2003). "Turnout and abstention at multi-level elections in Great 
Britain."   Retrieved 21 May 2011, from 
http://www.ucd.ie/dempart/workingpapers/britain.pdf. 
285 
 
Rallings, C. and M. Thrasher (2005). "Not all 'second-order' contests are the same: electoral 
turnout and party choice at the concurrent 2004 local and European Parliament elections in 
England." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 7: 584-597. 
Rallings, C. and M. Thrasher (2007). "The turnout 'gap' and the costs of voting - a comparison 
of participation at the 2001 general and 2002 local elections in England." Public Choice 131(3-
4): 333-344. 
Rattinger, H. and S. Wagner. (2003). "Germany: supplementing sense of duty by cognitive 
mobilisation."   Retrieved 21 May 2011, from 
http://www.ucd.ie/dempart/workingpapers/germany.pdf. 
Reif, K. (1984). "National election cycles and European elections 1979 and 1984." Electoral 
Studies 3(3): 244-255. 
Reif, K., Ed. (1985). Ten European elections. Aldershot, Gower. 
Reif, K. and H. Schmitt (1980). "Nine 2nd-Order National Elections - a Conceptual-Framework 
for the Analysis of European Election Results." European Journal of Political Research 8(1): 3-
44. 
Riker, W. and P. Ordeshook (1968). "A theory of the calculus of voting." American Political 
Science Review 62(1): 25-42. 
Robinson, W. (1950, 2009). "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals." 
International Journal of Epidemiology 38(2): 337-341. 
Rose, L. and K. Ståhlberg (2005). The Nordic countries: still the promised land? Comparing local 
governance: trends and transformations. B. Denters and L. Rose. Basingstoke, Palgrave. 
Rose, R. (1974). Electoral behavior: a comparative handbook. New York, Free Press. 
Rose, R. (2007). Perspectives on political behavior in time and space. The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Behavior. R. Dalton and H.-D. Klingemann. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Rosenstone, S. J. (1982). "Economic Adversity and Voter Turnout." American Journal of Political 
Science 26(1): 25-46. 
Rueschemeyer, D. (2006). Why and how ideas matter. The Oxford handbook of contextual 
political analysis. R. E. Goodin and C. Tilly. Oxford, Oxford University Press: xii, 869. 
Saint-Germain, M. (2002, 7 Aug 2002). "PPA696 Research Methods - Simple Regression."   
Retrieved 11 Feb 2008, from http://www.csulb.edu/~msaintg/. 
Sartori, G. (1991). "Comparing and miscomparing". Journal of Theoretical Politics. 3 : 243-257 
Saward, M. (2006). Democracy and citizenship: expanding domains. The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Theory. J. Dryzek, B. Honig and A. Phillips. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Scarrow, S. (2007). Political activism and party members. The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Behavior. R. Dalton and H.-D. Klingemann. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
286 
 
Schmitt, H. and M. Loveless. (2004). "European Election Study 2004: Design, data description 
and documentation."   Retrieved 6 Apr 2011, from 
http://campus.murraystate.edu/academic/faculty/mark.wattier/EES2004Codebook.pdf. 
Schnabel, C. and J. Wagner. (2005, Jan 2005). "Determinants of Union Membership in 18 EU 
Countries: Evidence from Micro Data, 2002/03."   Retrieved 1 Nov 2009, from 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp1464.html 
 
Schroeder, L. D., D. L. Sjoquist and P. E. Stephan (1986). Understanding regression analysis : an 
introductory guide. Newbury Park, CA ; London, Sage. 
Sharp, H. (1955). "Migration and voting behavior in a metropolitan community." Public Opinion 
Quarterly 19(2): 206-209. 
Siaroff, A. and J. W. A. Merer (2002). "Parliamentary election turnout in Europe since 1990." 
Political Studies 50(5): 916-927. 
Statistika Centralbyrån. (2010, 2008). "Regionala indelningar."   Retrieved 12 Mar 2010, from 
http://www.scb.se/. 
StatSoft. (2011). "Electronic Statistics Textbook."   Retrieved 11 Apr 2011, from 
http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/multiple-regression/. 
Staveley, E. (1972). Greek and Roman voting and elections. London, Thames and Hudson. 
Subramanian, S. V., K. Jones, A. Kaddour and N. Krieger (2009). "Revisiting Robinson: The perils 
of individualistic and ecologic fallacy." International Journal of Epidemiology 38(2): 342-360. 
Svensson, P. and S. R. Thomsen. (2003). "Denmark: Uniting local and European perspectives."   
Retrieved 21 May 2011, from http://www.ucd.ie/dempart/workingpapers/denmark.pdf. 
Taagepera, R. (2009). Electoral systems. The Oxford handbook of comparative politics. C. Boix 
and S. Stokes. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
The Electoral Commission. (2006). "Compulsory voting around the world."   Retrieved 27 July 
2010, from 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0020/
16157/ECCompVotingfinal_22225-16484__E__N__S__W__.pdf. 
The Poverty Site. (nd). "Income inequalities."   Retrieved 15 July 2011, from 
http://www.poverty.org.uk/index.htm. 
Thoenig, J.-C. (2006). Territorial institutions. The Oxford handbook of political institutions. R. A. 
W. Rhodes, S. A. Binder and B. A. Rockman. Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press: xvii, 
816. 
Tilly, C. (2006). Why and how history matters. The Oxford handbook of contextual political 
analysis. R. E. Goodin and C. Tilly. Oxford, Oxford University Press: xii, 869. 
Tilly, C. and R. E. Goodin (2006). It depends. The Oxford handbook of contextual political 
analysis. R. E. Goodin and C. Tilly. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
287 
 
Topf, R. (1995). Electoral participation. Citizens and the state. H.-D. Klingemann and D. Fuchs. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
UNDP. (2011, various). "Human Development Reports."   Retrieved 6 Jan 2011, from 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/. 
UNESCO. (1997, Nov 1997). "International Standard Classification of Education."   Retrieved 28 
Oct 2009, from 
http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/doc/isced_1997.htm. 
van der Eijk, C., M. Franklin and M. Marsh (1996). "What voters teach us about Europe-wide 
elections: what Europe-wide elections teach us about voters." Electoral Studies 15(2): 149-166. 
van der Kolk, H. (2007). "Local election systems in Western Europe." Local Government Studies 
33(2): 159-180. 
Van Der Valk, I. (2003). "Right-Wing Parliamentary Discourse on Immigration in France." 
Discourse & Society 14(3): 309-348. 
Verba, S. and N. Nie (1972). Participation in America: political democracy and social equality. 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
Waring, M. (1999). Counting for nothing: what men value and what women are worth 2nd 
edition. Toronto, University of Toronto Press. 
Wells, A. (2006, 24 May 2006). "UK Polling Report."   Retrieved 7 Apr 2011, from 
http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/blog/archives/225. 
Wilson, D. (2005). The United Kingdom: an increasingly differentiated polity? Comparing local 
governance: trends and transformations. B. Denters and L. Rose. Basingstoke, Palgrave. 
Wolfinger, R. E. and S. J. Rosenstone (1980). Who votes? New Haven, Yale University Press. 
 
 
